Western University

Scholarship@Western
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
7-20-2017 12:00 AM

Evidence in Neuroimaging: Towards a Philosophy of Data
Analysis
Jessey Wright, The University of Western Ontario
Supervisor: Dr. Jacqueline Sullivan, The University of Western Ontario
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree
in Philosophy
© Jessey Wright 2017

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd
Part of the Philosophy of Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Wright, Jessey, "Evidence in Neuroimaging: Towards a Philosophy of Data Analysis" (2017). Electronic
Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 4659.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/4659

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

Abstract
Neuroimaging technology is the most widely used tool to study human cognition. While
originally a promising tool for mapping the content of cognitive theories onto the structures
of the brain, recently developed tools for the analysis, handling and sharing of data have
changed the theoretical landscape of cognitive neuroscience. Even with these advancements
philosophical analyses of evidence in neuroimaging remain skeptical of the promise of
neuroimaging technology. These views often treat the analysis techniques used to make sense
of data produced in a neuroimaging experiment as one, attributing the inferential limitations
of analysis pipelines to the technology as a whole. Situated against the neuroscientists’ own
critical assessment of their methods and the limitations of those methods, this skepticism
appears based on a misunderstanding of the role data analysis techniques play in
neuroimaging research. My project picks up here, examining how data analysis techniques,
such as pattern classification analysis, are used to assess the evidential value of neuroimaging
data. The project takes the form of three papers. In the first I identify the use of multiple data
analysis techniques as an important aspect of the data interpretation process that
is overlooked by critics. In the second I develop an account of inferences in neuroimaging
research that is sensitive to this use of data analysis techniques, arguing that interpreting
neuroimaging data is a process of isolating and explaining a variety of data patterns. In the
third I argue that the development and uptake of new techniques for analyzing data must be
accompanied by changes in research practices and standards of evidence if they are to
promote knowledge generation. My approach to this work is both traditionally philosophical,
insofar as it involves reading and analyzing the work of philosophers and neuroscientists, and
embedded insofar as most of the research was conducted while attending lab meetings and
participating in the work of those scientists whose work is the object of my research.
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Analysis, Explanation.
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Chapter 1

1

Evidence in Neuroimaging

Neuroimaging technology is the most widely used technology in cognitive neuroscience
to study the human brain. Neuroimaging experiments involve measurements of blood
oxygenation levels and participant behaviour, which are used as evidence for claims
about the relationship between cognitive processes and neural activity. Techniques of
data manipulation and analysis are what, in practice, bridge the gap between the objects
of measurement and the phenomena that neuroscientists are interested in learning about.
To motivate the three papers that follow and situate them as addressing a common
challenge, in this introductory chapter I examine and contrast the philosophical and
neuroscientific views on the promise and perils of data analysis techniques as used to
interpret neuroimaging data.

1.1

Introduction

Neuroimaging data are large, complex and laden with uncertainties. A single scanning
session, which a neuroimaging experiment includes at least twelve of, can produce over
20,000 data points, making neuroimaging data ‘big’ by most measures. The data are
complex as they include measurements of blood oxygenation, behaviour and brain
structure. Uncertainties arise from the fact that the details about the relationship between
the data points and phenomena of interest are not fully known. The strategy
neuroscientists use to bring this data to bear as evidence on claims about the phenomena
they are interested in involves the application of methods of data analysis and
manipulation. The broad aim of this project is to develop an account of how methods of
data analysis and manipulation are used to overcome challenges with interpreting
neuroimaging data. This is done in the context of ongoing debate between skeptics of the
technology and critical advocates as contrasted with the methodological debates that
occur within the neuroscientific literature.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is the most widely used methodology
that modern neuroscience has at its disposal to investigate the healthy human brain in
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action; fMRI data are used to support claims about the involvement of particular brain
regions in performing specific cognitive functions, and in representing different types of
information. The technology provides insight into variations in neural activity via
measurements of blood oxygenation levels in the brain — called the blood oxygenation
level dependant, or BOLD, signal. In human neuroimaging research, BOLD
measurements are collected while participants perform tasks in the scanner. Participant
behaviour and facts about the task parameters are used to relate variations in BOLD
activity to cognitive processes, capacities and states.
In the introduction to a volume of reflections on the then 20 year history of fMRI, Peter
Bandettini explains that “[e]ven though the underlying relationships between changes in
brain activation and changes in BOLD contrast-weighted MRI signal are still debated, it's
clear that the method has proved itself more robust, reliable, and information-rich than
most originally anticipated” (2012, p. 576). The surprise is in part due to, as Bandettini
notes, uncertainty about the relationship between the measured data points and
phenomena the data are used to make claims about. Functional scanning protocols
measure changes in blood oxygenation, which is, at best, a proxy for cognitively relevant
neural activity. Even though the measurements are of causal factors indirectly related to
the neural and cognitive systems neuroscientists are interested in, neuroimaging data has
been put to some surprising uses in the field. Relatively recently neuroimaging data has
come to be viewed as valuable for pursuing a deeper understanding of how information is
processed and represented in the brain. Kenneth Norman and colleagues, for example,
note that “[f]unctional MRI (fMRI) is a powerful tool for addressing questions…” such
as “… what information is represented in different brain structures; and how is that
information transformed at different stages of processing?” (Norman et al 2006, p. 424).
The indirect and uncertain relationship between the objects of measurement and
phenomena of interest makes it prudent to ask: Is the BOLD signal really as valuable for
the study of human cognition as the current practice in neuroscience takes it to be, or are
these research projects reaching well beyond the evidence? The philosophical literature
on neuroimaging research tends to favour a skeptical answer, stocked as it is with
regularly rehearsed arguments that theories and claims neuroscientists often infer on the
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basis of neuroimaging data are not justified by the available evidence (van Orden and
Paap 1997; Uttal 2001; Hardcastle and Stewart 2002; Aktunç 2014; Ritchie, Kaplan and
Klein forthcoming). In addition to their skeptical conclusions and apprehensive stance
towards neuroimaging research, the arguments offered by critics of the technology often
include a detailed analysis of the logic implicit in the methods of data analysis applied in
the interpretation of neuroimaging data. As it was the dominant method of analysis in the
early days of neuroimaging research, skeptics have tended to emphasize the problems
with subtractive methods of analysis (beginning with van Orden and Paap 1997). While
new analysis methods have entered the field in the last decade and a half, the focus on
subtraction has continued in the skeptical literature (e.g., Aktunç 2014). That is, at least,
until very recently (e.g., Ritchie, Kaplan and Klein forthcoming).
It is no accident that the primary point of contact between skeptics and the practice of
neuroimaging research are the methods of data analysis that dominate the field. Methods
of data analysis, like subtraction or the newer machine-learning inspired methods that are
rapidly taking over, are a central part of neuroimaging research methods. Indeed, the
progress alluded to above has, at least in part, been driven by the development of new
techniques for analyzing and manipulating data. Examples of innovations in the methods
of analysis and data manipulation driving progress include the discovery of the default
mode network, which is a collection of brain regions that have been shown to reliably coactivate when subjects are required to ‘do nothing’ in the scanner (e.g., Gusnard &
Raichle 2001), and research on the representational character of brain activity patterns
(e.g., Tong and Pratte 2012). The discovery of the default mode network was partly based
on manipulating data differently during their analysis. That is, “… researchers began
routinely noticing brain regions more active in the passive control conditions than the
active target tasks” (Bucker, Andrews-Hanna and Schater 2008, p. 3), and so began to see
control conditions as potentially reflecting the influence of a shared phenomenon. This
became what is now known as the default mode network. With respect to research on
representations, the critical development seems to have been the uptake of machine
learning methods of data analysis that bring “... fMRI investigation closer to investigating
the codes for how functions are represented in neural population responses…” (Haxby
2010, p. 56). In both of these cases, changes in the way neuroimaging data was
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manipulated and analyzed were critical for making discoveries, or changing scientist’s
views on what claims the available data are relevant for learning about.
Given the central role of methods of data analysis, it should not be surprising that
neuroscientists frequently engage in discussion and debate over the uses and limitations
of techniques like subtraction and the machine learning methods behind research on how
information is represented in the brain. As it turns out (and as I discuss in more detail in
the next section), many of the assumptions identified as problematic by skeptics parallel
the limitations of the analysis methods that are openly discussed and debated in the
scientific literature. What differs is the response to these challenges. Where skeptics
argue for tempering conclusions and limiting the scope of neuroimaging research,
neuroscientists forge ahead. The different conclusions may either be due to skeptics
overlooking some important feature of the research that blunts the force of their critiques,
or neuroscientists failing to grasp the significance of these challenges. The responses to
skeptics available in the philosophical literature, however, tilts the scales in favour of the
neuroscientists. Critical advocates of the research tend to resist skeptical arguments by
identifying how the skeptic in question has overlooked or oversimplified an epistemically
relevant aspect of the practice. This is not to say that research practices in neuroimaging
research are flawless. Only that it seems, from this cursory and top-down viewpoint, that
the positions offered by critics miss something about the role of data analysis techniques
in neuroimaging research. This raises the question that is central to my project: what
contribution do data analysis techniques make to the inferential practices operative in
neuroimaging research?
As the skeptical perspective appears to consistently miss important aspects of the
research practices neuroscientists engage in, I have explicitly adopted an approach to
conceptualizing and analyzing research practices that is distinct from the form of features
of the skeptics’ arguments. Instead of examining the structure of inferences and
articulating the conditions that must obtain for those inferences to be warranted, then
assessing if those conditions do in fact obtain in practice, I examine the procedures
neuroscientists engage in to interpret and make sense of neuroimaging data. In doing so,
my aim is to uncover the various factors that contribute to the perceived value of
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neuroimaging data that ultimately result in inferences to claims. I treat assessments of the
evidential value of data, or the process of data interpretation, as the primary object of my
analyses, and not the form of the inference that results from that process. I have pursued
this project piecemeal, writing three research papers each engaging with a question
related to judgements of the evidential significance of neuroimaging data. In the first I
articulate how skeptical arguments overlook certain uses of data analysis techniques by
virtue of isolating the analysis process from the broader research context. The second
paper argues that data analysis techniques support data interpretation through the
isolation of data patterns that can be explained by appeal to claims about the phenomena
of interest. In the third paper I argue that the use and uptake of large scale databases and
meta-analysis tools must be accompanied by the development and uptake of research
practices appropriate for interpreting the resulting data sets if it is to be epistemically
advantageous.
My research for this project has involved regular interactions with neuroscientists via the
lab associates program available through a mutually beneficial arrangement between the
Rotman Institute of Philosophy and the Brain and Mind Institute at the University of
Western Ontario. This has afforded me opportunities to collaborate on research projects
(e.g., Martin et al 2015), attend lab meetings, and regularly interact with members of the
brain and mind institute in general, and the Köhler memory lab in particular. These
experiences underpin many of my arguments and views that follow. As casual and
regular interactions are not inherently convincing or reliable data points, I support the
insights gained from my experience in the lab with textual analyses of research papers
published in neuroscience journals.
With the remainder of this introductory chapter I provide the background and further
motivation for this project by examining the philosophical and neuroscientific
perspectives on data analysis in neuroimaging research. The next section presents the
view from neuroscience. I provide an overview of the significance and promise of data
analysis techniques, and some of the concerns that neuroscientists have raised with
respect to the current state of the field. In the third section I present the view from
philosophy. There, I briefly outline two philosophical debates that pertain to inferences in
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neuroimaging research. On one hand, there is the ongoing debate about the claims
neuroimaging data can and cannot be used to infer, and on the other is Jim Bogen’s
argument that counterfactual (Woodward 2000) and error-statistical (Mayo 1996)
accounts of experimental evidence fail to identify what makes neuroimaging data
epistemically valuable (2001; 2002). Contrasting the views from neuroscience and
philosophy raises a number of questions about the significance of data analysis for the
interpretation of neuroimaging data that are taken up in the papers that follow. In the
fourth section I present an overview of those papers, and roughly situate their individual
contributions within the larger aims of this project.

1.2

The View from Neuroscience

Neuroimaging data are used by neuroscientists as evidence for claims about the
relationship between cognitively relevant brain activity and cognitive processes, states, or
capacities. While experimental design plays an important role in establishing the
evidential value of neuroimaging data, data analysis techniques act as a bridge between
the data that is produced in an experiment and the claims neuroscientists take those data
to be evidence for. New methods for the analysis of neuroimaging data are often
developed in the pursuit of a particular question or hypothesis, and some of these go on to
take on a life of their own as they are refined and see uptake throughout the broader
community. This process is only possible because neuroimaging data itself is rich enough
to be useful for addressing research questions beyond those it is produced to investigate.
The phenomena cognitive neuroscientists use neuroimaging technology to investigate
requires information about the structure, activity and connectivity of the brain to be
brought together with information about cognitive processes. Each of these experimental
targets is accessed by different modes of measurement within a neuroimaging
experiment.
Experiments using fMRI involve placing a human subject in a magnetic resonance
imaging scanner (MRI) while they perform a cognitive task, such as attending to a
moving pattern of dots (Liu et al 2011), or deciding whether or not an image is one they
saw in a previous part of the experiment (Martin et al 2013). While the participant
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performs the task, the scanner measures changes in brain activity. The BOLD signal data
captured by fMRI provides information about the activity of the brain, MRI scanning
protocols provide structural information, while the cognitive states of subjects are probed
through the use of carefully designed cognitive tasks. Each of these produce distinct data
sets that are used together to make inferences in neuroimaging research.
There are many ways to integrate, analyze and classify these data sets. Since each
decision made in the process of integrating, manipulating and analyzing data is informed
by the aims of the scientists, it is in principle possible to use neuroimaging data to
investigate phenomena that they were not originally produced to investigate by analyzing
them in different ways. Indeed, advocates of open databases often argue for data sharing
by emphasizing the need to capitalize on this potential. With respect to neuroimaging
data, the argument is that “[i]f such data can be archived, indexed with accompanying
meta-data, and combined, there is an enormous opportunity to obtain deep insights into
the workings of the brain and mind” (p. 678) since “... there are often dimensions of the
data that are not fully explored or even recognized by the researchers obtaining it…”
(Van Horn and Gazzaniga 2013, p. 678).
An example of the potential for making new discoveries through the reuse of
neuroimaging data can be found in the discovery of the default mode network, which
created a sub-field of research on resting state fMRI, and is an important component of
the Human Connectome Project (Smith et al 2013). Early fMRI research treated task-free
conditions as a baseline, where task-free conditions require the participant to ‘do
nothing’, let their ‘mind wander’, or otherwise remain still in the scanner without
executing a particular task. These task-free conditions were typically used as a baseline
contrast for a task-based condition in research aiming to isolate task-relevant brain
activity through subtraction analyses. The discovery of networks of brain activity
persistent across subjects in resting state was made possible by a combination of a choice
in the analysis of neuroimaging data — that is to look at the ‘task free’ data — and the
availability of a large volume of useable data. Analyses of task-free data revealed a
collection of brain regions that are consistently active across subjects. Those patterns are
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now thought to reflect the activity of a ‘default mode network’ (Gusnard & Raichle 2001;
Greicius et al 2003; Morcom and Fletcher 2007).
While an example of how new ways of looking at neuroimaging data can lead to
discoveries, the story of default mode network isn’t driven by the development of a new
technique for the analysis of data. The recent trend towards research aimed at
understanding representations in the brain, however, provides a clearer example of this.
Traditionally neuroimaging data was used to identify the regions of the brain associated
with cognitive tasks, a theoretical project sometimes referred to as the localization of
cognitive functions. This was often done by analyzing fMRI data using subtraction
analysis. Subtraction involves taking the difference between two BOLD signal data sets
associated with distinct task conditions and attributing the difference in measured BOLD
signal to the cognitive difference between the tasks.
More recently neuroimaging data has been used to identify the informational content of
brain activity and to investigate where and how representations of stimuli are contained
and processed in the brain (Tong and Pratte 2012). This relatively new use of
neuroimaging data has been driven by the development of new techniques for analyzing
and interpreting it. These include machine learning tools such as pattern classification
analysis (Haxby 2010), and representational similarity analysis (Kriegeskorte and Kievit
2013). Advocates of these techniques argue that they can be used to answer new
questions. For instance, an introduction to pattern classification techniques identifies
three new questions that they can be used to address. They are: Is there information about
a variable of interest? Where is the information? And, how is that information encoded?
(Pereira, Mitchell and Botvinick 2009, p. S208). Some even go so far as to argue that
"[i]n addition to allowing us to sensitively detect and track cognitive states, MVPA
methods can be used to characterize how these cognitive states are represented in the
brain" (Norman et al 2006, p. 425).
The paper often cited as pioneering these techniques approached data analysis with a
technique inspired by machine learning to discriminate between three hypotheses about
the functional architecture of the ventral visual pathway (Haxby et al 2001). Of the three
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hypotheses, two proposed modular architectures in which distinct parts of the region are
specialized for processing or representing information about a particular category of
object or performing a particular process. The third proposed that the “representations of
faces and different categories of objects are widely distributed and overlapping” (p.
2425). The new method of data analysis used in the study, which involved determining if
variations in the BOLD signal could be used to predict the object category (face, house,
cat, etc) of the stimulus correlated with it, was chosen for its capacity to discriminate
between modular and distributed processing hypotheses.
This data analysis technique was introduced to the field because researchers saw in it the
potential to provide information relevant to the assessment of a claim that the functional
architecture of a brain region is distributed. This marks an important change in the
epistemic landscape of neuroimaging research. Consider, a common criticism of
localization research that uses neuroimaging data is that the analysis procedure often
used, that is subtraction, assumes that cognitive processing is not distributed across the
cortex, or even within a larger region (e.g., Uttal 2001; Hardcastle and Stewart 2002).
Localization hypotheses, critics argue, are assumed by virtue of the analysis technique
used to confirm them. If the analysis method Haxby and colleagues used can in fact
discriminate between modular and distributed processing hypotheses of brain
architecture, then the availability of these new data analysis method renders this line of
skepticism obsolete.
Haxby and colleagues’ result was important as it set a new threshold of evidence for
modular theories of functional architecture. They demonstrated that it is possible, and
necessary, to not only show preferential activation but also to show that the regional
activity carries information about the relevant stimuli (as noted in Kanwisher 2017).
Separately from its impact on theories of ventral visual stream architecture, it acted as a
proof of concept for a new approach to the analysis of neuroimaging data. The little
machine learning inspired methods presented in their paper has since grown into a rich
and diverse collection of analysis techniques broadly referred to as multivariate pattern
analysis (MVPA).
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The BOLD signal is now, when analyzed with MVPA techniques, used to pursue a
broader range of theoretical aims than merely assigning cognitive functions to discrete
regions of the brain, as was the standard contribution of the technology in its early years.
Pattern classification techniques, for instance, have been used to show that variations in
BOLD activity can predict the features of a stimuli a participant is attending to (Kamitani
and Tong 2005), to test whether the perception of an object and the act of imagining that
object share a representational profile (Reddy, Tsuchiya and Serre 2010), to address a
number of confounds and challenges in the study of consciousness (Sandberg, Andersen
and Overgaard 2014), and has been identified as a solution to the problem of ‘reverse
inference’ in neuroimaging research (Poldrack 2011). The last of these provides another
example of innovations in data analysis changing the epistemic landscape of cognitive
neuroscience.
Reverse inference refers to the use of brain activity data to ascribe a cognitive state to a
subject, such as inferring that a subject is experiencing fear on the basis of an observation
of activation in their amygdala (an area commonly associated with fear). Reverse
inferences are common in neuroimaging papers, and while often informal there are
studies for which reverse inferences are a central result. The problem is that
neuroimaging experiments involve manipulations of behaviour and measurements of
correlated changes in brain activity, while reverse inferences start from brain activity and
move to ascriptions of cognitive states. This has been identified by neuroscientists as
committing the logical fallacy of ‘affirming the consequent’ (Poldrack 2006, p. 2).
Furthermore, meta-analysis evidence provided in the same paper suggests that reverse
inferences are unreliable as ‘best explanations’ for brain activity patterns observed in an
experiment because any given region of the brain is implicated in a wide range of
cognitive processes and so the activity could be reflecting any one of those (p. 4-5). The
same neuroscientist who classified reverse inferences as a fallacy, has, with the uptake of
MVPA methods, recently changed his view. He has argued that pattern classification
techniques in particular “… provide a formal means to implement reverse inference”
(2011, p. 4). One of the problems with reverse inference is that the evidence available in
a neuroimaging experiment cannot discriminate between two competing reverse
inference claims. Pattern classification techniques are used to evaluate if patterns and
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variations within one set of variables can be used to predict, or identify, the values of
correlated variables. This allows neuroscientists to directly evaluate whether or not
variations in brain activity are predictive, or diagnostic, of the engagement of specific
tasks and cognitive states, an evaluation that simply was not possible prior to the
development of these methods. Treating this change in perspective at face value, the
problem with reverse inferences is resolved not by building better measurement devices,
designing better experiments or considering theoretical constraints arising from other
areas of neuroscience. The problem with reverse inferences is solved by analyzing
imaging data with an analysis technique suitable for evaluating reverse inference claims.
How data analysis techniques are used, including the decisions made in their
implementation as well as the form of the results scientists focus on, impact the
phenomena neuroscientists recognize data as relevant for learning about. Pattern
classification analysis is one of the more popular MVPA techniques. It involves training a
machine learning classifier to predict task conditions (e.g., ‘face’, ‘chair’, ‘building’), or
behavioural responses (e.g., ‘remembered’, ‘forgotten’) based on variations in the BOLD
signal that are correlated with those conditions or responses, then testing it on novel data
and evaluating its accuracy. Investigators typically focus on the accuracy of the classifier
at performing a primary classification task, such as identifying which of two patterns of
moving dots a subject is paying attention to (as in Liu et al 2011). Classifier accuracy is
used to support claims about the information carried by patterns of brain activity. If a
classifier is able to discriminate between different attentional conditions, one might
conclude that there is information in the brain activity patterns originating in the region of
interest relevant for making such a discrimination. Determining whether or not a
classifier can accurately classify is not always the only dimension of the analysis process
that is relevant. Classification failures can sometimes be important and informative when
they are found to correlate with behavioural errors, as they allow investigators to begin to
draw closer relations between the information contained in the brain activity and
information that the participant is acting on (Walther 2012, for instance, proposes a
mathematical method for doing so). Choices about the data the classifier is using can also
be informative to consider when evaluating certain hypotheses. Tambini and Davachi, for
instance, test and train a classifier using data from different time points after the task of

12

interest to evaluate whether or not activity patterns permitting classification persist in the
same way our actual memories of events do (2013). Comparing different analysis results
is often useful for better understanding what it means for a classifier to be able to
accurately identify the task conditions correlated with BOLD measurements. For
example, classifier accuracy is often contrasted with subtraction results to assist in
determining if information in the activity pattern requires the full multi-dimensional
representation that classifiers leverage, or if average or mean BOLD activity is sufficient
for consistently linking the brain activity to the task condition (Kohler et al 2013;
Coutanche 2013). These examples show that the evidence provided by a data analysis
process depends in part on the decisions investigators make when implementing it. These
include decisions about how to implement an analysis technique, which variables and
results to focus on, and the supplementary methods investigators choose to use.
The development and uptake of new analysis techniques is treated by many
neuroscientists with cautious optimism. In light of the kinds of developments discussed
above, there are three concerns raised as barriers to the promise of progress that
innovations in data analysis bring with them. Those concerns are: (1) the impact of an
increase in analytic flexibility on false positive rates, (2) technical analytic skills
overriding practical intuitions, and (3) the risks of replication failures.
Analytic flexibility refers to the “… range of analysis outcomes across different
acceptable analysis methods” (Carp 2012, p. 1), and has been associated with an increase
risk for inflating the rate of false positives within a research domain (Ioannidis 2005).
Joshua Carp examined the analytic flexibility in fMRI analysis pipelines, where a
pipeline is a series of data manipulations that produce an interpretable result (2012).
Variations in the order of manipulations, including those used to reduce error and correct
for artifacts, as well as variations in the statistical techniques themselves constitute
distinct pipelines. Carp found that, while some outcomes were consistent across a wide
range of pipelines, other results varied substantially. This flexibility means that, “… a
motivated researcher determined to find significant activation in practically any brain
region will very likely succeed…” (p. 12). Flexibility isn’t only worrisome in the case of
a ‘motivated researcher’, but creates a situation in which a well-intentioned researcher
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may infer claims that would not have appeared to be supported by the data had they made
different decisions in their analysis procedure. Andrew Gelman and Eric Loken, for
instance, argue that “… researchers can perform a reasonable analysis given their
assumptions and their data, but had the data turned out differently, they could have done
other analyses that were just as reasonable in those circumstances” (Gelman and Loken
2013, p. 1). These results appear to have all the significance of well-conducted statistical
tests, and yet, due to the degrees of freedom in the analysis that are not apparent to the
researchers conducting it, can have the same epistemic standing as the results of phacking or the work of a ‘motivated researcher’ seeking any ‘publishable result of
statistical significance’.
Analytic flexibility and its impact on false positive rates is a significant concern for
neuroimaging research when considering only the variations in standard pipelines.
Introducing new methods for data analysis, such as those briefly discussed above, creates
more opportunity for this kind of inferential error to occur. This worry is amplified by the
fact that these new techniques are more sophisticated than their predecessors. Eve
Marder, reflecting on the history and future of neuroscience, notes that, in this era of high
volumes of data and complex techniques for analyzing it, “… new findings will depend
on data analyses that are highly quantitative and that employ statistics and algorithms that
many of their users may not completely understand…” (2015, p. 3). Marder argues that
good intuitions about what methods of data analysis and manipulation (‘data treatments’)
will provide “… an answer that is true to the essence of the biological process studied”
(p. 3), are important for avoiding mistakes and making genuine progress. Her concerns
are partly rooted in the problem of analytic flexibility and the sophistication of analysis
techniques, but her primary concern is the growing body of evidence showing the various
ways that brains are highly complex and interconnected systems. In particular, brains
include multiple parallel pathways allowing for any given processing problem to be
solved in multiple different ways (p. 2-3). Without good intuitions about what analysis
technique to use when making sense of data about a system like this, it is likely that
hypotheses will be pursued that, in fact, are not borne out in reality but only appear to be
true as a consequence of complexity in the system under study. Marder argues that good
models and theories that hone intuitions about “… which biological details are significant

14

for a given brain function and which details can, as a first approximation, be ignored” (p.
4) are necessary for effectively navigating this difficult situation. The view that
familiarity with the material objects of investigation, in this case the biological materials
that make up brains, is critical for effectively using data to study those objects is echoed
in philosophical work on data sharing in biology (Leonelli 2013). Marder’s concerns are
also reinforced by recent discussions sparked by the replication crises occurring
throughout the sciences.
The reuse potential of neuroimaging data, and the potential for progress provided by
innovations in methods and approaches to analysis conspire to create an environment
where inferences may not be verifiable. Neuroimaging research, because of the “…high
dimensionality of fMRI data, the relatively low power of most fMRI studies and the great
amount of flexibility in data analysis…” has recently been dubbed “… a ‘perfect storm’
of irreproducible results” (Poldrack et al 2017). The problem is framed as one of
reproducibility, that is the ability to reconstruct the analysis and reasoning procedures
used to arrive at a given body of evidence. Reproducibility has to do with the capacity of
independent investigators to reconstruct a result from the original data following the same
steps as reported by the original authors, and a common proposal for improving
reproducibility is to foster transparent practices. Common suggestions include sharing
data, sharing algorithms and analysis code, and the pre-registration of research plans,
including methods of data analysis (Poldrack et al 2017; Munafò et al 2017). The success
of these proposals depends on their adoption throughout the community, and their
capacity to reveal the epistemically relevant aspects of the data interpretation process.
In summary, neuroimaging data are regarded as informationally rich, as they have the
potential to be relevant for the study of phenomena beyond those they were produced to
investigate. That potential is realized through the use and development of different data
analysis techniques. The richness of neuroimaging data allows changes in the analysis
process to influence the phenomena they are regarded as informative about. The richness
of the data and variability in analysis processes is also a potential source of inferential
errors. This potential and its realization through innovations in data analysis risks
increasing false positive rates by increasing analytic flexibility, the depreciation of
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intuitions based on details about the material objects under study, and reinforcing
research practices that have made it difficult to independently reproduce experimental
results. This is the potential and peril of data analysis in neuroimaging research as viewed
from within. In the next section, I discuss the view of neuroimaging research from the
perspective of philosophy.

1.3

The View from Philosophy

Philosophical work on neuroimaging research takes a variety of forms. This includes
debates about the evidential value of fMRI data with respect to investigations of the
relationship between the brain and cognition (Uttal 2001; Landreth and Richardson 2004;
Aktunç 2014), the evidential value of the images produced by common analysis pipelines
(Roskies 2010a; Klein 2010a), discussions about the validity (or invalidity) of particular
inferential practices such as reverse inference (Machery 2014; Glymour and Hanson
2016), the ethical and social dimensions of fMRI research (e.g., Figdor 2013; Bluhm
2013), and debates about the adequacy of the current stock of concepts used to theorize
about cognitive processes (Figdor 2011; Klein 2012; Anderson 2015). Here, I focus on
the epistemic dimensions of fMRI research and the role data analysis plays in the data
interpretation process. The original motivation for this project stems from an examination
of skeptical arguments about neuroimaging research that persist in the philosophical
literature, and in particular the recurring form of critical arguments and counterarguments. The persistence and consistency of the back and forth between skeptics and
critical advocates of neuroimaging technology leaves the impression that something
important in the research practices is being overlooked. Situating the debate against the
backdrop of the view from neuroscience presented in the previous section reinforces that
impression.
Critics tend to examine an inference in neuroimaging research by outlining its logical
structure, and then pick out one or more assumptions that must obtain for the inference to
follow from neuroimaging data. These assumptions are then challenged, either by way of
an argument from underdetermination that involves suggesting a number of alternative
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possibilities or explanations for the results (e.g., Mole and Klein 2010), or by showing
that the assumptions, once made explicit, reveal a vicious circularity (e.g., Hardcastle and
Stewart 2002). Responses to skeptics also follow a similar pattern. They typically deflate
the target skeptical argument by showing that the skeptics’ presentation of the research is
narrow (e.g., Landreth and Richardson 2004), misrepresents the data analysis techniques
in questions (e.g., Machery 2014), or otherwise overlooks epistemically relevant aspects
of the experimental practice (e.g., Roskies 2010b).
Criticisms of inferences common in neuroimaging research begin with van Orden and
Paap’s incisive critique of the logic of subtraction (1997). At the time this paper was
published subtraction was the most used method of analysis in neuroimaging research.
The method involves using two task conditions that differ by an isolable cognitive
component. The example van Orden and Paap use is a task in which the subject examines
pairs of words and decides whether or not they rhyme, and a contrast task in which the
same subject examines pairs of words but does not indicate whether they rhyme. To
perform a subtractive analysis, the BOLD signal data measured during each of these two
tasks is subtracted. The resulting difference in BOLD activity is then attributed to the
difference in cognitive activity. In the case they review, the subtraction isolated a small
part of the left temporoparietal cortex as differentially more active during the rhyming
judgement. They argue that this result does not warrant the conclusion that the cognitive
process crucial for making rhyming judgements resides in the region picked out by the
subtraction.
The use of subtraction, they argue, assumes that cognitive components can be isolated at
all. This assumption, sometimes referred to as the ‘pure insertion’ hypothesis, reflects the
notion that a single element or component of a cognitive process can be ‘inserted’ (or
removed) from a process without effecting the overall performance of that process
(Harrison and Pantelis 2010). Van Orden and Paap argue that “… the conclusion that an
observed pattern of dissociated brain regions demonstrates separate cognitive
components … simply affirms the inevitable consequent of assuming there were single
causes in the first place…” (van Orden and Paap 1997, p. S90), and further that this
assumption is likely to be false. This so-called ‘doctrine of single causes’, which
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attributes a single cause to an observed effect, is “… at odds with the nature of cognitive
systems” (p. S92), which they argue are reciprocally causal insofar as each component of
a system contributes to every outcome of that system. Furthermore, they claim that, “[i]f
the original assumption of single causes is false, the statistical tools will nevertheless
discover components” (p. S90). Taken together, the use of subtraction to localize
cognitive functions to parts of the brain is a failed program because the method assumes
such localization is possible, will produce apparently successful localizations no matter
the facts of the system, and forecloses viable alternative possibilities such as a distributed
processing account of cognitive function. This argument, while the first, is not the only to
challenge neuroimaging research in this way.
Valerie Hardcastle and Matthew Stewart provide a blanket criticism of research that
claims to have localized any cognitive process to any discrete part of the brain that targets
all of neuroscience, ranging from single cell recordings (2002, p. S73), to neuroimaging
(p. S77). The argument runs the same course as van Orden and Paap’s, resting on the
observation that the methods of analysis, and research strategies more generally assume
“… local and specific functions prior to gathering appropriate data for the claim” (p.
S80). That is, the inferences from experimental results to claims about the cognitive
contributions made by structures of the brain are based on experimental methods and
analysis procedures that presuppose brain structures play a specific cognitive role. They
reinforce their argument by an appeal to underdetermination, suggesting that the core
problem is that results could be due to functional diversity of brain regions, details of the
neurophysiology that are not considered when inferences are made, and cannot be
considered given the assumptions required by the methods and techniques used to
produce the data in the first place.
One common feature of these arguments is that they all take aim at subtraction analysis,
which, as it turns out, is no longer the dominant method for analyzing and interpreting
neuroimaging data. This change in analytic methods has, until recently, only been briefly
alluded to in contributions to these debates (e.g., Klein 2010a; Roskies 2010a). A recent
contribution does engage pattern classification analysis in detail, and it joins the skeptical
chorus. Following the critical format outlined above, Brendan Ritchie, David Kaplan and
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Colin Klein argue that interpreting pattern classification analysis results as evidence for
claims about neural representations relies on assumptions about the cause of the
classifier’s performance that are not likely to be borne out (forthcoming).
These arguments share a similar structure. They claim that inferences in neuroimaging
research are undermined by the assumptions motivating, or implicit in the use of,
particular data analysis techniques. In each case, assumptions are shown to make the
inferences viciously circular, or relevant and compelling possible alternatives are
identified as overlooked by virtue of these assumptions. Compared against the perils of
innovations in data analysis reviewed in the previous section, the novelty of these
critiques is that they argue for a vicious circularity in the logic of the application of
methods of data analysis. After all, the neuroscientific view on the challenges with
interpreting neuroimaging data is attentive to the inferential risks that follow from the
causal complexity of brain systems, and the indirect nature of neuroimaging data. If the
inferential practices that skeptics identify accurately reflect the practice, then concerns
about analytic flexibility and the inability to replicate experiments, are deeper problems
than neuroscientists give them credit for. The other half of the debate about the epistemic
status of neuroimaging data provides reason to doubt that skeptical arguments do in fact
accurately capture the inferential practices neuroscientists engage in. Those responding to
skeptical views tend to argue that the critics have, in one way or another, misrepresented
or overlooked epistemically relevant dimensions of the experimental practice. I briefly
review two such responses.
William Uttal’s suggestively titled book The New Phrenology (2001) provides one of the
most comprehensive critiques of the form noted above. In a more recent book that
expands on the argument in the first, he argues that fMRI is an “epistemological sledge
hammer” and that a close examination of the experimental protocols of a variety of
publications is not encouraging: “[v]arious kinds of statistical manipulations may appear
to define particular prototypical response patterns: however, given their variability all
must be considered skeptically” (2011). In a response to Uttal’s 2001 book, Anthony
Landreth and Richard Richardson criticize him for misrepresenting neuroimaging
methodology (p. 118). They note that, while Uttal is correct that separating signal from
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noise in the BOLD signal is a difficult task, research practices such as controlling
stimulus presentation, the repetition of trials to enable signal boosting through averaging,
and the use of supplementary statistics, are essential aspects of the experimental process
that Uttal doesn’t take into account (p. 118-9). They conclude that, while the science is
not perfect and Uttal raises important issues with respect to the prospects of localization
projects, it isn’t productive to raise those issues by misrepresenting the practice and
leaving out epistemically relevant details.
Separately, Adina Roskies uses a similar strategy to refute the critique laid out by van
Orden and Paap. She argues that interpretations of neuroimaging data involve what she
calls ‘functional triangulation’, noting that “… in functional imaging, information from
other task comparisons and other studies is brought to bear on the interpretation of
experimental data” (Roskies 2010b, p 641), and further that “[c]onvergence across
multiple experiments is key to epistemic warrant when it comes to attributing function to
anatomical regions” (P. 641). The examples of convergence she notes includes
convergence between different task paradigms within an experiment, across experiments
within a discipline, and across different measurement techniques. Viewing the inferential
practices engaged in neuroimaging research through the lens of functional triangulation,
van Orden and Paap’s criticism loses its force.1 An individual experiment must be
recognized as part of a larger practice. The inferential limitations of the results of
subtraction analysis are not indicative of the limits of the entire data set, or domain of
research. The consistent features of arguments resistant to skeptical conclusions, and the
divergence between the pessimistic outlook of skeptics, and optimistic outlook of

1

Hardcastle and Stewart’s argument, which is critical of a number of different experimental methods

common in neuroscience, can be diffused in a similar fashion. Their general skeptical view about
neuroscience is based on arguments that each of the parts of neuroscience are inferentially limited. This is
the very kind of argument, and conclusion, that Roskies’ functional triangulation account of evidence
resists. Additionally, with respect to neuroimaging in particular, they place the weakness of neuroimaging
research on decisions about statistical thresholding in the application of subtraction (p. S78), and the fact
that fMRI measures metabolic, not neural, change (p. S79). These are the very inferential challenges that,
as I argue in what follows, neuroscientists engage through the use of a variety of data analysis techniques.
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neuroscientists suggests that there may be a systematic problem in the way skeptics, and
philosophers in particular, approach their analysis of neuroimaging data’s evidential
significance.
Neuroimaging research is not only discussed in the context of debates about the merits
and challenges of neuroimaging data. Parallel to this debate is an argument by Jim Bogen
that philosophical accounts of evidence in experiments do not capture what “make[s]
experimental evidence” like that obtained from functional imaging technologies
“epistemically valuable” (2002). Bogen focusses his attention on accounts of
experimental evidence that emphasize error-statistics (Mayo 1996) and counter-factual
dependencies between the processes of data production and claims data are used to
support (Woodward 2000). Both of these views recognize the primary role of data
manipulation as correcting for errors. Bogen observes that “... what is epistemically good
about functional images is not that they are highly accurate with regards to [biological
indicator] levels or locations of individual brains” (p. S65), and further that the purpose
of manipulating imaging data is not to “... bring error-ridden, [biological indicator]
estimates recognizably closer to what would have resulted from ideal experiments
shielded from significant sources of error” (p. S65).
In the introduction of Bogen’s paper he notes that neuroimages are different from the
kinds of data considered when he and Woodward developed the data-phenomena
distinction, which forms the basis of Woodward’s counterfactual account of experimental
evidence (2001, p.S61). The data they had in mind is data that owes their evidential value
to “... having been produced in such a way that the item they are used to study exerts a
detectable causal influence on them” (p. S61). Bogen suggests that neuroimages are
distinct from data in that they are, as images, “… more like graphic representations of
interpretations of data than what Woodward and I meant by data” (p. S61). Whether or
not neuroimages themselves are best treated as data, or representations of interpretations,
they are the most salient output of a neuroimaging experiment. It is common in the
philosophical literature to treat the neuroimages produced as part of the analysis of
neuroimaging data as the central piece of evidence produced by the analysis of
neuroimaging data (e.g., Roskies 2010a; Klein 2010; Klein 2012; Machery 2014).
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Whether this tendency involves treating neuroimages as a compact representation of the
interpretive process, or as the final product of a complex data production process, it is
important to recognize that neuroimages are just one of many data patterns used by
investigators in the interpretation of neuroimaging data. This is the conclusion Klein
arrives at in his aptly titled “Images Are Not the Evidence in Neuroimaging” (2010b).
Klein acknowledges that, because the brain is causally dense, that is a change in BOLD
signal in one voxel can be caused by changes in almost any other part of the system, that
neuroimages do not even provide weak evidence for claims about the cognitive
contribution of regional brain activity (p. 275).2 He cautions, however, against extending
this to the whole of neuroimaging data. Neuroimages are the product of one analysis
procedure, and they provide a ‘first-pass sanity check’ on the data, but additional
analyses are required to interpret them (p. 275). Klein points towards ‘more sophisticated
analyses’, details about neural anatomy and converging evidence for other research
modes such as single cell recordings, as providing the additional evidential value to
neuroimaging data above and beyond the neuroimages themselves (p. 276).
Evidence accumulated across laboratories and research paradigms is important for any
account of explanation and knowledge production in neuroscience broadly construed
(Bechtel 2004). Indeed, convergence across measurement technologies played a critical
role in the eventual uptake of neuroimaging methods in cognitive neuroscience (Bechtel
and Stufflebeam 1997). These factors certainly contribute to the strength of inferences in
neuroimaging research, but they cannot explain what makes neuroimaging data itself
epistemically valuable. They are part of the body of evidence neuroscientists appeal to

2

It is noteworthy that this argument has been disputed for misrepresenting the kind of statistical inference

neuroscientists engage in. Where Klein presents neuroimaging researchers as aiming to reject ‘point null’
hypotheses, statistical testing in neuroimaging research involves the rejection of a ‘range null’ hypothesis
and not a point null, and the causal density of the system is not problematic in the way Klein makes it out to
be for range null hypothesis tests (Machery 2014). That neuroscientists are concerned about the causal
density of the brain, however, is reason to take Klein’s argument seriously even if it misrepresents some of
the technical aspects of the practice.
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when making inferences, but neuroimaging data must also make their own contribution to
the inferences if it is to be worth the effort to produce and analyze. Appealing to
convergence with external results does not help clarify the intrinsic evidential value of
neuroimaging data. This leaves ‘sophisticated data analysis techniques’ to make up the
difference, which is the very thing that critics of the technology focus on in their
analyses. That is, the same skeptical arguments that have been criticized for overlooking
epistemically relevant aspects of the research practices neuroscientists engage in. The
systematic problem with the skeptical approach, then, may be that they mistakenly treat
all data analysis techniques as tools for reducing noise and ‘approximating the results of
an ideal experiment’ (that is, an experiment that actually measured the causal factors of
interest).
Some contributors to the discussion of evidence in neuroimaging have acknowledged that
data analysis is important, and that techniques beyond subtraction (Roskies 2010a) and
image production (Klein 2010a), make a difference to judgements of the evidential value
of neuroimaging data. A detailed account of how data analysis techniques that are not
used to account for error, eliminate artifacts or approximate the results of an ideal
experiment, contribute to the evidential value attributed to neuroimaging data is at
present absent. This leads to the primary question this project seeks to answer: What
contribution do data analysis techniques like subtraction and pattern classification
analysis make to the process of interpreting neuroimaging data? I pursue this question by
addressing three narrower questions relating to the use of data analysis in neuroimaging
research.

1.4

Towards a Philosophy of Data Analysis

The questions motivating each of the three papers that follow are: Is the skepticism about
inferences in neuroimaging research warranted? How does the use of data analysis
techniques account for the epistemic value neuroscientists recognize in neuroimaging
data? How does the availability and use of data and analysis tools shape assessments of
the evidential value of neuroimaging data? The included papers each examine how
neuroscientists bring neuroimaging data to bear on claims about the relationship between
cognition and the brain.
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The first paper, “Data Analysis and the Evidential Scope of Neuroimaging Results”,
argues that philosophical skepticism about the ability of neuroimaging data to support
theoretical hypotheses that relate brain function to cognitive function is not warranted. I
identify the skeptics’ strategy of treating data analysis techniques in isolation from the
research context in which they are used as a shortcoming of the approach common to
many skeptical arguments. To demonstrate the importance of situating the use of data
analysis within a research context, I show how multiple data analysis techniques are used
to minimize confounding interpretations of the analysis results. As it turns out, the
assumptions addressed through the use of multiple analysis techniques include some of
the assumptions that critics are keen to identify as sufficient for undermining these
inferences.
The second paper, “The Interpretation of Neuroimaging Data as Explanations of Data
Patterns”, presents a conceptual framework for evaluating the contribution data analysis
techniques make to the interpretation of data. The problem with many skeptical
arguments, as argued in the first paper and alluded to above, is that they are not attentive
to the complexity of data interpretation, or the subtleties of the contribution data analysis
techniques make to that process. By situating data analysis techniques within the process
of data interpretation, I argue that data analysis techniques facilitate data interpretation by
isolating data patterns that neuroscientist explain by appeal to claims about phenomena.
The third paper, “Data Analysis and The Perceived Value of Data", examines a dispute
between neuroscientists over the evidential value of data represented in the NeuroSynth
repository. NeuroSynth is novel insofar as it is curated and annotated by an algorithm. I
use this dispute to argue that strategies for data interpretation are likely to be successful
only insofar as they are sensitive to facts about how the data came to have the form that it
does. In particular, I trace the inferential errors made by the users of the data to the
inappropriate application of criteria of explanatory adequacy honed for the interpretation
of locally produced data to the interpretation of synthesized data. Set alongside the first
two papers, this paper begins exploring factors that contribute to the explanations of data
patterns.
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The concluding chapter takes up where this one leaves off: addressing the broad question
set out above: how do data analysis techniques contribute to the inferential practices
operative in neuroimaging research? To spoil the conclusion, I argue that they are not just
tools for quantifying the strength of hypotheses via statistical tests, or correcting for
various sources of noise and artifacts in the data. While some data analysis techniques
perform these roles, the techniques at the heart of neuroimaging research make a distinct
contribution to the data interpretation process. They are valuable because the results of
data analysis techniques, unlike the ‘raw’ data provided by neuroimaging experiments,
can be explained in terms of claims about phenomena. In this way data analysis
techniques are integral to the practice of neuroimaging research. In the final chapter I use
the arguments and cases examined in the included papers to add detail to this account,
articulating more clearly the role of data analysis in the interpretive process in terms of
the interpretive and epistemic leverage they provide.
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Chapter 2

2

The Analysis of Data and the Evidential Scope of
Neuroimaging Results

2.1

Introduction

The debate amongst philosophers about the epistemic status of neuroimaging begins with
van Orden and Paap’s criticism of the logic of subtraction (1997), the primary technique
used to analyse neuroimaging data at the time their paper was published. Philosophers
have continued to debate the strengths and weaknesses of neuroimaging as a tool for
investigating the relationship between cognitive functions and the brain (Uttal 2001;
Hardcastle and Stewart 2002; Roskies 2010a; Klein 2010a; Uttal 2011; Aktunç 2014). I
argue that, since most critics have not taken into account the significance of the diversity
of data analysis techniques used to analyse neuroimaging data, the skepticism towards
neuroimaging technology is misplaced.
Many of the skeptical positions are grounded on careful analyses of subtraction and
subtraction logic (Uttal 2001; Hardcastle and Stewart 2002; Klein 2010a). While
philosophers are rightly critical of the ability of subtraction analyses, on their own, to
support claims about the relationship between cognitive functions and the brain,
subtraction is only one kind of data analysis technique used to analyse neuroimaging
data. Given that the development of new data analysis techniques has been a significant
driver of progress in neuroimaging over the last decade and a half,3 a narrow focus on

3

There has been a steady shift from using univariate analysis techniques that treat the

neuroimaging data as a scalar value, usually an average, towards the use of multivariate
analysis techniques that treat the neuroimaging data as a vector. These new techniques
have allowed neuroimaging researchers to pursue new theoretical goals and study new
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subtraction is a problem for any argument that aims to shed light on the range of
hypotheses that neuroimaging technology can discriminate between.
Indeed, some recent contributors have noted that the role and impact of multivariate
analyses has not been fully appreciated in this debate (Roskies 2010a; Klein 2010b).
However, while they acknowledge that techniques other than subtraction are important to
consider, they do not, themselves, take up the task of exploring how the use of other
analysis techniques changes the evidence available in neuroimaging research. My aim
here is to begin to fill this gap by demonstrating that, when evaluating the hypotheses and
claims that neuroimaging technology can and cannot support, it is important to take into
account the contribution of new analysis techniques such as pattern classification
analysis, and to consider how multiple analysis techniques can be brought together to
strengthen the evidence provided by neuroimaging technologies.
I proceed as follows: In section two I review the debate about the epistemic status of
neuroimaging and specify the categories of hypotheses that philosophers claim
neuroimaging data can and cannot support. In section three I present a conceptual
framework for evaluating the strength and content of evidence produced via a data
analysis technique. In section four I apply this conceptual framework to a study that uses
multiple analysis techniques to generate evidence in support of a hypothesis and, where
critics of neuroimaging would argue that the data do not support this hypothesis, I show
how they can. The evidence is stronger than it appears because one analysis technique is
used to validate a crucial assumption required by the other. In section five I argue that
different analysis techniques provide different evidence, and that the use of multiple
analysis techniques to examine the same data provides experimental results with a kind of
local robustness.

hypotheses, such as the investigation of the content of neural representations (see Tong &
Pratte 2012 for an introductory review of multivariate techniques).
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2.2

Skepticism About Neuroimaging

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) allows neuroscientists to study the
human brain through non-invasive measurements of metabolic activity (see Ashby 2011
for a technical introduction). Experiments using fMRI typically require a participant to
perform a cognitive task – such as identifying faces as familiar or unfamiliar (as in
Martin et al. 2013) – while the scanner measures changes in the Blood Oxygenation
Level Dependent (BOLD) signal throughout their brain. 4 Roughly speaking, the scanner
does this by dividing the brain into voxels (volumetric pixels), which are one millimeter
to three millimeter cubes of brain matter, and measuring the BOLD signal in each voxel
over time. The value of the BOLD signal is the ratio of oxygenated to deoxygenated
hemoglobin in a voxel at the time of scanning. Since it tracks properties of blood flow,
the BOLD signal is often referred to as the hemodynamic signal. After a scanning
session, the investigators will have a data set that consists of BOLD signal values for
each voxel labeled with the task condition that the participant was performing when that
data was collected.
Neuroimaging data has historically been analysed using subtractive analyses. In the
simplest case of subtraction, two sets of neuroimaging data are required, each obtained
while the participant performs a different task. The goal of subtractive analysis is to
identify the difference in BOLD signal that corresponds with the cognitive difference
between the tasks. Roughly, the BOLD signal values in each voxel associated with one
task are subtracted from the values in the same voxels associated with the other task. This
analysis is classified as univariate because each voxel is treated independently of each

4

The fMRI scanning protocol does not directly measure metabolic activity. During an

fMRI scan, radio pulses cause hydrogen atoms to align with a uniform magnetic field. As
they relax to equilibrium they release energy, which the scanner measures. Deoxygenated
hemoglobin, unlike oxygenated hemoglobin, causes the nearby magnetic field strength to
vary, resulting in a difference in the measured energy, and forming the basis of the
BOLD signal.
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other voxel, and as such the data needs to be corrected for multiple comparisons. The
result is a difference map that identifies the voxels (or regions) where brain activity is
significantly different between the task conditions. To evaluate if the difference effects
can be attributed to the population, and not just a given subject in the study, a secondlevel analysis is carried out (typically random effects analysis, see Friston et al 1999). If
this analysis shows the difference to be consistent across subjects, then the cognitive
difference between the tasks is attributed to the regions of the brain shown to be
differentially active. To illustrate the conceptual logic of the process, consider van Orden
and Paap’s toy example in which task A is reading two words, and task B is reading two
words then judging whether or not they rhyme (1997). The resulting subtraction between
the imaging data obtained during task A and the data obtained during task B is taken to
indicate the regions of the brain that are involved in the cognitive process that underlies
the rhyming judgment.
Van Orden and Paap argue that the subtractive method cannot be used to locate where in
the brain cognitive functions ‘reside’ because the reliability of subtractive inferences
depends on several assumptions that they believe are not likely to be true. In particular,
the reliability of subtraction with respect to localizing cognitive functions to regions of
the brain requires that ‘. . . one must begin with a “true” theory of cognition’s
components, and assume that the corresponding functional and anatomical modules exist
in the brain’ (1997, p. S86). These assumptions, they argue, follow from the fact that a
valid subtraction requires that the task-difference precisely isolates a single cognitive
component, which can only be the case if the cognitive theory used to design the tasks is
accurate (p. S87). Additionally, they argue that functional localization using subtraction
further requires that those modules are feed-forward ‘. . . to insure that the component of
interest makes no qualitative changes “upstream” on shared components of experimental
and control tasks’ (p. S86), and that the contrasted tasks ‘. . . invoke the minimum set of
components for successful task performance’ (p. S86).
William Uttal engages in a similar kind of skeptical attack on neuroimaging in his book
(2001). Building on van Orden and Paap’s critique, Uttal compares neuroimaging to
phrenology and argues, among other things, that it requires the false assumption that
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cognitive processes are managed and maintained by isolable modules of the brain.
Valerie Hardcastle and Matthew Stewart (2002), express a similar type of skepticism,
arguing that the logic of neuroimaging is viciously circular and conclude that ‘. . .
neuroscientists cannot use the data they get to support their claims of function . . .’
because ‘. . . they are assuming local and specific functions prior to gathering appropriate
data for the claim’ (p. S80). These critiques all point to a vicious circularity in the
inference from the results of subtraction analysis to claims about the localization of
cognitive function.
Some philosophers have defended cognitive neuroscience from these criticisms. For
instance, Landreth and Richardson responded to Uttal’s arguments (2004) in part by
clarifying the details of how neuroimaging data are processed, analysed and interpreted.
Additionally, Roskies has rejected van Orden and Paap’s characterization of subtraction
(2010b). She argues that subtraction results are just one part of a more complex scientific
procedure that she calls functional triangulation, whereby ‘. . . information from other
task comparisons and other studies is brought to bear on the interpretation of
experimental data’ (p. 641). She also argues that characterizing neuroimaging as solely
aimed at localizing cognitive functions to specific brain regions, as the three critics noted
above do, is not representative of all uses of neuroimaging data. After providing
examples of the variety of theoretical aims neuroimaging and subtraction methods are put
towards she concludes that ‘without recognizing the diversity of the immediate goals of
imaging studies, it is impossible to do justice to the technique’ (p. 639).
Indeed, the recent development of new multivariate analysis techniques,5 which were
introduced to discriminate between modular and distributed accounts of the role that the

5

It is important to note that the techniques discussed here, collectively referred to as

multivariate pattern analyses (MVPA), are neither the only nor first multivariate
techniques to be used in neuroimaging. For example, spatio-temporal partial least squares
(PLS) is a multivariate technique that has been in use since the late 90s (McIntosh et al.
1996; 1998). I owe this clarification to an anonymous reviewer.
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ventral visual pathway plays in visual perception (Haxby et al. 2001), has motivated
cognitive neuroscientists to investigate hypotheses about the content of brain activity. In
a review of the theoretical uses of multivariate techniques the authors predict that ‘… the
enhanced sensitivity and information content provided by these methods should greatly
facilitate the investigation of mind-brain relationships by revealing both local and
distributed representations of mental content, functional interactions between brain areas,
and the underlying relationships between brain activity and cognitive performance’ (Tong
and Pratte 2012, p. 503). The study of mental content, neural representations and the
characterization of these in terms of distributed patterns of brain activity are very
different theoretical goals than the localization of cognitive functions to parts of the brain.
This is grist for Roskies’ mill. Whenever critics of neuroimaging research treat it solely
in terms of localization, the critics have failed to appreciate the variety of theoretical
applications that the technology is put towards. Furthermore, this theoretical shift, which
was made possible by the development of data analysis techniques that treat
neuroimaging data as multidimensional patterns, illustrates the importance of evaluating
analysis techniques other than subtraction when evaluating the epistemic value of
neuroimaging technology.
Despite these defenses of neuroimaging, and the theoretical and analytic advances in the
field of cognitive neuroscience, the general trend towards skepticism and the focus on
subtractive analyses has persisted. While more recent conclusions tend to be on the
milder side of skepticism, philosophers continue to challenge the ability of neuroimaging
technology to provide evidence that supports the claims neuroscientists use the
technology to investigate. Additionally, they continue to do so on the basis of an
evaluation of subtraction and subtraction logic. I will examine one of the most recent
contributions to this debate in more detail, as it challenges the inferences neuroscientists
make on the basis of an evaluation of subtraction and subtraction logic, and leans on the
rest of the skeptical literature to reinforce its conclusions (Aktunç 2014). In line with the
skeptical tradition, Aktunç argues that, while neuroimaging data are useful, they cannot
be used to support the kinds of hypotheses that cognitive neuroscientists use them to
support.
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Aktunç distinguishes between two types of hypotheses that neuroimaging data might be
brought to bear on. There are hemodynamic hypotheses, which relate BOLD signal
activity to the performance of cognitive tasks, or parameters of the tasks. There are also
theoretical hypotheses, which relate cognitive processes to the brain structures that
implement them (this distinction is from Huettel et al. 2008). To illustrate this distinction
consider the following example: The claim that patterns of BOLD signal activity in both
PrC and PhC are sensitive to differences between faces, buildings and chairs (Martin et
al. 2013, p. 10921), is a hemodynamic hypothesis. The tasks used in this study require
participants to judge images of faces, buildings and chairs as familiar or novel. Thus, this
claim is about the relationship between patterns of BOLD signal activity and features of
stimuli used in the cognitive task that participants performed. After discussing these
results, the researchers advance a theoretical hypothesis. They claim that the ‘. . . findings
indicate that both PrC and PhC contribute to the assessment of item familiarity’ (p.
10922). This is a theoretical hypothesis because it identifies two brain structures, PrC and
PhC, and specifies a cognitive process that they implement, the assessment of item
familiarity. It is worth noticing the inferential relationship between these two types of
hypotheses: the theoretical hypothesis is inferred from the hemodynamic hypothesis.
Where a hemodynamic hypothesis specifies BOLD signal activity, a theoretical
hypothesis specifies a structure of the brain. Likewise, where a hemodynamic hypothesis
specifies a cognitive task, a theoretical hypothesis specifies a cognitive process.
Given this distinction between hemodynamic and theoretical hypotheses, Aktunç uses
Deborah Mayo’s error statistical framework to argue that neuroimaging data can only
provide a severe test of hemodynamic hypotheses. On the simplest interpretation of
Mayo’s severity criterion, a hypothesis passes a severe test just in case (1) the data agree
with the hypothesis and (2) there is a sufficiently high probability that, if the hypothesis
were false, then the data would not agree with the hypothesis (Mayo 2005, p. 99).
Aktunç argues that, while neuroscientists may be interested in providing evidence that
supports theoretical hypotheses, neuroimaging only has evidential import with respect to
hemodynamic hypotheses (2014, p. 969). This is because a difference in mean BOLD
signal, which is the pattern identified by subtractive analyses, can be embedded in a
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statistical significance test. From this, Aktunç argues that ‘. . . using error probabilities,
we can find out whether specific fMRI experiments constitute a severe test of specific
hemodynamic hypotheses. Thus, fMRI data do have evidential import for hemodynamic
hypotheses’ (p. 969). His argument that theoretical hypotheses cannot be subjected to
severe testing relies on two premises. First, there is the ‘fact’ that ‘. . . fMRI obviously
does not test for the existence of cognitive modules or functions as defined by theories of
cognitive science’ (p. 969) because ‘. . . fMRI gives us data only on hemodynamic
activity . . .’ (Aktunç 2014, p. 968). The second premise rests on the arguments made in
the existing skeptical literature (specifically Uttal 2001; Hardcastle and Stewart 2002;
Klein 2010a). Thus, according to Aktunç, neuroimaging data cannot support theoretical
hypotheses because (1) the data are indirectly related to the content of those hypotheses
and, (2) critiques of subtraction analysis show that such inferences are viciously circular,
unstable or otherwise unreliable. Neither of these premises can support the derived
conclusion.
Inferences from neuroimaging results to theoretical hypotheses, like most inferences from
measurement results to theoretical claims, are ampliative; hemodynamic activity is at best
an indirect measure of neural activity (see Logothetis 2008), and task performance is at
best an indirect indicator of cognitive functions (see Poldrack 2010a). However, the
indirect relationship between the data and content of the theoretical hypothesis is not
sufficient to support the claim that neuroimaging cannot provide evidence for hypotheses
that relate cognitive functions to brain activity. Whether or not these inferences are
warranted depends on the particular theoretical hypotheses that are advanced, and
whether or not the assumptions required by the inferences are justified. Indeed, this is
how van Orden and Paap originally argued against the logic of subtraction. It was not on
the basis of the indirectness of the data itself, but on the basis of the specific assumptions
required to infer from the data to a theoretical hypothesis of a certain kind.
However, no matter where you stand on the reliability of inferences from subtraction
analysis to claims about the localization of cognitive functions, these arguments cannot
be grounds for a sweeping claim about the evidential scope of neuroimaging data. Just
because one data analysis technique has certain limitations does not mean that the data
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themselves are similarly limited. Indeed, neuroimaging data can be, and are, analysed
with other analysis techniques that reveal different patterns and correlations in the data.
Whether or not neuroimaging data provides evidence in support of theoretical hypotheses
depends on how the other analysis techniques help neuroscientists to mediate the
inferential gap between hemodynamic hypotheses and theoretical hypotheses.
Inferences to theoretical hypotheses from neuroimaging data can be, and in practice are,
strengthened by the use of multiple analysis techniques. The specific case I consider is
when analysis techniques are used in sequence as a way to validate assumptions required
by the primary analysis procedure. In the final section I distinguish this use of multiple
analyses from functional triangulation as discussed by Roskies, in which multiple
independent analyses provide convergent evidence for a hypothesis. In the next section I
provide a framework for evaluating the kinds of information about theoretical hypotheses
data analysis techniques provide.

2.3

Data Analysis and Evidence

The skeptical position reviewed in the previous section is a claim about the kinds of
hypotheses neuroimaging data can and cannot support. According to skeptics, it can
support hemodynamic hypotheses, which specify a relation between features of the data.
It cannot support theoretical hypotheses, which specify a relation between the phenomena
that those features are taken to indicate. Whether it is used to investigate a hemodynamic
or theoretical hypothesis, neuroimaging data needs to be manipulated to reveal
relationships between features of the data that are relevant to the hypothesis under
investigation. This is the function of data analysis techniques, such as subtraction and
pattern classification analysis.
Data analysis techniques transform the data produced by experimentation into evidence
suitable for statistical analysis. These transformations reveal patterns and correlations
between features of the data, which are then taken to be evidence in support of a
hypothesis. Bogen and Woodward’s distinction between data and phenomena (1988) is a
useful place to begin thinking about this process. Broadly speaking, they characterize
data, which are the result of the interaction between experimental design, implementation
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and measurement, as ‘. . . idiosyncratic to particular experimental contexts, and typically
cannot occur outside of those contexts’ (p. 317). Phenomena, on the other hand ‘. . . have
stable, repeatable characteristics which will be detectable by means of a variety of
different procedures, which may yield quite different kinds of data’ (p. 317). On this
view, data provide evidence for claims about phenomena, while claims about phenomena
provide evidence for theories.
Bogen and Woodward illustrate this by considering how one might determine the melting
point of lead (pp. 309-310). To do so, a researcher might take several measurements of a
sample of lead just after it melts. The data, in this case, is a collection of temperature
measurements. These temperature measurements provide evidence about the melting
point of lead, which is a claim about a phenomenon. The data are idiosyncratic because
the result of each temperature measurement depends on a complex network of causal
interactions, many of which are not related to the phenomenon of interest. The value of
each temperature measurement will be influenced by features of the thermometer used,
the heating apparatus, the sample of lead, the time of day, the ambient temperature, and
more additional causal factors than could be named. After collecting sufficiently many
measurements, the researcher averages them and, on the basis of the value of that
average, makes a claim about the melting point of lead. Notice that it is not the individual
temperature measurements, but the average value of the temperature measurements that
provides evidence in support of a claim about the melting point of lead. This calls
attention to a general feature of scientific practice: the individual data points, which are
the products of specific runs of an experiment, need to be transformed to reveal their
evidential value. Typically, this involves eliminating the effects of factors that contribute
to the value of specific data points that are not relevant to the theoretical question or
hypothesis under investigation. The data, without the influence of these factors removed,
speaks only to the melting point of this sample of lead, at this time, as measured with this
thermometer. Factors such as those arising from the peculiar features of the thermometer
used are irrelevant to the melting point of lead insofar as they distort or conceal patterns
in the data that reflect the ‘true’ melting point of lead.
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After data is produced it is manipulated so that the patterns relevant to the phenomenon
of interest are revealed and the irrelevant patterns are suppressed. Averaging the
temperature measurements of melted lead is intended to suppress the patterns in the data
caused by the irrelevant causal factors that contribute to the value of each specific data
point. Other examples of manipulations that suppress irrelevant patterns are noise
reduction procedures, and manipulations that remove the effect of measurement artifacts.
Averaging, as well as more complex analytic techniques such as those discussed in detail
below, transform data such that patterns relevant to the phenomenon in question are
revealed. The result of these manipulations is taken to be evidence for one or more claims
about the phenomenon. A data analysis technique, then, is a series of data manipulations,
or transformations, that clarify the evidential import of the data. 6
Different data analysis techniques can be distinguished by the data points that they
operate on and by the specific transformations of the data they involve. For example,
univariate and multivariate techniques can be distinguished by the data points that they
manipulate. Univariate techniques, such as subtraction, treat voxels as independent
variables while multivariate techniques, like pattern classification analysis (discussed in
detail below) and representational similarity analysis (Kriegeskorte and Kievit 2013),
treat the data as having many dependent variables. Data analysis techniques that operate
on the same class of data points, such as these two multivariate techniques, can be
distinguished by the particular manipulations they apply to the data. For example, pattern
classification analysis uses a machine-learning decision procedure to classify the data,
whereas representational similarity analysis uses a measure of similarity to compare brain
activity between task conditions.
Data manipulations are important because they transform otherwise complex data into a
form that investigators can interpret and statistically analyse7 (Good 1983, pp. 285-286).

6

Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this phrasing.

7

This process is often referred to as data reduction.
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Each manipulation, by virtue of the transformation that it makes, imposes assumptions on
the result. These assumptions limit what the result can be taken as evidence about. Just as
van Orden and Paap identified several assumptions required by the use of subtractive
analyses, most data manipulations require researchers to make assumptions about the
data. For example, a standard manipulation performed on neuroimaging data is the
removal of patterns caused by magnetic field drift. Magnetic resonance scanners use the
variations in a magnetic field to detect the BOLD signal, and the magnetic field in some
scanners slowly changes during the course of scanning. Manipulating data such that the
effects of field drift are removed requires assuming that the data are corrupted by
magnetic field drift. If the procedure is used on data produced by a scanner that does not
have a field drift, then the procedure would introduce artificial patterns into the data. It
would create artificial patterns in the data because the required assumption, that the
scanner has a field drift with specific parameters, is not true of the data. In the case of
field drift correction, the assumption can be validated by measuring the field drift of a
scanner. This simple example illustrates how data manipulations entail or require
assumptions to be made of the data, and shows that treating a specific data manipulation
in isolation from the rest of the experimental process can make the evidential status of the
data appear weaker than it in fact is.
Different analysis techniques operate on different data points, implement different
manipulations and require making different assumptions of the data. This is how they
reveal (and suppress) different data patterns. For example, subtraction reveals
correlations between average amplitudes of the BOLD signal and task performance.
Techniques like subtraction, when they include processes for smoothing and averaging
the signal, suppress information about differences in activity between voxels within a
region. Thus, some subtraction analyses are unable to reveal correlations between the coordinated activity of groups of voxels that preserve the same level of average activity
between tasks. On the other hand, multivariate techniques, such as pattern classification
analysis, correlate distributed patterns of BOLD signal activity with task performance.
Pattern classification analysis is sensitive to distributed activity patterns that univariate
techniques, like subtraction, cannot detect. However, multivariate techniques are less
sensitive to one-dimensional effects that covary with stimulus features, to which
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univariate techniques are very sensitive (see Davis and Poldrack 2013 for a detailed
discussion of the uses of these techniques).
By leveraging their differences, investigators can use several data analysis techniques
together to overcome the inferential limitations of a particular technique. The limitations
of a technique tend to derive from the assumptions that the technique requires. If
assumptions can be identified, depending on the nature of those assumptions, other data
analysis techniques can be used to validate them. In this way, the use of multiple analysis
techniques on the same data can strengthen an inference from the result of one analysis to
the target hypothesis by providing a clearer picture of the evidential import of the data.
Specifically, where a given analysis technique provides evidence that can support a
hemodynamic hypothesis, the inference from that hypothesis to a theoretical hypothesis
will require investigators to make further assumptions about the data. Since different data
analysis techniques reveal different patterns, it is often possible to validate some of those
assumptions by analyzing the data in another way. This is how multiple analysis
techniques can come together to strengthen the inference from a hemodynamic to a
theoretical hypothesis. Typically, this is done through functional triangulation (Roskies
2010a), where multiple techniques are used separately on the data, and the hypotheses
inferred are further supported by independent analysis of different data sets. The case I
will discuss below is different, as the evidence is strengthened not through the
independent application of multiple analyses, but the sequential application of analysis
techniques.

2.4
Case: Deconvolution and Pattern Classification
Analysis
Liu and colleagues’ study aims to determine the role that certain regions of the brain play
in directing attention (Liu et al. 2011). The primary analysis technique used is pattern
classification analysis, a multivariate technique derived from research on machine
learning. Pattern classification analysis is used to determine if cognitive tasks can be
differentiated exclusively on the basis of patterns in the BOLD signal that correlate with
task performance. As I argue below, this technique alone cannot support a theoretical
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hypothesis attributing a cognitive role to activity within a region or part of the brain.
However, Liu and colleagues do not deploy the technique in isolation. Their analysis
includes a region of interest selection procedure that partially validates one of the crucial
assumptions required by pattern classification analysis. While this does not provide
definitive evidence in support of the theoretical hypothesis they advance, it demonstrates
how multiple techniques can be used together to bring neuroimaging data to bear on
hypotheses beyond those that merely relate hemodynamic activity to task performance.
Two behavioural tasks were used to generate their data set. In both tasks subjects were
presented with two overlaid patterns of dots and were instructed to attend to one pattern
or the other. In the first task both patterns were composed of white dots, but one was
rotating clockwise and the other counterclockwise. In the second task, both patterns were
moving in a random-walk, but one was composed of red dots and the other green dots (p.
4485-6). The resulting data set contained BOLD signal measurements for each of the six
task conditions: attending to clockwise rotating dots, attending to counter-clockwise
rotating dots, attending to red dots, attending to green dots and the null-condition for each
task (attending to a fixation cross).
The data were pre-processed before they were analysed. This involved head motion
correction (to remove artifacts caused by subjects moving while being scanned), removal
of low-frequency drift (this corrects for a scanning artifact due to a drift in the magnetic
field of the scanner) and conversion of the BOLD signal measurements from raw values
into a percentage of signal change (p. 4486). The result of these transformations is a data
set suitable for the analysis procedures with patterns due to known artifacts from head
motion and scanner drift suppressed. The pre-processed data were analysed using a series
of analysis techniques. Before discussing the techniques in detail, I will provide a brief
overview of the whole procedure.
The analysis began with deconvolution, a technique used to isolate the task-relevant
portion of the BOLD signal data. The result of the deconvolution analysis was used as the
input for a region of interest (ROI) selection procedure. The combination of the
deconvolution and ROI selection was then used as the input for pattern classification
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analysis. The result of the pattern classification analysis was then taken to support a claim
about the regions of the brain involved in the modulation of attentional control. Notice
that this is not a claim about the relationship between task performance and
hemodynamic activity. It is a claim about which parts of the brain implement a particular
cognitive process (modulation of attentional control). It is about the relationship between
a cognitive function and regional brain activity. This is a theoretical hypothesis.
There are multiple inferences involved in moving from a hemodynamic hypothesis to a
theoretical hypothesis. Recall that a hemodynamic hypothesis relates BOLD signal data
to the performance of a task, whereas a theoretical hypothesis relates brain structure (or
the activity in brain structure) to a cognitive process. Inferring from one to the other
requires treating the BOLD signal measurements as an indicator of cognitively relevant
brain activity within a brain structure, and task performance as an indicator of one or
more cognitive processes. Whether or not the task can be taken as an indicator of the
cognitive function that the researchers are interested in depends on an underlying theory
of psychological processing, and the robustness of the accompanying task analysis. As
the focus of this paper is on the interpretation of the neuroimaging data, I’m going to
assume that the behavioural tasks used are reliable indicators of the modulation of
attentional control. It is worth noting, however, that this assumption does not generally
hold, especially given the relative lack of critical task analyses in neuroimaging research
(see Poldrack 2010b for a discussion).

2.4.1

Deconvolution Analysis

Not all of the measured changes in the BOLD signal are relevant to the subject’s
performance of the cognitive task. The first substantive step in analyzing neuroimaging
data is to extract the portion of the BOLD signal that corresponds with the task
manipulation. This process is called deconvolution. Deconvolution is an algorithmic
solution to a particular type of signal processing problem in which a signal of interest is
convolved, or mixed with, another signal. In general, deconvolving the signal of interest
requires solving an equation of this form:
(f ⊗ g) = h
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Where h is the recorded signal, f is the signal of interest and g is the signal that f needs to
be separated from. In the case of fMRI data, h is the measured BOLD signal, g is the
design matrix (a mathematical representation of the task) and f is the hemodynamic
response function (hrf). The hrf represents the change in blood oxygenation levels that
corresponds with the demands of the cognitive task that the subject performed. The aim
of deconvolution analysis is to identify the portion of measured brain activity that is
modulated by the task. Solving for the hrf requires pseudo-inverting the design matrix
and multiplying it by the measured BOLD signal (this is the matrix-algebra equivalent of
dividing both sides in the above equation by ‘g’ in order to calculate f).
It is important to note that this procedure only works when the trials are mathematically
separable, which can be achieved using an event-related design. An event-related design
is such that the stimuli or tasks are separated by an intertrial interval (usually there are
about twenty seconds between tasks). Investigators can then assume that task-relevant
BOLD activity occurs for short, discrete intervals corresponding to the onset of the task.
The intertrial interval supports this assumption by ensuring that the trial-relevant signal is
temporally localized, and does not uniformly influence subsequent trials.8
Mathematically, this amounts to assuming that task-relevant variation in the BOLD signal
is linearly summed with the task-irrelevant BOLD signal, and so the two can be separated
by the deconvolution procedure described above. It is worth noting that these (and the
following) assumptions are supported by supplementary empirical research, and are not

8

The intertrial interval does not need to be the same between every trial. Indeed, it is

typically jittered, or randomly varied so that the interval between any two pairs of trials
varies. The variation in intertrial interval is important for blocking certain confounds and
artifacts that can arise when event onset is uniformly spaced. Since jittered events are still
mathematically separable, I have omitted a detailed discussion of jitter for the sake of
simplicity.
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arbitrarily made or taken for granted (see Chapter 12 of Kass, Eden, Brown 2014 for a
technical introduction to linear regression).
Typically, researchers assume that the hemodynamic response has a canonical shape and
use that assumption to determine the form of the hrf. In this case, however, the
investigators did not want to assume that the hemodynamic response function takes the
canonical form and so they used a linear regression formula to model the hrf. This
decision eliminates confounds that might arise from deviations in the hrf from the
canonical model. The regression approach also allows the form of the hemodynamic
response function to vary from voxel to voxel, instead of assuming that the BOLD signal
follows the same pattern in every voxel.
Regression is a curve fitting procedure. The investigators specify an equation, a linear
one in this case, with unknown coefficients, that is fit to the data. In this case, the ‘data’
that the curve is fit to is the result of multiplying the BOLD signal measurements with the
inverted design matrix. The regression formula is expressed by the following equation: x
= 𝛽y + 𝝐. Regression requires assuming that errors are independent (which is ensured by
the event-related design) and that the noise term, 𝝐, is linearly additive. For each
regressor there will be an additional 𝛽y term. Liu and colleagues treated each
experimental condition as a separate regressor, which resulted in a total of six regression
terms (one for each of the clockwise, counterclockwise, red, green and null task
conditions).
Once the regression formula and design matrix are determined, the design matrix is
pseudo-inverted and multiplied by the measured BOLD signal. Then, the result of that is
used to determine the unknown 𝛽 values in the regression equation. Note that this
procedure is implemented for each voxel, and so each voxel will have its own set of 𝛽
values. The 𝛽 values are then filled into the linear regression formula and the result is the
hemodynamic response function.
The hemodynamic response function, as represented by the 𝛽 values, indicates the
portion of the measured BOLD activity that varies with task onset. This could be
understood as capturing the portion of the data that is relevant to the manipulation of the
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experiment. The 𝛽 values are used in both the ROI selection procedure and the pattern
classification analysis.

2.4.2

Region of Interest Selection

Once the hrf was calculated, the investigators used a goodness-of-fit measure to
determine the amount of variance in the measured signal that the hrf accounted for. This
provides an indicator of the portion of the signal that the hrf models accurately. To do
this, they first averaged the modelled activity (the 𝛽 values) over continuous groups of
voxels (which they took to indicate specific regions of the brain). Then, they calculated
the goodness-of-fit of the hrf, which is a measure of the amount of variance in the signal
that is accounted for by the hrf. To evaluate the statistical significance of the estimate
they used a permutation test (see Gardner et al. 2005 and Nichols and Holmes 2002 for
details on these procedures).
Where the hrf identifies the portion of the signal modulated by the experimental tasks, the
goodness-of-fit measure specifies the regions of the brain (understood as a collection of
nearby voxels) where the hrf accounts for a significant portion of the variance in the
BOLD signal data. The result of the procedure identifies regions of the brain where the
variation in activity is correlated with the task demands of the experiment. When the
variance of activity in a region accounted for by the hrf was sufficiently high, the
investigators concluded that activity in that region ‘. . . is modulated by feature-based
attention’ (p. 4488).
This interpretation of the analysis result is a hemodynamic hypothesis since it relates
variation in BOLD signal activity to specific task conditions. The particular
hemodynamic hypothesis advanced attributes the portion of the measured BOLD signal
captured by the 𝛽 values that satisfy the goodness-of-fit criteria to the behavioural tasks.
Calculating the hrf identifies the portion of the signal that corresponds with the onset of
each task condition, eliminating the task-irrelevant portion of the signal. The goodnessof-fit procedure identifies the areas of the brain for which the hrf accounts for a
significant portion of the variance in the activity. In other words, this ROI selection
procedure identifies the regions in which the measured variation of the BOLD signal can
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be explained in the context of the experiment. The result is used as a pre-processing step
to select regions of interest for pattern classification analysis. As I will show, this step
improves the strength of the experimental evidence for the theoretical hypothesis the
investigators infer by providing partial validation for a crucial assumption implicit in the
use of pattern classification analysis.

2.4.3

Pattern Classification Analysis

The primary aim of the study was to use pattern classification analysis to test ‘. . .
whether the pattern of fMRI response across voxels in an area could distinguish which
feature was attended, although the average amplitude9 did not’ (p. 4490). Pattern
classification analysis is a type of multivariate analysis technique that treats each voxel as
a dependent variable. The procedure involves four distinct stages: feature selection,
classifier selection, training and testing. Feature selection involves choosing the voxels
that will be included in the analysis. Typically, the chosen voxels are those within a
particular ROI, although how that ROI is defined varies from study to study. Regions of
interest can be defined anatomically, either using software to select the voxels that fall
within the anatomical ROI, or by manually tracing the ROI. They can also be defined
functionally, using a functional localization task. The BOLD signal data collected while a
participant performs such a task can be used to identify voxels that are strongly activated
during the performance of that task, which are then defined as the ROI. In this case, the
investigators selected the voxels indicated by the procedure discussed in the previous
section.10

9

The investigators reported on a third analysis in the paper that I do not discuss in detail.

That analysis, which adheres closely with the logic of subtraction, was intended to
investigate if average BOLD signal amplitude discriminated between the specific features
attended (red-dots vs. green-dots). It did not.
10

In addition to the analyses I discuss in detail, they also completed a whole-brain

searchlight analysis. A searchlight is a specific kind of feature selection and analysis
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Classifier selection involves choosing the classifier, which is a machine-learning
algorithm that will be used to implement the analysis. The classifier represents brain
activity in a multidimensional space where each dimension corresponds to the BOLD
signal value in each voxel. If three hundred voxels are selected, then the space has three
hundred dimensions. Each point in this space specifies a particular BOLD signal value
for each selected voxel and so corresponds to a particular state of brain activity. For the
purposes of this paper, the particular classifier used does not matter, but it is worth noting
that different classifiers have different strengths and weaknesses (see Misaki et al. 2010).
Once the classifier is selected it is trained and tested. During the training phase, the
classifier is presented with labelled data (the labels indicate the task condition, such as
‘attending to clockwise rotating dots’). The classifier identifies correlations between
patterns in the BOLD signal and the provided labels, and based on those correlations it
divides the multidimensional space into subspaces. Different classifiers use different
procedures for subdividing the multidimensional space. Once subdivided, the classifier
identifies each subspace with the task condition that is most frequently associated with it.
During testing, the classifier is presented with unlabelled data that it has not seen. It
locates the novel data in the multidimensional space and, based on the subspace that it
falls into, predicts the task label that corresponds with the data. A data point that is
located in the ‘attending to red’ subspace is labelled as ‘attending to red’. The predicted
labels are compared with the true labels and the classifier’s accuracy at predicting the
task condition on the basis of the BOLD signal data is calculated. The regions of the

process. In a searchlight, investigators define a volume (the ‘searchlight’), and then run
the pattern classification analysis procedure over voxels within that volume. Then, they
move the volume and run the analysis again. This procedure is typically used to identify
arbitrary subdivisions of the brain that result in reliable classification, or to examine how
classification accuracy changes as the classifier is given data from different parts of the
same network or part of the brain.
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brain (as defined by the ROI selection procedure) where the classifier performed with
sufficient accuracy are said to ‘. . . contain the control signals for maintaining attention to
visual features’ (p. 4493). That is to say, the investigators took the classification results to
indicate the regions of the brain that contain signals used for the maintenance of
attention. They are attributing a cognitive function to a particular region of the brain (in
fact, several regions of the brain). This is an inference to a theoretical hypothesis. In this
case the hypothesis specifies the particular role that the identified regions perform control of attentional processes.
The attribution of functional role is made on the basis of the information carried in the
signal that is necessary to support the cognitive function. It’s not just a claim that the
indicated regions ‘play such and such a role’, but, by basing this inference on pattern
classification analysis, it is a specification of that role in terms of the signal content.
Given this, the inference from the successful predictions of a pattern classifier to the
content of the brain activity, and subsequent attribution of functional role, requires
additional assumptions. One particular assumption is that the patterns leveraged by the
classifier contain information that is accessible to the brain.
One way to understand why this assumption is required is by distinguishing between the
informational and representational content of a signal. The informational content of a
signal is whatever facts you can learn from the signal. The representational content of the
signal is the message actually carried by the signal. Informational content and
representational content are not necessarily the same (Dretske 1981). Consider the
following simple case: you are in a closed room and someone in an adjoining room is
communicating a message by banging objects together. Perhaps they are using Morse
code to express a fact about the weather. With sufficient equipment and expertise you
could determine if the person in the other room is moving around, or features about the
materials that they are banging together. These facts are part of the informational content
of the signal, as they are facts you can learn by analyzing the signal. The actual message
being communicated, however, may have nothing to do with these facts. Indeed, in this
case the message is about the weather. It may even be the case that the individual who is
communicating does not have access to the facts you are able to infer from the signal.
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They may not know what material the objects are made of, and so could not possibly be
communicating those facts. Without some knowledge of Morse code, or additional
constraints beyond the signal itself, it is difficult to verify that facts learned from analyses
of the signal correspond to the representational content of the signal. Thus, showing that
regularities in a signal can be used to reliably make inferences or predictions about the
world, as pattern classification analysis does, is not sufficient to support the claim that the
signal is transmitting those facts.
In these terms, pattern classification analysis characterizes some of the informational
content of the BOLD signal. It identifies which tasks can be discriminated between on the
basis of patterns in the signal. The inference from the informational content of the BOLD
signal to an attribution of functional role requires the assumption that the informational
content extracted by the analysis reflects the representational content of the signal. Thus,
successfully making an inference to the role a region plays on the basis of pattern
classification requires, at least, that the information leveraged by the classifier is
accessible to the brain or, more broadly, the organism.
Neuroscientists are well aware of this limitation. Classifiers are known to be very
powerful and researchers caution against drawing inferences from the particular decision
metric that a classifier implements. This is because a classifier will leverage anything that
permits it to make reliable predictions, including patterns in the data irrelevant to
understanding the functioning of the brain (Anderson and Oates 2010). Tong and Pratte
relate an illuminating case of a classifier achieving near perfect accuracy at predicting the
experience of humour when a subject was watching a sitcom while in an MRI scanner
(2012). A close inspection of the classification process revealed that several voxels in the
data were located along the edge of a ventricle (ventricles are a hollow space in the brain
filled with cerebrospinal fluid). Since the ventricles contain no blood, the BOLD signal
there is zero. Thus, a voxel along the edge of a ventricle will display a significant change
in BOLD signal value should the subject’s head move (even slightly), such as when
stifling laughter. The classifier’s performance was due to a correlation between slight
head motion, humorous stimuli and voxels that overlap with ventricles. This is why
researchers use secondary analyses, such as the ROI selection procedure described above
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and the searchlight procedure described in footnote ten. These procedures help limit the
possibility of the classifier 'cheating', which in turn provides (some) validation for the
assumption that the information in the signal leveraged by the classifier is accessible to
the brain.

2.5

The Strength of Multiple Analyses

The analysis techniques discussed above support different types of hypotheses. The ROI
selection procedure supports a hemodynamic hypothesis about the relationship between
variation in the BOLD signal and variation in the task conditions. Pattern classification
analysis is taken to support a theoretical hypothesis about the functional role played by
parts of the brain in attentional processes. The difference in use reflects a difference in
evidence.
ROI selection identifies the portion of the data that can be explained in the context of the
experiment. Pattern classification analysis identifies the task conditions that can be
discriminated between on the basis of the fMRI data. The goodness-of-fit measure does
not provide evidence that could support a claim about what task conditions can be
discriminated between on the basis of the neuroimaging data. Likewise, the result of
pattern classification analysis cannot support a claim about the quality of the data, or
characterize which portion of the signal is modulated by the experimental manipulation.
Indeed, that the classifier will leverage any correlation between task label and fMRI data
suggests that it is particularly poorly suited to provide evidence in support of such a
claim. The difference in evidence can be traced to a difference in the manipulations of the
data. Through their different manipulations, the different techniques reveal different
patterns.
Using these analyses together strengthens the evidence provided by classification analysis
with respect to the target theoretical hypothesis. The permutation test indicates the
portion of the signal that can be explained in the context of the experiment. By using the
results of that procedure to select features for the classifier, the investigators ensured that
the patterns available to the classifier are only those contained in the portion of the signal
that is modulated by the experimental task. While this does not guarantee that the
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leveraged signal carries information that is accessible to the system, it ensures that the
leveraged variations are at least relevant to the experimental manipulation. In this way,
some of the confounds that might prohibit inferring from the result of classification
analysis to the target theoretical hypothesis are controlled for by using multiple analyses
in series.11
The permutation test, when used to select a portion of the data for classification, provides
validation for one of the problematic assumptions invoked by pattern classification
analysis. Not only do these analysis techniques have different evidential targets, but
brought together they provide stronger evidence for a theoretical hypothesis than either
could alone. In this way, multiple analysis techniques that provide different perspectives
on the same data and can strengthen the evidence produced in a single neuroimaging
experiment. This is a kind of local robustness.
Robustness has been used to defend experimental practice from critiques similar to those
discussed here. Specifically, Collins’ experimenter’s regress proposes a vicious circle
between experimental results and the techniques that produce those results. He argues
that a technique is verified only when it produces correct data, but a technique is only
known to produce correct data when it is verified (1985). The critiques raised against
neuroimaging by van Orden and Paap, which form the foundation of skepticism towards
the technology, are of a similar form. The main issue they identify is that subtraction
analysis requires assuming that the brain can be subdivided into functional parts, which is
the very claim the analysis result is taken to support. This is a localized case of the
experimenter’s regress where the feature of scientific practice under scrutiny is not an
instrument, but a data analysis technique.
Philosophers have argued that, with respect to the experimenter’s regress, the epistemic
situation is not as dire as Collins makes it out to be. Cartwright, for example, argues that

11

Although not all. I leave discussion of those details for future work as it is beyond the

scope of this paper.
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the regress is broken by the robust reproducibility of instrument results (1991).
Confidence in the report of an instrument is justified when the measurement result aligns
with results produced by a variety of instruments, each of which relies on independent
assumptions (p. 451-452). Culp offers a more careful defense along the same lines
(1995). She argues, via a detailed case study analysis of approaches to DNA sequencing,
that experimentalists are convinced that measurements are getting at the same
phenomenon when multiple measurement techniques, each with different theoretical
presuppositions, produces a robust body of evidence (p. 441).
Robustness is achieved when the same result is obtained by multiple, independent (or
mostly independent) techniques (Wimsatt 1981). Robustness analysis involves
determining the features of measurement or analysis techniques that are invariant under
changes in the technique that might influence the result (Calcott 2011). Robustness is
derived from the use of multiple independent approaches to detecting, isolating or
measuring the same target. The independence of measurement results is characterized in
terms of theoretical presuppositions required by the use of the instrument. These can also
be understood as assumptions researchers must make about the production of the
resulting data. Different instruments are independent insofar as they require different
assumptions. The same can be said of different data analysis techniques.
Data analysis techniques, because of the manipulations they impose on data, require
investigators to make assumptions about the result. These assumptions, if true, justify
interpretations of the result of the data manipulation or analysis procedure. Different
techniques, as used to support different hypotheses, require different assumptions.
However, there is a relevant difference between using multiple data analysis techniques
as I have described, and the use of multiple measuring instruments to detect the same
phenomenon. The robustness of a measurement outcome is improved when independent
techniques produce the same result. A defense of neuroimaging against van Orden and
Paap’s criticisms along these lines is offered by Roskies with her account of functional
triangulation (2010b). Functional triangulation occurs when different analysis techniques
produce the same result, and so generate a robust body of evidence. The situation I have
described is different.
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The techniques discussed above do not, and indeed cannot, provide the very same result.
While the results of the analyses are not precisely the same, they are similarly aimed. The
permutation test indicates the regions of the brain that may play a role in attentional
processing, and the pattern classification analysis further clarifies that role. Thus, while
they do not provide evidence in support of the very same hypothesis, the hypotheses they
individually support are mutually supportive. The permutation test provides support for a
hemodynamic hypothesis, and the subsequent analysis of the evidence revealed by that
test using pattern classification analysis is brought to bear on a theoretical hypothesis.
Insofar as this is a robust result, then, it might be regarded as a weakly robust result.
Weak because the techniques do not have the same outcome.12
In general, different data analysis techniques provide different perspectives on the same
data, and the use of multiple analysis techniques together can strengthen the quality of
evidence produced by a particular method or instrument. This can result in evidence that
can support inferences that may not be warranted by the result of a single analysis
technique or data manipulation. In this way, multiple analysis techniques used in series
can provide experimental results a kind of local robustness. It is ‘local’ because the
techniques ultimately depend upon each other. While the different perspectives are not
fully independent, because one analysis technique is used as a pre-processing step for a
subsequently applied technique, they still contribute to the robustness of the inference
because different techniques reveal (and suppress) different patterns and rely on different
assumptions. Their differences are what contribute to the strengthening of the evidence.
The general lesson of the experimenter’s regress is that problematic assumptions can
arise in the context of experimentation. The general lesson of the appeals to robustness is

12

This should not be cause for skepticism, at least not skepticism that is localized to the

particular case of neuroimaging. There is reason to believe that any difference between
measurement techniques can contribute to a difference in the phenomena probed by those
techniques (see Sullivan 2009 for a discussion of this with respect to neurobiology). If
this is true, then weak robustness is the norm for scientific knowledge.
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that those assumptions can (sometimes) be validated by comparing different perspectives
of the same subject. With respect to skepticism towards the use of neuroimaging data, I
have argued that problematic assumptions, which arise from the use of particular analysis
techniques, can be validated by using different data analysis techniques that require
different assumptions. This provides the inference with a (weak) local robustness.

2.6

Conclusion

I have demonstrated that different data analysis techniques provide evidence for different
phenomena and that multiple analysis techniques can be used together to improve the
epistemic situation in neuroimaging research. Thus, the debate about the epistemic status
of neuroimaging, which is framed in terms of the logic of subtraction, is at best an
evaluation of the limitations of analysis techniques that depend upon that logic. Sweeping
conclusions about the range of hypotheses that neuroimaging technology can and cannot
be used to investigate are not supported by this literature.
The argument presented above provides grounds for a mild optimism with respect to
neuroimaging technology. That is, optimism that it can be used to do more than provide
evidence about hypotheses specifying the relationships between BOLD activity and task
performance. I leave identifying what specific hypotheses and phenomena neuroimaging
technology can be used to investigate for future work, as completing this task will require
a careful evaluation of a representative collection of the data analysis techniques and
experimental strategies used in neuroimaging research. Given that different analysis
techniques provide different evidence, the diversity of techniques used in neuroimaging
research suggests that philosophers concerned with the epistemology of neuroimaging
should focus their attention on evaluating the evidential quality and scope of particular
analysis techniques (such as subtraction) and classes of analysis techniques (such as
multivariate analyses). Such evaluations should take into account the specific theoretical
goals they are put towards (functional localization, or tracking the content of neural
representations, to name two).
The general lesson here is that data analysis techniques play an important role in the
generation of scientific evidence. Differences in the data analysis procedure used and
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differences in how that procedure is implemented can make a difference to the range of
phenomena that the result of the analysis is informative about. This is a feature of
scientific practice in need of more careful philosophical attention.
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Chapter 3

3

The Interpretation of Neuroimaging Data as
Explanations of Data Patterns

3.1

Introduction

Debates about the inferences neuroscientists make on the basis of neuroimaging data
have persisted in the philosophical literature amidst significant changes in the methods
and techniques used in the field (e.g., van Orden and Paap 1997; Uttal 2001; Klein 2010).
In addition to their skeptical conclusions, these arguments are similar in a number of
respects. The neuroimaging data discussed consists in measurements of blood
oxygenation levels and is used to investigate cognitively relevant neural activity. The
indirect relationship between the measured data points and the targets of inference is
taken by some skeptics to be sufficient grounds for sweeping skepticism about the status
of these claims (e.g., Aktunç 2014a). These arguments also share an approach to
evaluating the inferential limitations of neuroimaging data. Skeptics tend to examine the
evidential relationship between the results of data analysis techniques, such as subtraction
and more recently pattern classification analysis (PCA), and the phenomena that
neuroscientists deploy those techniques to investigate. That is the localization of
cognitive functions and claims about neural representations respectively. The analyses
provided by the skeptics make explicit the logic implicit in the use of the techniques, and
argue that treating the results of subtraction as evidence for localization claims
(Hardcastle and Stewart 2002), or PCA results as evidence for claims about neural
representations (Ritchie, Kaplan and Klein forthcoming), is viciously circular, or
otherwise invalid.
Debates about the claims neuroimaging data can provide evidence for, and the best
methods for pursuing this research also occur between cognitive neuroscientists. For
instance, multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) is a relatively new collection of analysis
techniques that are often used to evaluate what information is carried in, or represented
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by, neural activity (Tong and Pratte 2012; Haxby 2010). Cognitive scientists have
criticized this use of MVPA methods by pointing out that changes in blood oxygenation
are indirectly related to neural activity, limiting the strength of inferences that can be
made (de-Wit et al 2015), and by clarifying how variations in the analysis process
contribute to the obtained results (Anderson and Oates 2010; Misaki et al 2010). These
concerns parallel those raised by skeptics. They draw out inferential challenges that
follow from the indirectness of the data, and examine how the particulars of the data
analysis processes used to investigate specific claims and hypotheses should influence the
inferences made on the basis of the analysis results. They diverge from the skeptical
arguments in their conclusions.
Where skeptics often recommend conservative interpretations of the data, insisting for
example that inferences should be restricted to claims about the relationship between
behaviour and blood oxygenation levels (Aktunç 2014a), neuroscientists continue to use
these data to make claims about the relationship between the brain and cognition. Indeed,
there has been a steady increase in the use of MVPA and claims about representations in
the brain. This is at least in part because MVPA techniques are regarded as useful for
investigating new questions and hypotheses, including questions about the content and
structure of representations in the brain, but also because neuroscientists continue to work
to improve their use (see Haxby et al 2014). While there are debates about the inferential
limitations of these techniques as noted above, most of the contributions to these
discussions are made by investigators who rely on them in their own research.
Neuroscientists and skeptics disagree about the implications of well-known challenges
with the use of neuroimaging data as evidence for particular kinds of claims. Other
contributions to the philosophical literature suggest two reasons for this disagreement: (1)
skeptical accounts overlook epistemically relevant details of the practice, and (2) some
philosophical approaches to evidence in science do not capture what is epistemically
good about the results of data analysis techniques as applied to neuroimaging data.
Like the skeptical arguments, the defences of neuroimaging research that resist them are
similar. They each point out that the critics have, in some manner or another,
mischaracterized the research process. This includes (a) focussing on rarely used
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statistical methods (Machery 2014 on Klein 2010), (b) simplifying the analysis processes
considered (Landreth and Richardson 2004 on Uttal 2001), (c) failing to consider
supplementary evidence (Roskies 2010 on van Orden and Paap 1997), and/or (d)
overlooking the diversity of analysis processes used to evaluate neuroimaging data
(Wright forthcoming on Aktunç 2014a). The general lesson here is that, while there may
be value in explicating the inferential limitations of specific analysis techniques, it is
important that these limitations are not taken to reflect limitations of neuroimaging
research as a whole, or even the limitations of a given neuroimaging data set. No matter
how central they appear to be to an empirical investigation, even powerful data analysis
procedures like pattern classification analysis do not comprise the full evidential base for
inferences in neuroimaging research (see Roskies 2010 and Wright forthcoming in
particular).
Separately from the debate over the efficacy of neuroimaging research, Jim Bogen uses
inferences in neuroimaging research to argue against the adequacy of Jim Woodward
(2000) and Deborah Mayo’s (1996) accounts of evidence in experimental science. This
argument shows that some philosophical approaches to examining inferences in
neuroimaging research are ill suited for addressing questions about the evidential value of
the data with respect to the claims neuroscientists use it to support. Mayo and
Woodward’s views locate evidential value in the ability to account for errors and produce
data that are accurate with respect to the content of the claims the data are used as
evidence for. Identifying, eliminating and reducing the impact of errors is certainly an
important part of the interpretation of neuroimaging data. This is the role that many data
analysis techniques perform, including the tools of inferential statistics and the data
manipulations used to eliminate artifacts, reduce noise, and amplify signal. However, this
is not the only contribution that data analysis techniques make to this process, and
treating it as such leads to systematically undervaluing neuroimaging data. Indeed,
Mayo’s account is at the heart of a recent contribution to the skeptical tradition that
argues that neuroimaging data's value is fundamentally limited because the techniques
used to analyze it, such as subtraction, do not constitute tests with sufficiently stringent
error-characteristics (Aktunç 2014a; 2014b).
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Orthogonal to the skeptical literature, Bogen argues that this should not be taken to
reflect a failure of inferences in neuroimaging research, but instead taken as a problem
for Mayo and Woodward’s accounts of evidence. The problem, Bogen argues, is that
neither account fully captures the evidential value of neuroimaging data (Bogen 2002).
His argument turns on the observation that “... what is epistemically good about
functional images is not that they are highly accurate with regards to [biological
indicator] levels or locations of individual brains” (p. S65), and further that the purpose
of manipulating imaging data is not to “... bring error-ridden, [biological indicator]
estimates recognizably closer to what would have resulted from ideal experiments
shielded from significant sources of error” (p. S65). Bogen's proposal is that we should
“… think of functional images as perfectly accurate, error free representations of the
anatomy and cognitively significant [biological indicator] of highly idealized, imaginary
brains” (p. S67). On this view, the epistemic value of the functional image is determined
by the degrees of resemblance between the idealized brain it portrays and the real brains
it is used to make claims about. The images need not be accurate in every respect, but
only in those respects that are relevant given the hypotheses under investigation (p. S689).
While Bogen focusses on neuroimages, which are one product of data analysis in
neuroimaging research, a similar argument could be made for MVPA techniques like
pattern classification analysis. The purpose of these techniques is not to better
approximate the results of an ideal experiment — such as one directly measuring the
representationally-relevant dimensions of neural activity — and so analyses of the
evidential value of neuroimaging data cannot treat them as such. The problem with the
skeptical literature is not just that skeptics ought to include more details about the
practice in their analysis, but that their approach to evaluating the inferences made in
neuroimaging research may itself need revision. The aim of this paper is to argue for a
new approach to examining inferences in neuroimaging research that is sensitive to the
epistemic role data analysis techniques actually play in those inferences.
My first step towards this is methodological. Instead of examining the logical structure of
particular inferences, I examine how data analysis techniques are used to arrive at those
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inferences in the first place. In doing so I focus on the data interpretation process in
which scientists use data analysis techniques to assess the evidential relations that hold
between the data at hand and a claim, and not the product of that process — which is an
inference, or judgement of evidential value. This work is informed by my experience
collaborating with neuroscientists, both as a lab member and as a collaborator (e.g.,
Martin et al 2015). This experience is what made clear to me that analyses of the
structure of inferences from data to claims must be complemented by an examination of
the processes and assumptions that scientists use to navigate and engage with the
challenges that complicate those inferences.
Inspired by Bogen's view on the epistemic value of neuroimages, in what follows I show
how data patterns are in general inferentially limited and yet valuable as evidence for the
claims neuroscientists regularly infer. A conceptual framework that is adequate with
respect to the actual practice of data interpretation in neuroscience must provide an
account of how the limited evidence provided by data patterns could be accumulated into
evidence sufficiently strong to justify the claims inferred. Julian Reiss’s pragmatic
account of evidence provides a good starting point for articulating the aspects of this
process (2015). In applying it I argue that the account of evidential accumulation Reiss
proposes is inadequate in the case of neuroimaging research. I argue instead that this
process has an explanatory character, and appeal to I.J. Good’s work on exploratory data
analysis to draw a parallel between the process of interpreting neuroimaging data and the
processes of exploratory data analysis (1986).
I proceed as follows: in section 2, I provide an overview of neuroimaging experiments
and outline three challenges with using neuroimaging data as evidence in cognitive
neuroscience. In doing so I identify an apparent tension in the use of data analysis
techniques to assess the evidential value of neuroimaging data. In section 3, I diffuse this
tension by looking more closely at pattern classification analysis (PCA) and the
relationship between its results and claims it is used to investigate. By distinguishing
between claims about data, claims about phenomena, and the evidential relations that can
hold between data and such claims, I show how the inferential limitations of data analysis
techniques outlined in section 2 do not undermine their usefulness in assessing the
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evidential value of neuroimaging data. In section 4, I argue that the strength of evidence
that a data set provides for a claim is a function of the explanatory relation that holds
between the claim and each of a variety of data patterns isolated by different analysis
techniques or variations of a single technique. I conclude in section 5 with reflections on
further questions raised by this account.

3.2

Neuroimaging Experiments

Neuroimaging experiments13 are used to learn about the relationship between brain
activity and cognitive functioning in humans. The research that I will focus on involves
the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure changes in the ratio
of oxygenated to deoxygenated hemoglobin in the brain, called the BOLD (blood
oxygenation level dependent) signal, as a subject performs a variety of cognitive tasks
(see Ashby 2011 for an introduction). Experiments involve placing a human subject in a
magnetic resonance imaging scanner while they perform a cognitive task, such as
attending to a rotating pattern of dots (Liu et al 2011), or deciding whether or not an
image is one they saw in a previous part of the experiment (Martin et al 2013). While the
participant performs the task, the scanner, using a functional scanning protocol, measures
changes in blood oxygenation throughout their brain. The resulting data set is used as
evidence for claims about the relationship between brain activity and cognitive
processing. This includes claims about the role regions play in cognition, such as the
claim that the hippocampus is involved in memory (e.g., Greicius et al 2003), and claims
about the information carried or represented in neural signals, such as claims that the
content of memories can influence their maintenance (e.g., Kim et al 2014). The first
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The discussion of experimental practice I provide is only as detailed as required for the

discussion that follows. It is informed by a variety of accounts of experimental practice
(Hacking 1983; Bogen and Woodward 1988; Mayo 1996; Woodward 2000; Sullivan
2009), and accounts of scientific data (Hacking 1983; Rheinberger 2011; Leonelli 2015).
For broader perspectives on experimentation in science Hans Radder’s volume The
Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation (2003) is an excellent place to start.
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claim is an example of a ‘localization claim’, since it attributes a cognitive role to a
particular region, network or part of the brain. The second claim is an example of what I
will call a ‘representational claim’, since it is about the information carried in, or
represented by, patterns of brain activity (in this case, the content of memories).
Skeptics tend to emphasize two challenges for these inferences: (1) neuroimaging data
consists in measures of blood oxygenation and behaviour, and thus cannot be used to
reliably make inferences about neural activity and cognitive processes (Aktunç 2014a;
2014b); and (2) the techniques used to analyze neuroimaging data require investigators to
make assumptions that undermine the inferences those techniques are used to support
(Hardcastle and Stewart 2002; Ritchie, Kaplan and Klein forthcoming). The first of these
challenges is often supported by an argument from underdetermination. The indirect
nature of the data, combined with the complex interconnectedness of neural systems,
ensures that there are a large number of viable alternative claims that the results of a
neuroimaging experiment are consistent with. This is regarded as sufficient grounds for
suspicion (Mole and Klein 2010; Klein 2012; Aktunç 2014a). The second challenge
usually accompanies a logical analysis of the use of a popular data analysis technique,
such as subtraction or pattern classification analysis. These analyses identify assumptions
implicit in the operation of the techniques, or the most common interpretations of their
results, that undermine the inferences either because the assumptions are likely to be
false, or worse make the inference viciously circular (van Orden and Paap 1997; Uttal
2001; Hardcastle and Stewart 2002; Ritchie, Kaplan and Klein forthcoming).
As noted above, arguments against these skeptics tend to identify epistemically relevant
aspects of the data interpretation process that skeptics deemphasize, overlook or fail to
take into account. While these are grounds for denying the conclusions, skeptics arrive at,
the skeptical views are not without merit. Even if their conclusions are not warranted
because they overlook a relevant aspect of the practice they criticize, they still identify
genuine inferential challenges characteristic of neuroimaging research. These are the
challenges that investigators must somehow overcome if they are to justifiably infer, for
example, representational claims, on the basis of data produced in a neuroimaging
experiment. An adequate account of the interpretation of neuroimaging data must identify
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how these challenges originate, and how the interpretation process engages them. The
aim of this section is to address the first requirement, while the remainder of the paper
addresses the second.
I have divided this section into two parts: data production and data interpretation
(following Woodward 2000). The primary reason for this is pragmatic, as doing so makes
it easier to locate the origins of the challenges noted above and identify a tension in the
use of data analysis techniques to address them. To this end, I use data production to refer
to any and all processes by which investigators assemble, produce or access a collection
of data for the purpose of learning about one or more target phenomena. Data
interpretation, on the other hand, refers to the processes investigators engage in to assess
the evidential value of the produced data with respect to claims about the phenomena of
interest. The product of data interpretation is an inference from the produced data to one
or more claims about phenomena.

3.2.1

Data Production

Data production in neuroimaging research involves collecting data about structural
features of participant’s brains, changes in brain activity, and details about each
participant's behaviour during the experiment. This comes in the form of three distinct
data sets: structural, functional and task data. These data sets are used together to make
claims about the features and anatomical origins of cognitively relevant brain activity and
the cognitive processes, states, functions or capacities that are correlated with that
activity.
Structural data are obtained using a magnetic resonance imaging scan. This data set
captures information about anatomical features of the scanned brain such as the shape of
regions, the size and location of folds (sulci and gyri), and the division between grey
matter (areas mostly consisting of neuron cell bodies) and white matter (areas mostly
consisting of axons).
Functional data are collected using scanning protocols that measure the ratio of
oxygenated to deoxygenated hemoglobin in small ‘pieces’ of the brain. The pieces that
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the scanner divides the brain into are called voxels, which are typically 2 to 3 mm
cubes.14 A functional scan measures the ratio of oxygenated to deoxygenated hemoglobin
within each voxel. This is called the BOLD, or blood oxygenation level dependent,
signal.
Task data consists in features of the task, stimuli parameters, and measurements of task
performance. Task data are used to identify the cognitive functions, states and processes
engaged by the participant during the experiment. This data consists in measurements of
externally accessible behaviours that are used to make claims about cognitive processes
internal to the subject that are themselves not directly detectable. In this way, the data are
indirectly related to the phenomena that they are used to make claims about. Steps are
taken in the production stage to overcome this limitation and provide opportunities for
addressing it during the interpretation stage.
Investigators design tasks to target specific cognitive states or processes and use
behavioural measures to detect instances of those states or processes. For example, in an
experiment where participants must attend to one of two overlapping gratings, the
investigators may require participants to press a button when the grating they are
attending to changes in size. By controlling when each grating changes in size the
behavioural data can be used to accurately classify each instance of the task (Kamitani
and Tong 2005). Task parameters are also used to discriminate between instances of
cognitive processes. For example, the properties of a field of dots can be varied in order
to contrast attention-to-colour with attention-to-motion (Liu et al 2011). Typically, a

14

The relatively new 7-Tesla scanners have more powerful magnets than the 3.5-Tesla

scanners that have become the standard for neuroimaging research. 7T scanners, since the
increase in field strength increases the signal, allow for functional scans with voxels as
small as 0.7mm cubes. The increase in signal, however, calls for new methods to analyze
the data. Work is ongoing to understand how 7T measurements compare with the results
of weaker scanners, and for the sake of simplicity I will not discuss them here (e.g.,
Seiger et al 2015).
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combination of behavioural measures, properties of the stimuli, and task demands are
used to control, and later evaluate, what cognitive processes are engaged by subjects
during an experiment.
Like task data, functional data are also indirectly related to the causal factors that give
rise to the phenomena they are used to investigate. This is one of the central challenges
with using neuroimaging technology to investigate the relationship between cognitive and
neural processes. The fact that access to information about neural activity is mediated
through measures of the BOLD signal places limits on the specificity of the claims that
BOLD signal data can support about neural activity. For instance, it is known that “[t]he
fMRI signal cannot easily differentiate between function-specific processing and
neuromodulation, between bottom-up and top-down signals, and it may potentially
confuse excitation with inhibition” (Logothetis 2008, p. 877). That is to say, there is a
number of functionally distinct neural activation patterns that can give rise to a given
BOLD signal measurement. This fact is often noted by critics of inferences made on the
basis of neuroimaging data (e.g., Klein 2012; Aktunç 2014a).
Compounding the challenge arising from the indirect relationship between the data and
phenomena is the growing body of evidence showing that observed localized change in
brain activity, say in the hippocampus, could be the result of any of a number of possible
upstream activities. This is because a number of the brain regions have connections that
feed into the hippocampus, and any of those — or a combination of them — could be
responsible for the observed change. This has been identified as an inferential challenge
by skeptics (Klein 2012), and neuroscientists (Marder 2015). This adds to the number of
claims that a given result might support, further amplifying the underdetermination of
inferences in neuroimaging research that was already high due to the indirect nature of
the data.
A well-designed experiment is one that is capable of producing data that has the potential
to recommend accepting or rejecting the hypothesis it was produced to investigate.
However, a data set does not, merely by its production, provide evidence for or against
any particular hypothesis or claim. When the data is in hand investigators must make a
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judgement about which claims the data provides evidence in favour of, and which claims
they provide evidence against. To make such an assessment is to make a judgement of the
evidential value of the data with respect to a number of claims about phenomena. Thus
begins the stage of data interpretation.

3.2.2

Data Interpretation

Assessing the evidential value of neuroimaging data requires investigators to analyze and
manipulate it. Scientists working with neuroimaging data are well aware of the
limitations discussed above, that is the indirect nature of the data and the implications of
the interconnectedness of brain systems. To determine whether or not a given data set
provides evidence for or against a target claim, investigators manipulate the data. While
there are data manipulations, referred to as ‘pre-processing steps’, whose primary
function is to eliminate errors in the data (see Poldrack, Mumford & Nichols 2011, Ch 3,
p. 34-50), the techniques skeptics emphasize in their critiques are not amongst these
procedures. Techniques like subtraction, and pattern classification analysis, perform a
distinct epistemic role. Instead of correcting for errors, they are used to directly assess the
evidential value of the data set with respect to specific claims. Localization claims in the
case of subtraction, and claims about representations in the case of pattern classification
analysis.
Take pattern classification analysis (PCA) as an example. PCA involves training a
machine learning classifier to correlate BOLD signal measurements with either task
conditions (such as ‘dots rotating clockwise’ or ‘dots rotating counterclockwise’), or
cognitive processes (such as ‘attending to rotating dots’ or ‘attending to counterclockwise rotating dots’). Then, the classifier is provided with BOLD signal data and
assigns a label to it. When the classifier’s accuracy at labelling the functional data is
significantly above chance investigators interpret this as showing that information in the
BOLD signal permits the discrimination of the task conditions or cognitive processes the
classifier was trained to label (as in Haxby et al 2001; Kamitani and Tong 2005; Liu et al
2011; Martin et al 2013; Sandberg et al 2014). PCA results are often treated as evidence
for claims about information in or carried by brain activity (Norman et al 2006), an
inference that philosophers have recently criticized for assuming that the ability to decode
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a signal is directly informative about the information carried in that signal (Ritchie,
Kaplan and Klein forthcoming). Concerns about what can be inferred from the results of
PCA are echoed in the scientific literature (Anderson and Oates 2010; Davis and
Poldrack 2013; de-Wit et al 2015).
This points towards a tension in the use of data analysis techniques to find patterns in the
data that are informative about specific hypotheses or phenomena. On one hand, tools
like PCA are necessary for assessing the evidential value of neuroimaging data with
respect to claims about phenomena that are indirectly related to the measured data points
— representational claims in particular. Without techniques for identifying patterns in the
data that are informative about the target phenomenon, neuroimaging data are at best
useful for studying the relationship between blood oxygenation levels and behaviour. On
the other, the use of these techniques introduces assumptions into the inference from the
data to the target claim — assumptions that have been identified as threats to the validity
of those inferences (van Orden and Paap 1997; Hardcastle and Stewart 2002; Anderson
and Oates 2010; Davis and Poldrack 2013; Ritchie, Kaplan and Klein forthcoming).
Even with knowledge of these challenges, neuroscientists continue to regard
neuroimaging data as a valuable source of evidence for claims about the informational
content of brain activity, and the relationship between the brain and cognition more
generally (Haxby et al 2014). In the rest of this paper I examine the process of data
interpretation neuroscientists typically engage in, and identify how that process is
sensitive to these challenges. Data analysis techniques like PCA play an important role in
this process, and accounting for their contribution requires diffusing the apparent tension
in the use of data analysis techniques to interpret neuroimaging data. This is the task of
the next section.

3.3

Data and Evidence

The indirect relationship between the data and phenomena they are used to investigate
make it necessary to manipulate the data in order to assess their evidential value.
However, the techniques used to do so appear to rely on, or invoke, assumptions that can
undermine the resulting inferences to claims about the target phenomenon. In this section
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I diffuse this apparent tension. Doing so requires distinguishing between kinds of claims
about phenomena that arise as part of the data interpretation process, and also
distinguishing between two evidential relations that can hold between evidence and a
claim. Making these distinctions shows how techniques like pattern classification
analysis are unable to provide sufficient evidence to justifiably infer representational
claims, and yet can be useful for assessing the evidential value of the data they are
derived from with respect to such claims. I begin with an overview of pattern
classification analysis.
Pattern classification analysis (PCA) is a multivariate analysis technique that is used to
examine the informational content of brain activity (Norman et al 2006; Haxby 2014).
The results of PCA indicate the extent to which it is possible to use one set of
experimental variables to predict the values of another. The procedure of implementing
PCA has four major steps: (1) feature selection, (2) classifier selection, (3) training, and
(4) testing.
Feature selection involves identifying a portion of the functional data set to be used in the
pattern classification analysis. Feature selection is driven by considerations of the
hypothesis or claim of interest, and ideally picks out data points that are most likely to be
informative about that target. Features may be selected by their anatomical location (Liu
et al 2011), by their responsiveness to particular task conditions (Martin et al 2013), a
mixture of these factors, or by a stochastic procedure (Etzel et al 2013). Classifier
selection involves selecting, or programming, the machine learning classifier that will be
used in the analysis. Both pragmatic considerations and features of the hypotheses and
data sets are relevant for selecting a classifier. For instance, a Gaussian Naive Bayes
classifier is better for procedures that need to be repeated may times since it can be
trained faster than others, while Support Vector Machines tend to work best when there
are only two experimental conditions that the classifier has to select between (Pereira,
Mitchell and Botvinick 2009; Pereira and Botvinick 2011).
With features and a classifier in hand, the subset of data picked out by the feature
selection process is divided into two portions, one for training and one for testing. The
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functional data in the training set are provided to the classifier along with labels of the
task or cognitive process it is associated with. During training the classifier develops a
decision procedure, based on correlations between BOLD signal patterns and the labels
that it will use to label novel data. Finally, the labels are removed from the portion of the
data that it was not trained on and the classifier assigns labels to these data according to
its decision procedure. The assigned labels are compared against the true labels and the
accuracy of the classifier is calculated. The accuracy of the classifier during the testing
phase is the primary output of this analysis procedure.
The primary advantage cited for using PCA, and MVPA methods more generally is that
they can be used to ‘decode’ the neural signals (Norman et al 2006; Kriegeskorte, Mur
and Bandettini 2008; Tong and Pratte 2012). Some advocates of the method go so far as
to claim that MVPA techniques have “… allowed researchers to access the contents of
thoughts in considerable detail” (Haynes 2012, p. 30). Others recommend restraint in
treating the results of PCA and similar techniques as ‘reading off’ the neural code
(Anderson and Oates 2010; Davis and Poldrack 2013). Even the cautious, however, still
regard the technique as useful for investigating claims about the content of
representations in the brain, at least when the methods of analysis and interpretation are
appropriately tempered by considerations of their limitations (Etzel et al 2013; Davis et al
2014; Haxby et al 2014).
MVPA techniques like PCA are often advocated for on the grounds that they bring “...
fMRI investigation closer to investigating the codes for how functions are represented in
neural population responses…” (Haxby 2010, p. 56). PCA techniques allow for a ‘closer
look’ insofar as they are sensitive to smaller variations in the BOLD signal than other
methods of analysis, not because they 'pick out' the representations directly (Haxby 2010,
p. 57). MVPA methods, of which PCA is an example, are sensitive to different kinds of
variations in the data than the subtraction methods that originally dominated the research
literature. In particular, they are sensitive to multidimensional effects that cannot be
detected by techniques like subtraction. This increased sensitivity comes at a cost, as
there are some patterns subtraction and other univariate methods are better suited for
highlighting (Davis and Poldrack 2013).
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Inferring, on the basis of successful classification, a claim about the content of a
representation in the brain, has been a recent target of criticism in the philosophical
literature (Ritchie, Kaplan and Klein forthcoming). The interpretation objected to is
treating significant classifier accuracy as “… strong evidence that the information is
represented by the patterns of activity used as the basis for the decoding” (p. 8). Such an
inference starts from a successful classification result, which establishes that the
functional data contains sufficient information to predict the task labels, and from there
concludes that this information is available to the classifier because it is represented in
the brain activity underlying the BOLD signal measurements.
This inference, the authors argue, is undermined by a ‘fundamental methodological issue’
with classification techniques (p. 9). The problem is in assuming that the classifier uses
the same information carried by, encoded in, or represented by the neural activity
underlying the BOLD signal to label the novel data. However, classifiers are known to
rely on any available correlations to make their predictions, and their performance is
influenced by a number of decisions made in the course of the analysis. For example, the
particular classifier (Misaki et al 2010), the method used to select data points for
classification (Pereira, Mitchell and Botvinick 2009), and the timing windows that the
functional data are divided into (Kohler et al 2013), can all influence classification
accuracy.
It is on these grounds that Ritchie and colleagues conclude that “[a]t best, MVPA-based
decoding shows that information about experimental conditions is latent in neural
patterns. It cannot show that this information is used, or is even usable, by the brain” (p.
15-6). In a footnote, they argue that this argument retains its force even if the inference
were adjusted, and classification results are taken to be weak (as opposed to strong)
evidence for claims about representations (p. 16). Classification accuracy is insufficient,
on its own, to warrant any claim about representations.
This exemplifies the tension noted in the previous section: PCA is used because it is
regarded as informative about the content of representations in the brain, but the way the
analysis technique is applied and the decisions made in its implementation conspire to
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undermine its value as evidence for claims about representations in the brain. If the
function of these techniques is to ‘close the gap’ between the data and target phenomenon
by approximating the results of measurements of the relevant casual factors, then it would
be fair to treat the classification results as the evidence upon which claims about
representations are inferred. This account of their epistemic role mischaracterizes the
contribution analysis techniques like PCA make to assessments of the evidential value of
the data.
PCA allows investigators to determine if a task or cognitive processes can be predicted or
classified via variations in the functional data15. Even considering the assumptions and
challenges noted above, accurate classification is informative insofar as it demonstrates
that information is available in the functional data. While PCA results cannot justify an
inference to a claim about representations, they can be used to justifiably infer a claim
that ‘pattern-variations in the BOLD signal permit reliable discrimination of task
conditions X, Y and Z’, which is a claim about what the classifier has shown to be
possible. This inference is not disputed by Ritchie and colleagues. They object to the
further inference from these results to a claim about representations. The first step
towards diffusing the tension in this use of data analysis techniques is to distinguish
between the kinds of claims data analysis results can, on their own, justify and those they
cannot.
The assumptions involved in PCA prohibit the analysis results from justifying
representational claims, but claims about the information contained in the data are within
reach. The first of these claims is a claim about the phenomena that the data were
produced to evaluate, while the second is a claim about a regularity in the data — that is
the information about task labels available from measures of BOLD signal activity. The

15

This has been referred to as a ‘reverse inference’, a practice that has only come to be

viewed as possible with the development of MVPA techniques (compare Poldrack 2006;
2011).
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targets of these claims map roughly onto what Uljana Feest calls ‘hidden’ and ‘surface’
phenomena (2011).
According to Feest, surface phenomena are “... equated with empirical data patterns that
are either found in the world or created in the lab…” and hidden phenomena are “... more
removed from particular regularities…” (p. 63). Surface phenomena occur as data
patterns, while hidden phenomena are indicated by, and so are more removed from, the
data. This distinction tracks the difference between claims about the discriminability of
task conditions, which are justified by patterns in the data, and claims about
representations, which are distant from the data and are not justified by the results of any
particular data analysis procedure. Multiple analysis procedures, or multiple data
patterns, are the required evidence for claims about hidden phenomena. If not evidence
that justifies an inference to claims about hidden phenomena, then what contribution do
techniques like PCA make to assessments of data’s evidential value with respect to those
claims?
An inference from data to a claim is a judgement of the evidential value of the data, but
not all assessments of evidential value conclude with an inference. For instance, Sabina
Leonelli, in a discussion of the processes involved in accessing and using data from a
shared repository, notices that scientists first judge the relevance of the data, then the
strength of evidence it provides for or against the hypotheses they are interested in
(2009). More generally, Julian Reiss’ pragmatic account of evidence recognizes these
judgements as reflecting different evidential relations that can hold between a body of
evidence and a claim (2015).
Reiss argues for a theory of evidence16 that provides “... criteria and guidelines that
translate between knowledge of the facts relevant to a hypothesis and judgements about

16

The account of evidence briefly discussed here is intended for evaluating evidence in

situations that are not ‘epistemically ideal’. This is certainly the case in neuroimaging
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the hypothesis” (p. 343). He refers to these as ‘supporting evidence’ and ‘warranting
evidence’ respectively. Supporting evidence is evidence that a fact, data set or source of
information is relevant for evaluating a hypothesis or claim. Supporting evidence can be
directly or indirectly related to a claim. A result directly supports a hypothesis when the
result is predicted by the hypothesis, and indirectly supports it when the result is
incompatible with one or more alternative hypotheses (p. 347). Warranting evidence, or
warrant, is grounds for inferring that a given hypothesis or claim is true (p. 342-3).
Applying this distinction to the results of PCA diffuses the apparent tension in its use.
PCA aids the assessment of the evidential value of the data with respect to
representational claims by providing supporting evidence for those claims. The support is
provided via the claim about the data that is warranted by the PCA results. The kind of
support provided depends on the details of the experiment. Direct support requires that
the evidence, the claim about the data in this case, is predicted by the claim about the
target phenomenon. Indirect support requires the claim about the data to be consistent
with the target claim and inconsistent with a number of alternative claims about the
phenomenon. I briefly consider examples of each.
On the minimal assumption that at least some differences in representations in the brain
are “… represented by different patterns of neural firing…” (Norman et al 2006, p. 425),
the claim that ‘region y represents cognitive dimension x’ predicts that differences in
brain activity in region y can be used to discriminate between cognitive states that vary
along dimension x. For example, it has been proposed that pattern classifier accuracy
could be used to identify candidates for neural correlates of consciousness (Sandberg et al
2014). The logic behind this is that neural activity representing the content of an
experience will be more consistently correlated with that experience, and so the BOLD
activity correlated with that activity should permit more accurate and consistent

research where causal factors of interest cannot be intervened upon, and the data points
measured are indirectly related to the phenomena of interest.
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classification of a participants' awareness of stimuli (p. 4). In such a case, high classifier
accuracy would provide direct support for a claim about neural correlates of
consciousness, as the target claim about phenomena predicts a claim about data. That is,
classification accuracy will be high for regions where candidate neural correlates occur.
The first use of pattern classification techniques in neuroimaging research provides an
example of indirect support (Haxby et al 2001). In that paper, Haxby and colleagues used
PCA to argue that object representations in the hippocampus are distributed throughout
the region and not localized to specific areas such as the ‘parahippocampal place area’ or
‘fusiform face area’. They use PCA to show that the brain activity could be used to
discriminate the object categories of stimuli with high accuracy even when the data from
the specialized sub-regions is excluded from the analysis. This result is consistent with
the distributed representation hypothesis and inconsistent with the localized
representation hypothesis. In this way the classifier’s performance provides indirect
support for the distributed processing claim.
By providing supporting evidence, directly or indirectly, for representational claims
pattern classification analysis is able to assist in the assessment of the evidential value of
neuroimaging data with respect to those claims. This is consistent with arguments that
PCA results are unable to justifiably warrant such claims. While this accounts for the
contribution that data analysis techniques make to the interpretation of neuroimaging
data, it is not sufficient to explain how such inferences could justifiably be made.
Fortunately, multiple data analysis techniques are used to assess the evidential value of
neuroimaging data (e.g., Wright forthcoming). Each individual technique at best provides
supporting evidence for claims about the target (hidden) phenomena, and only justifies
claims about the data (or surface phenomena). For the inferences that the data
interpretation process results in to be justified, the process must be such that identifying
and interpreting a number of data patterns ‘adds up’ to warrant. Doing so requires the
process to be sensitive to the other line of skepticism: the underdetermination due to the
indirect nature of the data and complexity of the system under investigation.
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3.4

Explaining Data Patterns

The data patterns that are the result of a data analysis technique are inferentially limited.
They provide warrant for claims about the data, reflecting surface phenomena, but merely
support claims about the hidden phenomena that are the targets of investigation. In
practice, multiple techniques and variations on those techniques are used to assess the
evidential value of neuroimaging data. What remains to be shown is how these results
can elevate the data set they are derived from to the status of warranting evidence. Put
another way, by what process of reasoning are the claims about the data inferred from
data analysis results brought to bear on the target claim about phenomena?
Warrant, on Reiss’ view, is a feature of a diverse body of evidence that includes both
direct and indirect support. Crucial to this process is the rejection of alternatives, which is
provided by indirect support (p. 357-8). As Reiss notes, rejection of alternatives is a
judgement, and supporting evidence at best recommends a decision, but cannot decisively
rule out all possible alternatives (p. 354). Reiss identifies a number of pragmatic criteria
that scientists rely on when such judgements come into conflict. These include the effect
size, study characteristics and political, social and economic considerations (p. 355-6).
While enumerating pragmatic criteria is useful for explicating the factors that contribute
to a given inference that is the product of an assessment of evidential value, it leaves
unspecified the details of the reasoning process by which such judgements are arrived at.
This is especially true in the context of criticisms of neuroimaging research, where the
underdetermination of claims about phenomena challenge the adequacy of assessments of
the warrant of claims based on neuroimaging data.
For example, Christopher Mole and Colin Klein argue that inferences from neuroimaging
data often mistakenly treat consistency with a claim as evidence for that claim (2010, p.
101). They argue that the mere consistency of data and a hypothesis is insufficient
grounds for inferring, assenting to or believing the hypothesis in question because
consistency does not entail that alternatives are ruled out, and it is only by ruling out
alternatives that hypotheses are confirmed (Mole and Klein 2010, p. 100). This is in line
with Reiss’ pragmatic account of evidence, which puts the weight of warrant on how
much direct support there is for the alternatives ruled out by the indirectly supporting
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evidence (2015, p. 359). Unfortunately, the indirect nature of neuroimaging data and the
causal complexity of neural and cognitive systems ensure that viable alternatives appear
easy to come by.
Mole and Klein argue that aspects of neuroimaging data provide ample space for
constructing viable alternatives to an inferred claim. These include appealing to details of
the experiment not explicitly considered in the interpretation (2010, p. 105), varying the
parameters of analysis procedures (p. 108), and adopting alternative background theories
(p. 109). Even if the details and conclusions of this argument are not aligned with the
practice17, they raise an important challenge for inferences in neuroimaging research.
Pragmatic criteria of the form Reiss proposes will not be sufficient for addressing this
challenge, as they do not address what appears to be a persistent underdetermination of
the inferences. A comparison with the severity requirement in Mayo’s error-statistical
account of evidence is suggestive of what is missing from the story so far (1991; 1996;
Mayo and Spanos 2010).
The severity requirement states that, where T is a statistical test, e is an experimental
outcome or data set, and H is a hypothesis or hypothetical claim, “[p]assing a test T (with
e) counts as a good test of or good evidence for H just to the extent that H fits e and T is a
severe test of H” (1996, p. 180). In other words, the evidential value of data with respect
to a claim is a function of the severity of the relationship between the data, a claim and
the testing procedure that connects them. Severity is not an all-or-nothing feature of a
test. Instead, it can be improved by eliminating alternatives, testing assumptions of the
statistical models, and identifying sources of experimental error — all of which are

17

Mole and Klein’s argument is specifically based on the logic of null-hypothesis

statistics testing, which has been shown to be more sophisticated than their treatment of it
(Machery 2014), and may also make the error of treating data patterns as evidence for
claims about phenomena, which, if it happens in experimental practice, is rare (Roskies
2010; Wright forthcoming).
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procedures that can be conducted independently of the primary test whose severity is
being evaluated (also see Mayo 1991; Mayo and Spanos 2011).
Like Reiss’ account, the severity principle recognizes the importance of ruling out
alternatives and accumulating evidence. Unlike Reiss’ account, it situates the ‘test’, or
more generally the reasoning process by which the evidential relation is assessed, as a
necessary component of the criteria for evaluating the resulting inferences. What’s
missing, then, is an account of the reasoning process neuroscientists engage in when they
assess the degree of warrant a neuroimaging data set provides for a claim about the
phenomenon it was produced to investigate. To aid in articulating that process I briefly
consider an example.

3.4.1

Representations in Parahippocampal Cortex

Martin and colleagues used pattern classification analysis to bring neuroimaging data to
bear on claims about the content of memory representations in subregions of the
hippocampus. At the time this paper was published, the received view was that PhC’s
contribution to memory was representing episodic contextual information. Contrary to
this view, these authors argue that “… parahippocampal (PhC) cortex does not only
represent episodic context but can also represent item information for some object
categories in recognition-memory decisions” (Martin et al 2013, p. 10915).18
The particular memory phenomenon they are interested in is familiarity, which is often
distinguished from recollection. A recollection is a memory of an object that includes
contextual details of the encounter, while familiarity is a memory of an object absent
such contextual details. That is, a ‘feeling’ that an object is familiar, without explicit
memory of what else occurred in the previous encounter with the object that is being
remembered.

18

The study also examines representations in other regions in the medial temporal lobe

(MTL), but for the sake of space I focus on only one claim.
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To investigate memory representations in PhC, they use a two stage experimental task. In
the first stage, participants are presented with images of faces, chairs and buildings, and
have to decide for each if it was attractive, comfortable or valuable respectively (p.
10916). This stage is conducted outside of the scanner. In the second stage, participants
are placed in an MRI scanner and functional data are collected while they perform a
recognition memory task. They are presented with images from each category (face, chair
and building), some of which they had seen in the first stage, and some of which are
novel. For each image, they rate their familiarity with the item on a scale of 1 (least
familiar) to 4 (most familiar). A separate response option allows participants to indicate if
they recollect contextual details associated with the feeling of familiarity so that these
data points can be excluded from the analysis.
There are two aspects to the claim that the regional activity contains category-specific
memory representations. That is, the representations are both category-specific and
influence memory. To assess if the data so produced warrants the target claim, they use
pattern classification analysis to address two central questions. The first is to “…
determine whether distributed patterns of activity in any of the [medial temporal lobe]
structures examined could reliably distinguish between the stimulus categories” and the
second is to “… examine whether distributed patterns of activity could be identified that
reflected a memory signal, ie. differences between familiar and novel stimuli, for each
stimulus category” (p. 10917). The first question addresses the category-specificity, and
the second the influence on memory. Notice that neither question is a question about the
phenomena per se, but questions that pertain to patterns in the data. These questions are
informed by consideration of the phenomena under investigation, the design of the
experimental task, and are formulated as questions that can be addressed using a pattern
classification method.
To address the first question, a classifier is trained to label the stimulus category of the
objects based on the functional data. To ensure that the underlying signal could not be
associated with memory the analysis includes only data from the novel trials. The
resulting pattern shows that the classifier performs above chance at labelling the object
category using data from the regions of interest (p. 10918). This result is reinforced by
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pair-wise classification analysis for each region and each pairing of the categories
(buildings vs chairs; buildings vs faces; faces vs chairs). These patterns show classifier
accuracy is above chance at discriminating between any pair of categories in PhC (p.
10919). This together is taken to be “… evidence for category specific representations…”
in PhC. The patterns isolated by these analyses are restricted to novel trials, and so they
do not assist in determining the evidential status of the data with respect to the memory
aspect of the central claim.
To address the second question, the classifier is trained to label each trial as low (1 or 2)
or high familiarity (3 or 4). Classification is then performed for each object category. The
resulting patterns show that activity in PhC could be classified by familiarity rating only
for buildings and chairs, but not for faces (p. 10919). These results, together, support the
claim that PhC represents category information for buildings and chairs in the context of
memory judgements.
Examining this set of three patterns suggests an alternative explanation for the result.
Specifically, “… above-chance classifier performance … [could be] based on a common
familiarity signal” (p. 10920). That is, while there is evidence for category relevant
information, the results up to this stage provide no evidence that the information is
actually category-specific. It could be that the familiarity signal is shared across
categories, it is not ‘chair’ or ‘building’ specific but instead reflects a categoryindependent feature of the stimuli in a manner that the classifier can leverage to label the
data. To address this possibility, they use a cross-classification analysis. This involves
training the classifier to label the data as familiar or novel within one category, then
testing it on data for a different category. If the information permits category
discrimination but is not category-specific, then the classifier should perform above
chance in cross-classification. Just as the decision to use PCA in the first place is guided
by the target phenomena, here too the decision to perform a cross-classification analysis
is guided by the search for a pattern that would be explained by only one of the candidate
claims. In the end, the cross-classification test result supports the claim that the
information is category-specific, as when the classifier is trained on building data it fails
to reliably label chair data and vice versa (p. 10920).

83

These patterns (and others I have not discussed) are taken to justify the judgement that
the data are evidence for the claim that PhC represents object-category information in the
context of memory judgements. Notice that it's not a single classifier result, but a
collection of them, that provides warranting evidence for the claim. The process of
incorporating diverse analysis results into a broader interpretation of the data is driven by
attempts to explain the analysis results in terms of claims about phenomena. This
includes a search for patterns that provide evidence that the data are relevant for
addressing the question, further patterns to work towards developing a clear answer to
questions relating to the target claim, and patterns specifically for the purpose of ruling
out alternative explanations for the set of patterns isolated up to that stage. Treating the
reasoning process involved in assessments of neuroimaging data as explanatory provides
the resources necessary to weaken the threat of underdetermination.

3.4.2

Towards the Best Explanation

I. J. Good's discussion of the reasoning process involved in exploratory data analysis is,
perhaps surprisingly, a good fit for capturing how data analysis results contribute to
assessments of the evidential value of neuroimaging data. Good argues that exploratory
data analysis involves manipulating the data to highlight specific features and suppress
others (1986, p. 290). The aim of exploratory analysis is to identify patterns in the data
that are potentially explicable, then to formulate hypotheses about those patterns and
improve those by examining other patterns in the data (p. 291). When a plausible
explanation for a pattern is identified, the data analyst examines the residuals of the
pattern to evaluate the plausibility of the offered explanation. The residuals are the
portions of data that were set aside, or suppressed, by the manipulations used to arrive at
the original pattern. The same is true of the interpretation of neuroimaging data.
The investigators in the case discussed above chose to use PCA because of its potential to
isolate patterns in the data that could be explained by the target phenomenon. The
patterns are regarded as potentially explicable in terms of claims about representations in
part because the form of patterns that obtain indicates which of the claims under
consideration are likely to be true. Once a number of patterns are isolated, explaining
them leads investigators to notice alternative explanations not controlled for in the data
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production process. The potential availability of these alternatives threatens the
plausibility of the offered explanation, and so they isolate and examine other patterns in
the data to rule out alternatives. All of this was done while actively considering the
experimental protocols involved in the production of the data, the manipulations
implemented by the classifier, and the overall aim of the research project.
The judgement that neuroimaging data warrants a claim about a phenomenon is justified
when the claim can be shown to be the best (available) explanation for the data. This is
established by isolating patterns in the data that are explicable in terms of the claims
under consideration. Warranted claims are those that explain the collection of isolated
data patterns, while also taking into account the procedures of data production and
manipulations that together produced each data pattern. Claims about data provide useful
scaffolds for this reasoning process, as claims about phenomena can sometimes be used
to formulate claims about data in the form of a prediction, and because claims about data
are, unlike the abstract data patterns that justify them, more susceptible to explanations.
An inference in neuroimaging research is warranted not only by the structure of the body
of evidence that the accumulated data patterns provide, but also to the degree that the
claim inferred is regarded as the best explanation of the data patterns isolated in the
process of interpretation. This provides some resistance against straightforward
underdetermination arguments such as that offered by Mole and Klein. There are, as
Mole and Klein notice, a variety of decisions made in the process of producing and
analyzing neuroimaging data, and any given decision may be the cause of an observed
data pattern. However, data patterns are not considered in isolation of the rest of the
experimental context, and so alternative hypotheses based on isolating one or another
decision point as critical and mistaken are not likely to be serious threats to the inferences
scientists make. Alternatives, to be viable threats to an inference, must be as good of an
explanation of the total set of patterns explained by the claim under scrutiny.
Furthermore, where alternatives are threats, as in the case considered above with respect
to the possibility that the familiarity signal is shared across categories, it is sometimes
possible to rule them out, or at least address them, by analyzing the data further. One way
this is done is by articulating the data patterns predicted by the viable alternative that can
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be isolated with the available tools of data analysis, and conducting the relevant analyses.
If those patterns are not found, the once-viable alternative can no longer be regarded as
sufficient to explain the collected data patterns.
Explanations are valuable because they are easier to communicate and conceptualize in
terms of claims about phenomena than statistical facts, or raw data. Their function is
heuristic, and not necessarily truth conducive. In this regard, I am sympathetic to Andrea
Woody’s recent work on explanation in science, in which she argues that explanations are
“… genuinely important to the proper functioning of science, but it is a worker bee,
rather than … a shiny bauble proudly displayed in the aftermath of scientific activity, or
… a mysterious seer pointing us toward a yet undiscovered truth” (2015, p. 86). On her
view, philosophical inquiry into explanations ought to begin by asking what roles they
play in science. Here, I have argued that they are used in making judgements about the
evidential value of data.

3.5

Conclusion

Treating the process of data interpretation as explanatory allows the well-known
challenges associated with using neuroimaging data to be reconciled with the continued
enthusiasm for their potential. Data analysis techniques are used to isolate patterns in data
that are explicable in terms of the target claim. Insofar as these claims are consistent with
claims about phenomena they are evidence that the data set they are about is relevant to
consider in evaluations of those claims. As more patterns are isolated, investigators
attempt to explain the collection of patterns in terms of claims about the target
phenomena. Neuroimaging data are judged to warrant a claim about the relationship
between brain activity and cognition to the extent that such a claim explains the
collection of data patterns isolated in the process of its interpretation. This process
weakens threats of underdetermination due to the indirectness of data and complexity of
the system because a viable alternative cannot simply explain a single pattern, but must
account for at least as many of the patterns as the claims inferred from the data explain.
If the purpose of isolating a data pattern is to arrive at a form of evidence that is
interpretable by a human investigator, as Good argues, then an important contribution to
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the epistemology of neuroimaging research would be to examine how the process of data
analysis can lead well-intentioned investigators to misinterpret the resulting pattern.
Treating this process as explanatory suggests that what is required is an account of what
criteria neuroscientists do (and ought) to use in evaluating competing explanations of data
patterns. This is particularly important given current trends in neuroimaging research.
New data analysis techniques are continually in development and, especially with the
rising popularity of multivariate methods, each is more complex and sophisticated than
the last. While new analysis techniques certainly constitute a form of progress, this
progress is regarded with caution by many members of the neuroscientific community.
Concerns raised include a trade off in computational sophistication and deeper
understanding of the material objects under investigation, that is brains (Marder 2015),
and inferential risks that are associated with an increase in analytic flexibility within a
scientific community which can lead to an increase in false positive rates (Carp 2012).
Proposals for improving the epistemic status of neuroimaging research promote sharing
data and sharing algorithms (Poldrack et al 2017), and include a demand for preregistration of research plans (Munafò et al 2017). The explanatory treatment of data
interpretation argued for above suggests that the success of these models and research
strategies will depend on how they interact with the criteria communities, and individual
researchers, use to assess the adequacy, or ‘bestness’, of explanations of data patterns.
Engaging with concerns about analytic flexibility, the differential expertise with respect
to the computational and material aspects of neuroscience, and the promise and
challenges with reproducible neuroscience are important and valuable areas for
philosophical inquiry. As these issues are timely, philosophical contributions could have
a direct impact on the trajectory of cognitive neuroscience. These impacts, however, are
only possible to the extent that philosophical analyses are sensitive to the relevant details
of the practice, and how the procedures that compose that practice contribute to its
outcomes. I offer the account provided here as one way to approach such an analysis.
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Chapter 4

4

Meta-Analyses and Brain Mapping

4.1

Introduction

Cognitive neuroscience, broadly understood as the study of the relationship between the
brain and cognition, has seen a significant increase in the volume and complexity of data
produced over the last two decades. The rapid growth of subfields and steady increase in
the sophistication and power of tools for the production and analysis of data has added to
existing concerns about the effectiveness of the knowledge produced in cognitive
neuroscience. The high volume of published results makes it difficult for investigators to
stay aware of current trends even within their own subfield (Yarkoni et al 2011; Silva,
Bickle and Landreth 2013). Indeed, the isolation of areas of research, which are
organized around investigations of particular regions of the brain, or particular cognitive
functions, has been flagged as a possible cause for the lack of critical discussions about
the adequacy of popular brain mapping strategies (e.g., Price and Friston 2005).
Additionally, neuroscientists are increasingly aware of the limitations of neuroimaging
experiments, which, due to practical constraints, have low statistical power and are
unable to support generalized claims about the relationship between brain activity and
cognitive functioning (Lieberman and Cunningham 2009; Costafreda 2011; Poldrack et al
2017). In light of these challenges, philosophers and neuroscientists have identified largescale meta-analyses as a promising method for making progress in cognitive
neuroscience (e.g., Yarkoni et al 2011; Klein 2012; Silva, Bickle & Landreth 2013;
Anderson 2015; Sullivan 2017).
Meta-analyses are already being used to address a number of barriers impeding progress
in neuroimaging research. These challenges range from the low statistical power of
inferences, to concerns about the validity of concepts used to theorize about cognitive
processes and states (Yarkoni et al 2011; Anderson 2015). The effectiveness of a metaanalysis is partly tied to the volume and diversity of data that it operates over. Thus, the
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push for bigger, more powerful and more robust meta-analyses is one of the primary
motivations behind the development and maintenance of repositories of neuroimaging
data, such as NeuroSynth (Yarkoni et al 2011), BrainMap (Laird 2011), NeuroVault
(Gorgolewski et al 2015), openfMRI (Poldrack et al 2013) and even a database of metaanalysis results, ANIMA (Reid et al 2015).
Philosophical work on the epistemic impacts of and conditions necessary for data sharing
and data repositories to promote knowledge generation shows the importance of
community coordination and collaboration (e.g., Leonelli and Ankeny 2012; O’Malley
and Soyer 2012; Leonelli 2016). Recent work on the prospects of meta-analyses and large
repositories of neuroimaging data indicates that cognitive neuroscience presently lacks
sufficient coordination of the methodological and conceptual practices necessary to
promote knowledge generation through data sharing (Sullivan 2017). Complementing
concerns about the need for community coordination and organization, here I argue that
research practices themselves must change with the uptake of meta-analysis tools and
widespread use of shared data sets.
If not accompanied by changes in the practices and standards that inform and direct the
analysis and interpretation of data, easy access to large-scale meta-analyses could lead to
the production of apparently justified, but likely misleading theories and hypotheses. To
make this argument I examine a recent dispute over the evidential significance of metaanalysis results between well-intentioned users of the NeuroSynth database, a data set
made by the automated extraction of reported findings from published neuroimaging
studies, and the lead developer. I argue that the dispute reflects a difference in the
methods of analysis and interpretation favoured by the investigators, as well as a different
understanding of the implications of data manipulations used to synthesize data drawn
from diverse sources. The inferential and analysis errors the database users make
indicates an inadequacy in the approach to data interpretation that they take. Their
approach is sound in the context of neuroimaging research, but likely to be mistaken
when applied to the analysis of a data set made from the synthesis of a diverse collection
of neuroimaging results. If it is to be epistemically advantageous, the development and
uptake of data repositories and the large-scale meta-analyses they make possible must be
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accompanied by the development and uptake of research practices adequate for the
analysis and interpretation of diverse data sets.
I proceed as follows: in section 2 I begin by outlining some of the problems metaanalyses and repositories of neuroimaging data are expected to solve. In section 3 I
briefly discuss challenges for meta-analyses that follow from current research practices
operative in neuroscience. In doing so, I raise the possibility that changes in research
practices may be necessary if meta-analysis techniques and data repositories are to
succeed at resolving the problems outlined in the second section. In section 4 I review a
dispute over the interpretation of meta-analysis results, emphasizing the factors that direct
the use and interpretation of the shared dataset and contribute to the persistent
disagreement between participants in the dispute. In section 5 I argue that research
practices in cognitive neuroscience need to be adapted in order for meta-analyses and
data repositories are to promote genuine progress.

4.2

Meta-Analyses, Databases and their Promise

Cognitive neuroscience, and neuroimaging research in particular, faces a number of
practical, theoretical and structural barriers to progress. These problems include the
inability of neuroimaging experiments to provide evidence that can support generalizable
claims about the relations between brain activity and cognitive states, and the rapidly
increasing volume of publications in the primary literature. Aggregating data from
disparate experiments into accessible repositories, and providing meta-analysis tools to
evaluate their evidential significance, are expected to address these barriers to the
production of knowledge from the results of neuroimaging experiments.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), is used to measure the ratio of
oxygenated to deoxygenated hemoglobin in small pieces of the brain (called voxels,
which are typically 2 to 3 mm cubes). This is called the BOLD (blood oxygenation level
dependant) signal, and it is used as an indirect measure of neural activity. A change in the
BOLD signal within a voxel occurs when the oxygenation needs of cells in that voxel
change. As neural activity increases, the neurons (and other cells) will require more
oxygenation and so the BOLD signal will change. Neuroimaging data are collected while
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a human participant performs cognitive tasks. Tasks are designed to require participants
to engage specific cognitive processes, such as memory or attention, or experience
specific cognitive states, such as a feeling of familiarity or pain. The resulting data set
consists in BOLD signal measurements that are correlated with the performance of
specific cognitive tasks.
Investigators go to great lengths to ensure that only the cognitive processes of interest are
reflected in an experimentally produced data set. Such a data set may be useful for
identifying the origin and character of the brain activity sufficient for the implementation
of the particular cognitive states or processes of interest, but is unable to substantiate
claims about the general function performed by the brain region or network. This
problem is at the heart of discussions about the evidential value of neuroimaging data for
reverse inferences, which involve attributing cognitive states or processes on the basis of
observed patterns of brain activity (see Poldrack 2006, 2011; Klein 2012; Machery 2014;
Glymour and Hanson 2016).
Neuroimaging data showing, for example, a correlation between the experience of pain
and activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), cannot warrant the
corresponding reverse inference claim that if ‘a subject’s dACC is active, then they are in
pain’. The central problem with the reverse inference claim is that brain regions19 could
also be activated by a variety of different cognitive tasks and processes. Data originating
from a neuroimaging experiment correlating pain and dACC activity, on their own,
cannot substantiate claims about reverse inferences because such a data set does not
reflect a sufficiently diverse collection of cognitive states and processes. For instance, in

19

While there is hope that network-analyses may be able to resolve this problem (e.g.,

Klein 2012), there is evidence that network activity also stands in a many-to-many
relationship with cognitive processes (see Pessoa 2014 and Horwitz 2014 for a relevant
discussion). For this reason, while I focus this discussion on brain regions and areas, it is
likely that the same concerns and challenges will also apply to network-based
approaches.
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addition to pain, experimental data have correlated dACC activity with executive control
(Carter et al 1999), emotion (Etkin et al 2011), and salience (Menon and Uddin 2010).
Thus, an observation of dACC activity, at best, warrants a claim that one, or some
combination of, these cognitive states or processes are active.
The problems with reverse inferences are barriers to achieving a larger theoretical goal of
cognitive neuroscience: mapping the relationship between brain activity and cognitive
processes, states and capacities. Currently competing theories of the relationship between
brain activity and cognition propose everything from one-to-one mappings in which each
brain activity pattern has an associated cognitive process or state, to many-to-many
mappings in which activity patterns and cognitives states have a complex relationship.
These theories have similar evidential requirements that neuroimaging experiments fall
short of providing. Evidence for claims about the relationship between brain activity
patterns and cognitive processes must include evidence that the cognitive process of
interest is associated with a brain activity pattern, called a forward inference, and that the
brain activity pattern indicates the engagement of the cognitive process, or evidence for
the corresponding reverse inference (Price and Friston 2005; Klein 2012; Anderson
2015). While consulting the broader literature, as briefly done above, may be the obvious
solution to this problem, the steadily increasing volume of primary research findings
makes that approach less feasible by the day.
Even relatively narrow subfields, such as research on ‘visual working memory’— which
is a particular subcategory of working memory, which is a specific category of explicit
memory — can produce over 800 publications in one year (based on a pubmed search of
articles published in 2014). The same is true of research relevant to claims about the
functional role of discrete brain regions (almost 8000 articles were published on the
hippocampus in 2014, one of the most widely studied regions of the brain. At least 1100
of those publications include fMRI data). The volume of literature directly relevant to any
given research question is only part of the problem. These searches only capture studies
that explicitly report the data and findings as relevant to understanding memory or the
function of the hippocampus. Countless other studies in the literature may include data
patterns and correlations linking hippocampus activity and other cognitive process, and
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even hippocampus activity and various memory processes, that go unreported because the
hippocampus was not the region of interest in those studies.
The aggregation of data into central repositories, and the meta-analyses they make
possible, are expected to provide a way through these obstructions. The hope is that, by
performing meta-analyses on large collections of neuroimaging data, the statistical power
of results will increase, false positives can be identified (Lieberman and Cunningham
2009; Yarkoni et al 2011; Costafreda 2011), the current status of hypotheses and theories
can be established beyond the boundaries of specific research projects pursuing them
(Silva, Bickle, Landreth 2013), an evidential base that can be used to evaluate
generalizable claims about brain-cognition relations will become available (Price and
Friston 2005; Kober and Wager 2010), and patterns in data relevant for evaluating
theories beyond those the data produced to evaluate may be discovered (Van Horn and
Gazzaniga 2013). Most of the advantages meta-analyses are purported to have over
individual experiments rests on the diversity of the data they operate on. This is the
feature that is supposed to allow neuroscientists to move away from claims restricted to
the occurrences in laboratories and towards generalizable theories of the brain’s
contribution to the realization of cognitive capacities.
By combining data from multiple experiments each using different task manipulations,
meta-analyses accommodate a diverse range of cognitive functions (Reid et al 2015;
Poldrack and Gorgolewski 2015). This makes it possible to evaluate if a pattern of brain
activity, or the activation of a specific area of the brain, is consistently associated with a
given cognitive process, and to determine if it is specific to one cognitive process or if it
is also associated with other cognitive processes. To do this is to assess the consistency
and specificity of the relationship between a pattern of brain activity and a cognitive
process or state. That is, to evaluate the evidential support for both forward and reverse
inference claims (Kober and Wager 2010). Providing a data set and analysis tools that
can support claims about forward and reverse inferences is one of the aims of the
NeuroSynth's database (see Yarkoni et al 2011).
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NeuroSynth data are curated by an algorithm that scans articles published in journals it
can parse and extracts peak-activation coordinates from tables in those articles. Peak
activation coordinates are the X-Y-Z coordinates in a brain atlas at which investigators
measured the greatest level of activation in their study. A text-analysis of the abstract is
used to label the coordinates. All terms (a term is a word or word pair) in the abstract that
occur in a sufficient number of other abstracts in the database are assigned as labels
(examples include ‘pain’, ‘language’, ‘magnetic’, ‘task’, ‘working memory’ and
‘cingulate’). The result is a collection of peak activation coordinates labelled by words
that appear in the abstract of the article the coordinates were extracted from. NeuroSynth
also includes a number of automated meta-analysis tools, making it relatively easy to
conduct meta-analyses of the represented literature.
These tools provide forward and reverse inference maps correlating terms and activation
coordinates. A forward inference map highlights coordinates that are more likely to be
reported in articles that are labelled by a given term than in articles that are not labelled
by the term. For example, if you were to randomly select a ‘pain’ study, the coordinates
indicated on the forward inference map for ‘pain’ are likely to be amongst the peak
activation coordinates reported in the study. A reverse inference map highlights terms
that are more likely to be reported in articles reporting the given co-ordinates as active
than in articles without. If you were to select a random study that reported activity in a
coordinate shown in the reverse inference map, it is likely that the study would have the
label you ran the analysis on.
Meta-analyses and data repositories together can help address the practical challenge of
canvassing an ever-growing literature by providing tools that can expedite and guide the
literature review process. This is one of the functions of NeuroSynth, which is expected
to “... accelerate progress in cognitive neuroscience through greater formal synthesis of
the rapidly growing primary literature” (Yarkoni et al 2011, p. 489). NeuroSynth not only
aggregates data, but allows users to group and identify published research by similarities
in terminology, or by similarities in reported peak activity co-ordinates. More
sophisticated meta-analytic tools for collecting research outputs and providing automated
guidance on future research are on the horizon. One example is the Network of
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Experiments (NEX) framework presented by Silva, Bickle and Landreth (2013). The
NEX uses graph-theoretic representations of neuroscientific research to evaluate the
strength of evidence supporting claims about causal relations between cognitive
phenomena. While there are reasons to be skeptical that the NEX framework will
catalyze a revolution in neuroscience in the way the authors imagine (see Klein 2014), it
is another example of the conviction that meta-analytic tools will propel neuroscience
(and neuroimaging) forward by enabling the automated synthesis, search and
classification of evidence available in the literature.
Whether or not these tools can succeed at achieving these goals depends on how they are
received and used by the neuroscience community. In the next section I briefly review a
number of challenges for the efficacy of meta-analyses that follow from concerns about
the current state of experimental practice in neuroscience. I then raise it as a possibility
that some of the conditions that have established some of the problems that they are
supposed to resolve, are also barriers to the capacity of meta-analyses to resolve those
very problems. In the following sections, by analyzing the factors contributing to a
dispute over the evidential significance of NeuroSynth data, I argue that research
practices must be adapted to the differences between synthesized data sets and the
experimentally produced data they are derived from for meta-analyses to succeed at
improving the knowledge producing capacity of cognitive neuroscience.

4.3

Challenges for Meta-Analyses

The cultivation of a diverse data set, made by combining data produced in different
experiments each aiming to better understand distinct cognitive phenomena, is what
enables meta-analyses to provide support for hypotheses about the relationship between
cognitive processes and brain activity that are generalizable beyond the few cognitive
states represented in a single, experimentally produced, data set. However, the
differences between data sets that are the source of strength for meta-analyses may also
be a potential weakness if research practices, and specifically approaches to the analysis
and interpretation of data, are not adapted to account for the limitations and features of
the data sets that result from the synthesis of disparate data.
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Research programs in cognitive neuroscience are typically aimed at providing evidence
for theories about the role played by regions, or networks, of the brain and specific
cognitive capacities. Different investigators working in different laboratories are likely to
use different task parameters, and even different tasks, to study what they consider to be
the same phenomenon (i.e., ‘working memory’, ‘cognitive control’, or ‘pain’).
Inconsistencies due to variations in research methods and the use of terminology,
especially across subdomains, are recognized as a barrier to the effective integration of
data. For instance, Poldrack and colleagues note that ‘working memory’ has at least three
distinct meanings in the literature (Poldrack et al 2011). This makes it challenging to
combine data together with the aim of, for instance, conducting a meta-analysis on
research related to working memory. The situation is complicated by the common
treatment of tasks as equivalent to the cognitive constructs that they are used to study.
Tasks typically require participants to perform a number of different cognitive processes
to complete them, including the process investigators are interested in. Treating a task as
equivalent to a psychological construct invokes assumptions about the cognitive
strategies participants use to complete the task. The assumptions weaken the inferences
drawn on the basis of the data, as they are rarely justified. The inconsistent use of
terminology and treatment of tasks and constructs as equivalent makes it “… difficult to
draw meaningful inferences from existing literature and limits the cumulative value of the
knowledge represented in this literature” (Poldrack et al 2011). Furthermore, these
problems are a recognized challenge for the integration of data in the neurosciences
(Turner and Laird 2012; Sullivan 2017, p. 1-3).
The terminological ambiguity noted above is not just due to different communities of
researchers using similar terms for different purposes. It is also due to the widespread
disagreement over the best explanations for cognitive phenomena, and the conceptual
resources necessary for understanding these phenomena. This is reflected in the structure
of the Cognitive Atlas, a wiki-inspired knowledge base, which, it is hoped, will provide a
framework for clarifying current descriptions of phenomena. One valuable feature of the
Atlas is its wiki-like structure which allows for disagreements about the meaning and
empirical basis for terms to be captured and discussed. This is important in a field where
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“there is precious little consensus … regarding the basic units of mental function”
(Poldrack et al 2011).
This lack of consensus reflects more than disagreements over the correct theory of
cognition. It can be traced to the inconsistent use of conceptual terminology across tasks
(Figdor 2011), and to variations in the experimental protocols used to realize phenomena
in experiments (Sullivan 2009 discusses analogous challenges in neurobiology; also, see
Sullivan 2016). Additionally, there is a growing consensus that, even when the meaning
of the terms is agreed upon, the cognitive taxonomy is not ideal for capturing the
mapping between brain processes and cognition (see Bunzl, Hanson and Poldrack 2010).
The rationale for this is partly empirical, as terms and concepts used to theorize about
cognitive processes stand in a many to many relationship with regional brain activity
(Price and Friston 2005), and network activity (Pessoa 2014). A fact revealed by
comparing findings from disparate subfields (as in Price and Friston 2005), which has
since been reinforced by evidence provided by meta-analyses (Lenartowicz et al 2010;
Yarkoni et al 2011). This is taken by some within the community as an indication of the
failure of theories of cognition to reflect ‘the brain’s native ontology’, and is a central
motivation for efforts to revise and redefine the cognitive ontology (Anderson 2015).
Data-driven revision projects, as it happens, are one of the research programs that have
been made possible by the availability of large data sets and meta-analysis techniques (of
which Leonartowicz et al 2010 is an example; and Klein 2012 and Anderson 2015
discuss the strategy in more detail).20

20

By data-driven approaches, I refer to those revision projects that begin from a large

data set and apply machine learning analysis tools to identify the categories and concepts
that ‘best’ capture the patterns in the collected brain activity data. These approaches are
data-driven as they aim to be agnostic about which cognitive theories are best, and
instead let the available data ‘decide’. Anderson’s functional fingerprinting approach is
one example of a data-driven approach to ontology revision. Roughly, the process
involves using an algorithm that identifies the minimum set of variables that maximally
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While tools like NeuroSynth are developed by members of the scientific community, and
collect together neuroimaging data produced by cognitive neuroscientists for a diverse
range of theoretical purposes, they are not (yet) a hub around which the community is
organizing itself. This is noteworthy because, in other domains of the life sciences where
data repositories have had a positive impact on knowledge production, community uptake
and engagement with the repository development was an important factor in the success
of these initiatives (e.g., Ankeny and Leonelli 2012; O’Malley and Soyer 2012; Leonelli
2012; Leonlli 2015). Community coordination is necessary for achieving the
development of a shared taxonomy or ontology that could alleviate the barriers to data
integration noted above. That is, to eliminate the terminological ambiguity and
inconsistencies in conceptual and methodological practices across research programs that
make data integration, and the progress it promises, difficult to achieve (see Sullivan
2017 for a detailed discussion). It is not enough to improve community coordination, and
alter research practices so that they support the downstream integration of experimentally
produced data into repositories. The research practices themselves, and in particular
approaches to the analysis and interpretation of data, must also be adapted to the use and
analysis of synthesized data sets. The methods, techniques and reasoning procedures that
are applied to the analysis and interpretation of neuroimaging data are not appropriate for
the interpretation of large bodies of synthesized neuroimaging data.

captures variation in brain activity patterns defining the ‘functional fingerprint’ of each
region. The variables, then, are examined to determine the cognitive capacities they
might refer to (see 2014, chapter 4). An alternative is the machine learning approach used
by Lenartowicz and colleagues (2010). This method uses a machine learning classifier to
determine which cognitive term can be discriminated between on the basis of brain
activity patterns and which cannot. Those that cannot be discriminated become
candidates for being removal from the ontology.
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Looking to work on the epistemic character of integrative practices in other life sciences,
collaboration is often emphasized as an important aspect of successful data-intensive
research practices (Leonelli 2013; O’Malley and Soyer 2012; Sullivan 2017).
Collaboration is important because integrating data involves “… abstracting data from
their original sources…” to produce a new body of information (O’Malley and Soyer
2012, p. 61), and effectively interpreting a diverse body of data requires familiarity with
the material objects that the data are about, as well as the methods and tools used to
produce it (Leonelli 2013). Sabina Leonelli argues that manipulation of data such that it
can be integrated with other data sets broadens its evidential scope by making it relevant
for evaluating hypotheses and theories it may not have been produced to investigate
(2009). However, data manipulations also restrict the scope of a data set as they
inevitably suppress patterns and information in the data (Good 1983; Wright
forthcoming). The processes of data manipulation used to abstract and integrate data is
itself a tool that changes the evidential value of data by both expanding it and restricting
it, and so familiarity with these process is also important for the effective use of
synthesized data.
Data manipulations are used to eliminate noise, by suppressing the influence of
detectable causal factors unrelated to the phenomena of interest — such as head motion,
or a measurable drift in the magnetic field strength of the scanner. They are also used to
emphasize patterns in the data, allowing human investigators to make judgements about
the evidential significance of complex and multifaceted data sets. This is one of the
primary functions of data analysis and manipulation in neuroimaging research: to identify
patterns in a complex data set that are relevant for evaluating the hypotheses under
consideration (see Wright forthcoming). Consider the use of subtraction analysis, which
involves subtracting BOLD signal measurements between two task conditions, to identify
parts of the brain that ‘preferentially activate’ for one task over another. The method
itself has often been the target of criticism (Uttal 2001; Hardcastle and Stewart 2002;
Klein 2010; Aktunç 2014), and has declined in popularity with the development of
machine learning methods of data analysis (Haxby 2010; Kriegeskorte and Kievit 2010).
However, it remains useful for addressing basic questions about regional involvement in
cognitive processing. Even in the wake of powerful techniques like the machine learning
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methods alluded to above, subtraction analysis results are recognized as important for
clarifying the implications of more sophisticated techniques (Coutanche 2013; Davis and
Poldrack 2013).
Whether to remove the influence of noise, or to emphasize aspects of the data set
investigators regard as informative about a hypothesis under consideration, data
manipulations support the interpretation of data by suppressing patterns and information.
Specific methods of analysis and interpretation, such as subtraction or machine learning
methods of analysis, are regarded as useful for answering specific questions about the
data and underlying phenomena, in part because they are sensitive to different variations
in the data. For instance, machine learning methods have been shown to be sensitive to
variations between BOLD signal values at a voxel-by-voxel level, while univariate
methods like subtraction are sensitive to variation in activity level between subjects that
machine learning methods are unlikely to pick up on (Davis et al 2014). Which is to say,
the implications of a data analysis result are contingent on facts about the data’s
production, but also on the operations that make up the analysis technique itself.
The results of a single analysis technique are rarely able to definitively discriminate
between hypotheses and theories neuroimaging experiments are designed to test. Multiple
techniques are used to isolate a variety of patterns, which together are used to assess the
significance of the data set with respect to the hypotheses and theories under
consideration (Wright forthcoming). The details of the tasks, behavioural performance,
analysis techniques used to interpret the data, and their resulting data patterns, are all
important in the context of the original research for drawing conclusions. These details
are often suppressed in the process of data integration because they are not shared by all
data sets — this is one way that data integration involves abstraction. Integrating data can
restrict their evidential scope as data patterns relevant for making inferences about the
phenomenon it was produced to study may be removed to facilitate the smooth
integration with other data sets. To get a sense of how synthesized data sets may have
different evidential value from the data sets drawn on to construct them, consider the
following example.
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If you search the term ‘working memory’ in NeuroSynth there is a prominent area of
activation roughly centred on the coordinates X: -44, Y: 0, Z: 36. You can use
NeuroSynth to find studies that report activation within a specified radius of these
coordinates — these are the results that positively contribute to the forward and reverse
inference maps relating these coordinates and the term ‘working memory’. One such
study is the work of Todd and colleagues to identify the region of the brain that encodes
visual working memory (2011). Limitations of fMRI temporal resolution make it difficult
to distinguish between visual working memory encoding, perceptual and maintenancerelated activity (p. 1528). To overcome this limitation Todd and colleagues had subjects
perform two working memory tasks. In one task the participants had to distinguish
between two faces and in another they had to distinguish between two colours. Other
research has shown that encoding two faces takes almost ten times as long as encoding
two colours into working memory. This allowed the researchers to distinguish visual
working memory encoding from perceptual and maintenance-related processing because,
“... brain regions involved in [working memory] encoding should show differential
durations of activity depending on the time it takes to encode objects of different
complexity” (p. 1528). The results identify the region roughly centred on the coordinates
noted above as the only area of the brain where the time course of the measured signals
matches this prediction.
Todd and colleagues’ conclusion is supported by a pattern in the data which is not
included in the NeuroSynth database. The details of the task design and the time course
of the signal that justify the inferred relation between regional brain activity and working
memory are removed by NeuroSynth's automated curation procedure. The data reflected
in NeuroSynth are, at best, a rough proxy for the data that supports the claim that a
particular brain region is involved in encoding visual stimuli during a working memory
task.21 The details of the data set necessary for isolating patterns in the data that support

21

This is not to say NeuroSynth has limited value. NeuroSynth is useful for identifying

connections between areas of research that might not be apparent when data is considered
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the claims inferred from it are potentially absent from the synthesized data set. The
methods of analysis and interpretation adequate for evaluating the evidential significance
of a single experimentally produced neuroimaging data set are not guaranteed to be
successful when applied to the evaluation of a meta-analysis result. The synthesized data
set, by virtue of the processes of manipulation required to integrate disparate data, is
different in kind from the experimentally produced data sets that it is made from. This
presents a risk for the promise of meta-analyses: it may not be sufficient to coordinate
community practices to facilitate the integration of data. The methods of analysis and
interpretation need to also be adapted to suit the use of meta-analysis tools and
interpretation of synthesized data sets.
In the remainder of this paper I argue that inferences made on the basis of a meta-analysis
informed by research methods honed for the interpretation of locally produced
neuroimaging data are likely to be error-prone, and yet will appear to be justified from
the investigator’s perspective. The appearance of justification arises from the recognized
soundness of the approach to data analysis and interpretation in the context of a

in isolation. For example, while ‘working memory’ is strongly correlated with those
particular coordinates, the terms ‘phonological’, ‘frontal eye’ and ‘saccade’ are also
strongly correlated with those coordinates. This suggests that there may be data from
research on the phonological loop (which is a component of one psychological model of
working memory, for example see Baddeley and Wilson 2002), as well as from research
on the control of the visual system, relevant to the study of visual working memory. This
second connection may be of particular value to Todd and colleagues as one important
difference between their stimuli (which may contribute to the increased encoding time) is
a difference in the way the stimuli are scanned, as defined by saccade sequences. While
the stimuli and task design prevent differences in sustained focal attention from driving
differences in neural activity, there was no control for differences in saccade sequences
(and thus the active direction of attention) from driving the differences in activity.
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neuroimaging experiment, and the errors arise due to the differences between
neuroimaging data sets and the synthesized data sets available from data repositories. To
make this argument, I examine a recent dispute over the evidential value of NeuroSynth
data between researchers who argue that the data are evidence for the claim that a
discrete region of the brain is selective for pain processing and the developer of the
database who claims otherwise. I argue that the dispute, and its persistence, is due to the
very problem gestured towards above: methods of data interpretation adequate for
determining the value of neuroimaging data are applied to NeuroSynth data, resulting in
apparently-justified, but likely mistaken, inferences.

4.4

NeuroSynth Data and Pain Selectivity

Neuroimaging data sets are, at best, able to support claims about the relationship between
observed brain activity and the specific cognitive processes brought about by the
cognitive tasks participants perform. This makes it difficult to use neuroimaging data to
support general claims about the contribution specific regions of the brain make to the
realization of cognitive phenomena. Meta-analyses are expected to overcome this
limitation through the aggregation of a diverse body of data that represents a broader
collection of cognitive phenomena than can possibly be brought about in a neuroimaging
experiment (Kober and Wager 2010). This is what motivated Matthew Lieberman and
Naomi Eisenberger (L&E hereafter) to use NeuroSynth, a repository of published
neuroimaging results, to examine the relationship between activity in the dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex (dACC), and the numerous cognitive processes correlated with it.
L&E's collaborative work includes the use of neuroimaging technology to investigate the
neural correlates of ‘social pain’, such as rejection or exclusion from activities
(Eisenberger, Lieberman, and Williams 2003; Lieberman and Eisenberger 2004). In this
work they find that social rejection is correlated with activity in regions of the brain
separately associated with pain (the dACC included). This has led to more recent work
promoting and defending their view that social and physical pain, while
phenomenologically distinct, rely on shared neural systems (Eisenberger and Lieberman
2005; Eisenberger et al 2006; Eisenberger 2015). This view is not without its challenges.
One alternative is the salience account, which explains the activation of dACC in both
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social and physical pain conditions by a sensitivity to highly salient stimuli, such as
feelings of pain and rejection (see Eisenberger 2015). While not direct alternatives,
dACC activity has also been shown to activate during memory tasks (Wager and Smith
2003), emotion (Etkin, Egner and Kalisch 2011), and a number of other cognitive
processes and states that are not easily classified as ‘pain’ (Lieberman and Eisenberger
2015, p. 15250). Since L&E’s argument that physical and social pain share a neural
substrate depends on neuroimaging evidence showing that dACC is active under both
conditions, these results are confounding for their view. The big problem with this
domain, as with many in cognitive neuroscience, is that neuroimaging experiments
cannot provide evidence for reverse inference claims. Furthermore, evidence for reverse
inferences is just what is needed to discriminate between competing accounts of dACC
function (Eisenberger 2015, p. 619; Berkman, Cunningham and Lieberman 2014, p. 144).
This also happens to be the kind of evidence NeuroSynth has been promoted as able to
provide (Yarkoni et al 2011).
In an effort to determine which of the candidate accounts of dACC functions is supported
by reverse inference evidence, L&E use NeuroSynth to “... explore the best general
psychological account of [dorsal anterior cingulate cortex] dACC function” (2015, p.
15250). Reporting on comparisons of reverse inference maps from NeuroSynth for terms
associated with the competing accounts of dACC function, they conclude that ‘pain’
provides the best account of dACC function. Shortly after the paper was published, the
lead developer of Neurosynth, Tal Yarkoni, thoroughly criticized the paper in a pair of
blog posts (2015a; 2105b). Yarkoni’s position is that “... Neurosynth data does not
support any of the main claims ...” of the paper, arguing that L&E’s choice of analysis
methods, and interpretive decisions, amount to a misuse of NeuroSynth data (2015b).
This dispute played out mostly through blog posts, with Lieberman replying to Yarkoni’s
first post on a separate blog (Lieberman 2015), which Yarkoni engages in his second post
with a point-by-point critique. Later, a letter to the editor (Wager et al 2016), and an
official reply by the authors (Lieberman et al 2016) were published, continuing the same
lines of argument articulated in the blog posts. In the end, L&E were unconvinced by
Yarkoni and colleagues’ arguments that their analysis and interpretation of NeuroSynth
data is mistaken.
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This dispute is informative because it involves the use of a meta-analysis tool to conduct
the very kind of research these tools are purported to enable, and yet the results instigated
a heated debate between the database developer and well-intentioned users. Why did this
dispute occur, what factors contributed to it, and why might L&E’s unwavering position
be justified? The answer, as suggested at the end of the previous section, is that L&E’s
approach to the analysis and interpretation of the data is not appropriately sensitive to the
inferential limitations of NeuroSynth data, and yet it is also adequate for the
interpretation of neuroimaging data. To argue for this position, I first review L&E’s
findings, and the rationale offered for their interpretation, and then Yarkoni’s criticism.

4.4.1

The dACC is Selective for Pain

Lieberman and Eisenberger’s most general conclusion is that “... the clearest account of
dACC function is that it is selectively involved in pain-related processes” (2015, p.
15255). A region is selective for a process when there is evidence for the generalizability
of both forward and reverse inferences between observations of activity in that region and
instantiations of that cognitive process. As noted above, evidence that can support reverse
inferences is not available from most neuroimaging experiments. To this end, Lieberman
and Eisenberger justify their use of NeuroSynth by noting that it offers “… the
opportunity to perform comprehensive reverse inference analyses that include virtually
every psychological process that has been attributed to dACC” (p.15250).
To determine the significance of the data with respect to the claim that dACC is pain
selective, they examine the forward and reverse inference maps for a collection of terms
associated with four candidate psychological categories. Each of the categories
considered — pain, executive control, conflict processing and salience — is matched
with one to six terms in NeuroSynth (for instance, “pain”, “painful” and “noxious” are
the terms they used to capture the category of ‘pain’). They justify the selection of four
categories by identifying them as the best candidates for dACC function currently
available in the relevant literature. They also provide forward inference maps from
NeuroSynth as confirmatory evidence for this claim, and further justification for this
decision (p. 15251).
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The reported reverse inference maps show ‘pain’ terms as having a greater overall
density of dACC activity than the terms associated with the other three categories. On
this basis, they conclude that “… the only psychological phenomenon that can be reliably
inferred given the presence of dACC activity is pain” (p. 15251). The analysis results
L&E take to be the most important for their conclusion are the probability of the term
occurring given activation in dACC, and the associated z-scores, which are a measure of
statistical significance. L&E compare the posterior probabilities in each of eight evenly
distributed coordinates from the dACC, and find that, at seven of the eight points, only
the posterior probability estimates for “pain” are statistically significant. They interpret
this as “... strong evidence that dACC activity in seven out of eight foci … could be
attributed to pain by quantitative reverse inference” (2015, p. 15252). It is noteworthy
that it is not the value of the posterior probability estimates themselves, but the statistical
significance of those values, that L&E regard as the relevant criterion for assessing the
evidential value of the data.
In a similar vein, L&E also compare the z-scores for pain reverse inference maps in
dACC with the z-scores for reverse inference maps for all other terms in the database.
They find that pain z-scores in the dACC are either the largest of all terms or, in the case
of one coordinate, second only to the term ‘clinical’. They interpret this result as ruling
out the possibility that terms not considered in the above analyses are better candidates
for reverse inferences from dACC activity (p. 15253). It is on the basis of these two
comparisons of statistical significance, that L&E come to regard the NeuroSynth data set
as strong evidence for the claim that ‘pain’ is the best general psychological account of
dACC processing. Yarkoni's position, on the other hand, is that NeuroSynth data provides
evidence for the contrary conclusion: dACC activity and pain are not bound by a relation
of selectivity. Yarkoni offers a number of arguments for this position, two of which are
aimed at disputing L&E’s primary claim and are relevant to my aims here.

4.4.2

The dACC is not Selective for Pain

Two of the arguments Yarkoni offers are aimed at establishing that (1) NeuroSynth data
cannot provide strong evidence for reverse inference claims, and (2) L&E's method of
analysis and interpretation is not able to support their interpretive aims. Yarkoni argues
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that while NeuroSynth data could provide some evidence for pain selectivity, further
evidence showing that “... no other process activates dACC in a meaningful way
independently of its association with pain” (Yarkoni 2015a) is required. He contends that
NeuroSynth data are only able to provide weak evidence in support of reverse inferences.
Part of the reason for this is that NeuroSynth data are the product of an automated
curation process, which, as with any curatorial process, involves abstracting away from
the details of the experiment the data are drawn from in order to integrate them
seamlessly into the database. While the automated process NeuroSynth uses will retain
the fact that activity in a region is correlated with an ascribed label, it does not
necessarily include the aspects of the data and experimental conditions which are needed
to justify the claim that the label and regional activity are correlated. The letter to the
editor reinforces this point, concluding that “… Neurosynth is useful for exploring
structure-to-function mappings … but it cannot provide definitive inferences about
specific brain regions” (Wager et al 2016).
There is a deeper problem that Yarkoni raises for L&E’s analysis: a comparison of
reverse and forward inference maps over four categories does not represent a sufficiently
diverse collection of candidate cognitive processes to warrant a reverse inference claim.
The problem with L&E’s approach is that restricting comparisons to only four categories
recreates the epistemic limitations of neuroimaging experiments that NeuroSynth aims to
alleviate. L&E’s decision to do so is justified by reference to the extant literature on
dACC function, which is the product of a focussed effort to use neuroimaging
experiments to identify candidate processes for dACC function. These experiments,
however, lack generalizability— they cannot be used to establish a general claim about
dACC function, only a claim about dACC function relative to those cognitive capacities
explicitly targeted by the tasks. This is one reason for L&E’s use of the NeuroSynth
database, to diversify the cognitive states represented by the data set. Unfortunately, their
methodology, informed as it is by the standards of research guiding the conduct of
neuroimaging experiments, and the interpretation of the resulting data, leads them to
overlook patterns in the NeuroSynth data that contradict their conclusion. This problem is
exacerbated by the fact that they compare the z-scores of the reverse inference maps, and
not posterior probabilities. Where z-scores provide a measure of statistical significance,
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posterior probabilities provide an estimate of the accuracy of a reverse inference. The
latter is, contrary to L&E’s view, the data pattern most relevant for evaluating the
selectivity of dACC for pain.
Considering a more diverse selection of categories and comparing posterior probability
estimates provides evidence that dACC is not pain selective. Wager and colleagues letter
to the editor notes that “… using the same database, we estimate the probability of a
study including physical pain given activity in pain-selective dACC at ~12%, on par with
language, emotion, attention, and memory” (2016, p. E2474). Yarkoni, additionally,
provides a comparison of posterior probability estimates for a selection of terms —
motor, fear, reward, working memory — showing that, while the z-score for ‘pain’ is
greater than that for ‘motor’, the probability that ‘motor’ is a term labelling the data given
that any activity is reported in dACC is around 18%, while pain is around 8%. These
results show that “… it’s probably a bad idea to infer any particular process on the basis
of observed activity, given how low the posterior probability estimates for most terms are
going to be” (Yarkoni 2015b).
In the next section I argue that L&E’s judgement of the significance of NeuroSynth data
is directed and informed by a research strategy that is appropriate in the context of a
neuroimaging experiment, where efforts to maximize the reliability of the data limit the
generalizability of the supported claims and hypotheses. Applied to a data set arrived at
by integrating a diverse body of data, their approach leads them to make a number of
inferential errors — as identified by Yarkoni and colleagues. The dispute is, from this
vantage point, over the appropriateness of methods for analyzing and interpreting
synthesized data sets available from NeuroSynth.

4.5
The Analysis and Interpretation of Synthesized
Data
There are two factors that contribute to the dispute between Yarkoni, the developer of the
database, and Lieberman and Eisenberger, database users. They are (1) the application of
analysis strategies appropriate in the context of neuroimaging research to the
interpretation of NeuroSynth data, and (2) a misunderstanding of particular data
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manipulations and the meaning of the patterns they produce. L&E’s interpretation of the
data is mistaken, in part, because decisions made in their analysis and interpretation of
NeuroSynth data are guided by an interpretive strategy that is tuned for the interpretation
of data produced in a neuroimaging experiment, and not a data set made from the
integration of a diverse collection of neuroimaging data. The misunderstanding of zscores further suggests that the understanding investigators have of the operation and
meaning of data analysis techniques plays a signifiant role in directing judgements of the
evidential significance of the data those techniques are applied to.
L&E focus on four specific cognitive processes because the categories of pain, executive
control, conflict processing and salience are the four accounts of dACC function that are
currently best supported in the literature they are contributing to (Lieberman 2015). In a
review of research on social and physical pain (which Lieberman refers to in his blog
post), Eisenberger argues for the view that social and physical pain share an underlying
cognitive state — the “… feeling of distress or suffering and the motivation to put this
experience to an end” (p. 607).22 The alternative accounts of dACC function Eisenberger
presents in that article match with the categories, and terms, L&E considered in their
NeuroSynth analysis. The empirical question that this leads to is the one their
NeuroSynth analysis addresses: which of pain, salience, or a number of cognitive
accounts best explains dACC activity? This is why their NeuroSynth analysis takes into
consideration only the terms as associated with these four cognitive processes. While it is
misleading to take this approach in evaluating the evidential significance of NeuroSynth
data for a selectivity claim, this approach is methodologically sound when considered in

22

Eisenberger doesn’t just rely on neuroimaging evidence to argue for this point. The

evidence presented in support of this view largely consists in research showing that tasks
inducing physical and social pain activate the dACC (e.g., Eisenberger 2003; Wager et al
2009; Kross et al 2011) as well as evidence from other areas of neuroscience, such as
lesioning research correlating dulled pain experiences with damage to dACC
(Eisenberger 2015, p. 604-5).
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the context of a neuroimaging experiment and the more restricted inferences those
experiments can be used to make.
In neuroimaging experiments the number of distinct cognitive processes comparable
when analyzing and interpreting the data are limited by the details of the tasks
participants performed and how they performed them. This is necessary because, without
these controls, it would be (more) difficult to discern the evidential significance of
neuroimaging data, given that it is influenced by causal factors other than those that are
associated with the phenomena it is collected or produced to learn about. Many of these
factors are idiosyncratic to the instances of measurement or data collection, and so are
difficult to identify. Recognizing that data are noisy in this way entails an epistemic
challenge that all scientists must overcome. That is, researchers somehow use data
influenced by both the phenomena of interest and innumerable causal factors
idiosyncratic to the circumstances of data production as evidence for claims about
phenomena that occur in a variety of settings and circumstances (see Bogen and
Woodward 1988; McAllister 1997; Woodward 2000; Harris 2003; Schindler 2011;
Massimi 2011; Apel 2011 for a variety of accounts of these inferences, and arguments
identifying various factors that influence them).
Experiments can be divided into two broad steps: data production and data interpretation.
Following Jim Woodward’s classification, data production “… has to do with the causal
processes that lead from the phenomena of interest to the data”, while data interpretation
“… involves the use of arguments, analytic techniques, and patterns of reasoning which
operate on the data so produced to reach conclusions about phenomena” (2000, p. S165).
Data production has to do with what is done to create a data set, while data interpretation
captures those steps involved in assessing data’s evidential significance. There are two
broad strategies for strengthening inferences in experimental science: improve the
process of data production (i.e., ‘build a better telescope’, or design a better experiment),
or improve the process of data interpretation (i.e., use better statistics, a new theory, or
different reasoning strategies). Improving upon the process of data production results in a
data set that is less noisy, and so more reliable as evidence (Woodward 2000; Sullivan
2009). The problem with L&E’s inference is that, while it is based on ‘better data’ than a
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neuroimaging experiment could provide for investigating the selectivity of a region, the
data interpretation process that they use is not adequate to the task.
In designing an experiment to address an empirical question, such as the one L&E use
NeuroSynth data to pursue, researchers will attempt to constrain the experimental
conditions to ensure that the resulting data are able to discriminate between the specific
hypotheses under evaluation. This effort aims toward the ideal data production process
that Woodward describes, which is one that produces “… different sorts of data … in
such a way that investigators can use such data to reliably track exactly which of the
competing claims … is true” (2000, p. S166). Decisions about which processes to focus
on are guided by the current literature, which will include proposals and evidence for a
number of competing hypotheses that experiments can be designed to discriminate
between (see also Sullivan 2009; 2016). There is a tradeoff in using experimental controls
to enhance the capacity of data to discriminate between a specific set of hypotheses
(Sullivan 2009; 2015).
Jacqueline Sullivan argues that the reliability of data and their capacity to warrant
inferences that are true of phenomena produced outside of laboratory settings are in
tension because the controls necessary to improve the reliability of data often involve
creating circumstances far removed from those that occur outside of laboratory settings.
Research in neurobiology emphasizes reliability, and as a result “… inevitably restricts
the extension of interpretive claims to the laboratory” (Sullivan 2009, p. 535). The same
could be said of neuroimaging experiments (see Sullivan 2015). Indeed, this tension
captures part of the problem with using neuroimaging data to conduct reverse inferences.
Reverse inference claims, such as ‘dACC activity indicates pain-related processing’ are
about the cognitive capacity, state, or process indicated by the engagement of a region of
the brain. A data set that could provide this evidence, at minimum, must represent as
many cognitive states and processes as dACC could conceivably be involved in bringing
about. Since many correlations between regional activity and cognitive processes go
unreported, these processes must include, but not be limited to, those that dACC has
specifically been implicated in. Neuroimaging experiments, however, prioritize reliability
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with respect to discriminating between a specific set of hypotheses, and so cannot provide
the requisite evidence to support a generalizable reverse inference (see Poldrack 2006;
Klein 2012; Machery 2014).
L&E regard NeuroSynth data as valuable for overcoming the limitations of neuroimaging
experiments because the analyses it provides include “… virtually every psychological
process that has been attributed to dACC” (2015, p. 15250). This, however, only goes
part of the way to overcoming the problems with reverse inferences. While a data
representing a broad selection of cognitive processes are necessary to support a reverse
inference claim, simply possessing data that could be used as evidence for a reverse
inference claim is not sufficient to warrant such a claim. One one hand, the tradeoff
between external validity and reliability cuts both ways. Synthesizing data sets to secure
greater external validity for reverse inference claims means reducing the reliability of the
data with respect to those very claims. The process of data synthesis also eliminates
patterns in the data that are important for determining what each data set was originally
about (see the example at the end of section 3, and also Sullivan 2016). This is
particularly true for NeuroSynth, as its curatorial process is implemented by an
automated computational procedure. This is why Yarkoni insists that NeuroSynth data, at
best, can support weak claims. NeuroSynth data cannot stand on their own as evidence
warranting a reverse inference, let alone a claim about the selectivity of a region for a
cognitive process. The other reason data aggregation is not sufficient as a solution for the
problems of reverse inference is that the problems go beyond problems with data
production processes. Many methods of data interpretation and analysis popular in
neuroimaging research are unable to provide clear indications of whether or not a reverse
inference claim is supported by the data (Poldrack 2010, p. 755-6).
Proposals for improving the quality of reverse inferences typically recommend
improvements to both data production and data interpretation procedures. Colin Klein, in
addition to recommending a focus on networks over regions, gestures towards metaanalyses as the way forward (2012); Russell Poldrack promotes machine learning
methods of data-analysis as a tool for conducting investigations of reverse inference
claims using large bodies of synthesized data (2012); and Clark Glymour and Catherine
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Hanson propose a different analysis strategy from Poldrack, which also depends on the
availability of a large and diverse body of neuroimaging data (2016). Each of the
proposals recommends that both better data and a new method of analysis are needed to
assess the data’s evidential significance with respect to reverse inference claims. L&E
also use a new method of analysis to evaluate the data, relying on the reverse inference
maps which are produced by a machine learning method similar to the one Poldrack
argues formally implements reverse inferences (2011; see also Yarkoni et al 2011). The
problem with L&E’s approach is that they’ve only implemented a change in the data and
analysis techniques, and not a corresponding change in their approach to the data’s
interpretation.
By restricting their focus to the four categories identified within the specific literature
they are contributing to, L&E are assuming that the diversity in the cognitive states
reflected in the data set is a sufficient change to their research practices for evaluating a
selectivity claim. This would be fine if L&E were analyzing data produced in an
adequately controlled experiment, and if they were content to restrict the inferred claims
accordingly. As presented, however, they draw the stronger conclusions that dACC is
pain selective. Their approach to evaluating the evidential significance of the data with
respect to this conclusion, that is the process of data analysis and interpretation they use,
is not up to this task.
This dispute reflects a conflict between approaches to the analysis and interpretation of
data appropriate in the context of a neuroimaging experiment and approaches appropriate
for evaluating the significance of a synthesized data set. The analysis strategy L&E
apply, while it may be misleading when used to evaluate NeuroSynth data, is justifiable
in the context of a neuroimaging experiment. In this way, L&E’s interpretation can be
regarded as justified, if misleading. This presents a problem for the prospects of metaanalyses, above and beyond challenges to data integration that follow from the lack of
coordination in methodological and conceptual practices emphasized by other
commenters on the prospects of meta-analyses (Yarkoni et al 2011; Poldrack et al 2017;
Sullivan 2016; 2017). The problem, as it relates to the misuse of powerful new
technologies for data analysis and interpretation, is not unique to meta-analyses, but is a
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problem for cognitive neuroscience more generally. The general problem is related to the
second problem with L&E’s interpretation: it is based on a misunderstanding of data
analysis techniques and the meaning of the data patterns they isolate.
The perception of tools like NeuroSynth as ‘solving’ the problems with neuroimaging
experiments with respect to reverse inferences is part of what builds L&E’s confidence in
the soundness of their approach — they say as much in the introduction of their paper.
This is not to say L&E simply trust that NeuroSynth data are adequate to this task. They
consider some of the facts of NeuroSynth’s curatorial process, as they note that “... the
reverse inference is linguistic, focused on the terms used across articles rather than on
task trial types of specific psychological states” (2015, p. 15254), and in their official
reply to Wager and colleagues, they report that they manually verified the ascription of a
random selection of labels to fifty papers for each category (2016). Even so, L&E still
mistake it as providing strong evidence for the claim that dACC is pain selective in part
because they understand NeuroSynth as a tool that can provide evidence sufficient for
definitively evaluating a reverse inference claim. A similar misunderstanding affects their
assessment of NeuroSynth’s evidential significance and guides the decision to focus on zscores associated with the considered reverse inference maps.
In justifying the focus on z-scores over posterior probabilities, Lieberman explains that
they were “not interested in effect sizes” (which is what posterior probabilities are), but
wanted to evaluate the “accumulated evidence for the reliability of reverse inferences”
and for this reason focussed on z-scores (2015). If z-scores reflect the accumulated
evidence for the reliability of an inference, then a higher z-score indicates a more likely
reverse inference target. Whether or not L&E’s interpretation of z-scores is accurate, that
they understand them as they do explains why they judge the data to be positive evidence
for the pain-selectivity of dACC.23 Yarkoni, on the other hand, is familiar with the details

23

Comparing the z-scores for reverse inference maps associated with different terms

assumes that differences between z-scores are statistically significant. This is an
assumption that has been criticized by statisticians on the grounds that differences in
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of the NeuroSynth algorithm and meta-analysis tools, having developed them. Yarkoni
rightly regards z-scores as estimates of statistical significance, since they are computed
by transforming p-values, and views effect sizes as the relevant statistical output to
compare when evaluating selectivity claims. Posterior probabilities, and not z-scores, are
the relevant data pattern for judging the selectivity of a pattern of brain activity for a
cognitive process or state.
Tools for the efficient conduct of large-scale meta-analyses, like NeuroSynth, are only
the latest example of novel techniques for manipulating and analyzing data driving
progress in cognitive neuroscience. The last two decades of neuroimaging research has
seen the development and uptake of a diverse collection of distinct tools and technologies
for manipulating and analyzing data. This has been viewed as both valued and dangerous
- with neuroscientists cautioning that with the increasing number of methods for
analyzing data comes an increased rate of false positives (Carp 2012a; 2012b), an
increased potential for misinterpretation of results, more opportunities for questionable
research practices, and the potential of ‘getting lost in data’ (Poldrack et al 2017; Munafò
et al 2017). In response to some of these worries, Eve Marder has argued that, as data
analysis processes become more complex and more diverse, intuitions about how to

statistical significance are often not themselves significant (Gelman and Stern 2006), and
has been identified as an ubiquitous and problematic practice in the neuroimaging
research (Nieuwenhuis et al 2011). Lieberman’s response shows that they are unaware of
this problem, as they interpret a difference in z-scores as showing that “… we can be
more confident that there is some real association between pain and dACC than between
the other three terms and dACC” (2016). L&E’s understanding of z-scores leads to
inferring a descriptive claim about the data that is incorrect: that the evidence in support
of a reverse inference from dACC activity to pain is stronger than for other terms. This in
turn leads to explaining the z-score comparison by appeal to the selectivity of dACC for
pain.
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engage with data will become more important for driving progress in the neurosciences in
a positive direction (Marder 2015). Intuitions about how to engage with, analyze and
interpret data are also important because, as the dispute and discussion above shows, they
can promote inferential errors and lead to faulty judgements of data’s significance on the
basis of interpretive strategies that are sound in other contexts. Progress requires more
than just making tools, making them available, and community coordination. Open
discussions about the effective use of these tools, and changes in the standards of
evidence guiding the conduct and evaluation of approaches to the analysis and
interpretation of data must accompany these technologies. The debate between Yarokni
and Lieberman that unfolded in the blogosphere is an example of an open discussion, but
such discussions also need to be channeled into changes in research practices if they are
to be productive.
Disputes between stake holders in the scientific community are all but guaranteed in the
context of data sharing and meta-analysis, in part because individuals, labs, and research
groups have different goals, theoretical backgrounds, technical expertise and research
priorities. One striking difference between the data sharing efforts in cognitive
neuroscience and those operative in other biological sciences is that cognitive
neuroscientists have not instituted a mechanism of ‘governance’. In the case of bioontologies — which are the taxonomic structures used to label, categorize and organize
data within a database — consortia were formed that effectively forced curators,
regulators and users of databases to coordinate and interact by providing a platform for
stakeholders to engage in discussion, and mechanisms for dissent to be transformed into
action (see Leonelli 2016, chapter 2). Such a mechanism allows disputes to be
productively funneled into changes in research practices, repository structure and
curatorial procedures.
In cognitive neuroscience, there are informally organized communities of like-minded
researchers, database developers and curators who actively interact with users (Yarkoni,
for instance, is active on a google group for NeuroSynth), but there is not yet an
established regulatory body or disciplinary framework for assessing, guiding and
formalizing research practices as the discipline beings to engage with and use large data

121

repositories. The situation in neuroimaging research may just be a temporary symptom of
the growing pains associated with efforts to grow and enrich a research community
through the integration of data. Cognitive neuroscience, as is to be expected, faces its
own unique set of challenges including ongoing efforts to establish standardized data
formats and incentivize their uptake by the wider community (e.g., Gorgolewski et al
2015), research and funding incentives that are not aligned with data sharing, and a
limited allocation of resources to the sustainment of data repositories (Poldrack and
Gorgolewski 2015). Even so, the argument above demonstrates that, in addition to
community-wide collaboration and coordination as others have argued is necessary
(Sullivan 2017), data sharing practices also need to be accompanied by changes in the
standards appealed to in the assessment of the adequacy of analysis methods and
interpretive strategies if they are to promote the generation of knowledge as their
advocates promise.

4.6

Conclusion

The capacity to engage in large scale data integration, and conduct meta-analyses over
such a database, is a relatively new possibility for cognitive neuroscientists. It remains to
be seen if they will be successful at improving knowledge of human cognition in the way
that database developers hope.
The integration of data into shared and accessible repositories, and the meta-analysis
techniques they make possible promise to improve theories and knowledge production in
cognitive neuroscience. If meta-analyses are to productively move the discipline forward,
standards guiding the analysis and interpretation of data must be changed. Explicitly
outlining the pitfalls and limitations of databases and meta-analysis tools is not sufficient
to offset the potential application of analysis and interpretive strategies that are sound in
the context of neuroimaging experiments, but insensitive to the limitations of synthesized
data. Indeed, L&E refer to Yarkoni’s own work outlining the limitations and effective
uses of NeuroSynth as justification for their methods — which I have shown are, by
Yarkoni’s own lights, ill-suited to the interpretation of NeuroSynth data. They identify a
paper outlining the value of NeuroSynth for reverse inference claims (Yarkoni et al
2011), as well as discussions in the google group dedicated to answering questions about
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the use of NeuroSynth, as templates upon which their analysis and interpretation is based
(Lieberman and Eisenberger 2015). Furthermore, rigid guidelines for data use may
undermine one of the known epistemic advantages of data sharing. Sharing data promotes
knowledge, in part, by creating the potential for new discoveries to be made with old data
(e.g., Leonelli 2009, 2015; O’Malley and Soyer 2012). Arguments in cognitive
neuroscience for sharing data often refer to this potential as justification for the allocation
of resources to database development and maintenance (Van Horn and Gazzaniga 2013).
It is important that investigators are given some latitude in the way they access, analyze
and interpret shared bodies of data.
With respect to the broader philosophical impact of this discussion, the situation in
cognitive neuroscience is relevantly different from that in other areas of the life sciences
where data repositories have been successful. Neuroscientists are responding to typical
challenges for open science and sharing data in novel ways. NeuroSynth is a prime
example: it uses automated curation to bypass the need for the wider community to
commit to data sharing in order to effectively populate a large-scale database. It is, thus,
an occasion and a time in which philosophers might learn from carefully examining how
efforts to integrate neuroimaging data interface with the organization of the research
community. One promising approach is to compare the epistemic and social dimensions
of successful data sharing practices with the current practice of cognitive neuroscience
and use that as a lens through which to identify likely pitfalls and barriers to progress, as I
have begun to do here. In this way, philosophical contributions may also be able to
productively impact cognitive neuroscience by identifying similarities and differences
between strategies proven successful in other fields and the social, empirical and practical
conditions that allowed those strategies to succeed.
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Chapter 5

5

Data Analysis in Neuroimaging

5.1

Introduction

The development and use of new techniques for creating, storing, transporting,
transforming, analyzing and/or organizing data has been instrumental in moving
cognitive neuroscience forward. These developments have brought to light novel
hypotheses and phenomena that could not be investigated before the development of new
techniques for creating, handling and manipulating neuroimaging data. These innovations
and the progress they bring are not without their challenges. Data analysis involves
manipulating and changing data through the application of sophisticated computational
processes. This creates opportunities for results to be misinterpreted, or techniques to be
misapplied. The rapid rate of innovation in the methods of analysis and tools for handling
and sharing data, when not accompanied by equally rapid adaption and updating of
research methods and practices, also creates opportunities for well-intentioned
researchers to misuse and misinterpret data’s evidential significance. These are reasons
for the philosophical community working on the nature of evidence in neuroscience to
turn an eye towards data analysis. A first step towards this end is understanding what role
data analysis techniques play in cognitive neuroscience, and how that role is played. This
has been the broad aim that unites the preceding three papers.
Often, when we discuss data analysis and manipulation we think of statistical tests and
correcting for noise and artifacts. While data analysis techniques and manipulations are
used to quantify the evidential relation between data and a hypothesis, to eliminate
detectable artifacts, and minimize random noise, these are not the only functions
performed by the processes and techniques used to analyze neuroimaging data. The
techniques at the heart of neuroimaging research, including MVPA techniques like
pattern classification analysis, make distinct contributions to the data interpretation
process. MVPA techniques have, among other things, made possible a number of novel
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and promising research projects, including: interrogating the validity of concepts used to
describe cognitive capacities and processes (as in Lenartowicz et al 2010; Anderson
2015), tracking changes in information as it moves through the brain (as in Kohler et al
2013; Tambini et al 2013), and decoding the contents of brain activity by predicting
participant behaviour (as reviewed by Tong and Pratte 2012). In chapter three I argued
that these techniques are valuable because the results of data analysis techniques, unlike
the ‘raw’ data provided by neuroimaging experiments, can be explained in terms of
claims about phenomena. Data analysis techniques are useful because they isolate
patterns in the data that are explicable in terms of claims about the phenomenon
neuroscientists are interested in. They are, however, themselves inferentially limited. In
the second chapter, I showed that multiple analysis techniques are used together to
determine the evidential significance of neuroimaging data. In the fourth chapter, I
argued that research goals and background theory inform the decisions made in the
application of data analysis techniques, and in turn the explanations offered for the data
patterns. In this last chapter I use the arguments and cases examined in the previous
papers to articulate how data analysis techniques facilitate data interpretation in terms of
the interpretive and epistemic leverage they provide.
To this end, the next section clarifies the distinction between data and data patterns that
has been a central part of how I think about data analysis. I draw this distinction by virtue
of the advantages data patterns have in comparison to the challenges with interpreting the
data they are derived from. In the third section, I examine the epistemic advantages and
disadvantages of multiple analysis techniques more closely — reflecting on the examples
discussed throughout the preceding papers. I argue that the evidence provided by multiple
data patterns is unlikely to produce genuinely robust results, as suggested at the end of
the second chapter. I argue that it is not the independence or convergence of data patterns
that allows a variety of them together to enhance the value of neuroimaging data, but
their distinctiveness. In the final section, I reflect on the challenges and questions raised
by this project given the current trajectory of neuroimaging research.

131

5.2

Evidence in Neuroimaging

I have argued throughout the preceding chapters that the argumentative strategy skeptics
of neuroimaging research rely on is not sensitive to a number of epistemically relevant
features of research practices operative in cognitive neuroscience. In the second chapter, I
contributed my own defence of neuroimaging research, arguing that the skeptical strategy
mistakenly treats data analysis techniques in isolation of each other (Wright
forthcoming). Adequately treating of inferences in neuroimaging research requires
attending to the diversity of analysis techniques used to interpret the data. It also requires
recognizing and evaluating the impact that each individual technique, and decisions about
which techniques to use and how to use them has on the evidential value of neuroimaging
data. In the third chapter, I noted that the challenges raised by skeptics, while based on an
artificial treatment of the data interpretation process, are still legitimate challenges that
inferences in neuroimaging research must overcome. That is, analysis techniques require
assumptions to be made of the data that can undermine the inferences they are used to
support. The indirect relationship between neuroimaging data and the phenomena it is
used to study, combined with the sophistication of data analysis processes further
complicates this situation by making it relatively easy to identify viable alternative
hypotheses. To overcome these challenges, the interpretive process must (1) not be
weakened by assumptions implicit in each of its parts, and (2) provide resistance against
alternative and competing hypotheses not explicitly considered in the interpretive
process. This, I argued in chapter 3, is achieved through the explanation of a variety of
data analysis results.
In this section I argue that data and data patterns can be distinguished by the different
evidential roles that they play. This distinction serves two purposes: (1) it makes clear
why the argumentative strategy of examining a single, if salient and significant, analysis
technique fails, and (2) it shows how the use of multiple analysis techniques can address
the two challenges noted above. This distinction is then taken up in the next section,
which re-examines the epistemic advantage provided by the use of multiple analysis
techniques.
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5.2.1

Data, Data Patterns, and Phenomena

Recall that, on Bogen and Woodward’s view (1988), data are the product of an
experiment. They characterize data as “... idiosyncratic to particular experimental
contexts, and typically cannot occur outside of those contexts” (317). Phenomena, on the
other hand “.... have stable, repeatable characteristics which will be detectable by means
of a variety of different procedures, which may yield quite different kinds of data” (317).
Bogen and Woodward further argue that “... facts about data and facts about phenomena
differ in what they serve as evidence for (claims about phenomena versus general
theories)” (306). Data are evidence for claims about phenomena, which in turn provide
evidence for the general theories that explain them. Treating data as evidence for a claim
about a regularity in the world is no small task, often requiring the careful construction
and implementation of an experimental circumstance that instantiates an instance of the
target phenomenon such that it is susceptible to measurement. Indeed, Woodward argues
that improvements to the reliability of data-phenomena inferences often comes from
improvements to the quality of and knowledge about the means of data production
(2000).
Woodward contrasts improvements to the quality of data production with improvements
to the reasoning processes involved in data interpretation, insisting that, instead of by
changes in background theory and data interpretation, “… in real science the most
effective improvements in reliability very often are achieved by altering the data
production process—by building a better telescope …” (2000, p. S165). As the preceding
cases and arguments show, in neuroimaging research at least, significant progress has
been made not only by altering the data production process (neuroimaging technology
has certainly improved over the last two decades), and providing better and more
sophisticated theories, but also through the development and uptake of new tools for
analyzing, organizing, accessing and manipulating data. In situating data analysis as part
of the interpretation process, I have been implicitly arguing that the progress made
through innovations in data analysis constitute an improvement to the process of data
interpretation. Variations in BOLD signal measurements and behavioural data are
causally distant from the neural activity and cognitive processes investigators use those
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variations to make inferences about. This extra challenge, above and beyond those that
are characteristic of all experimental science, necessitates the need to improve reasoning
processes. This is necessary because neuroscientists using neuroimaging data to make
inferences to claims about phenomena must not only contend with noise in the data, but
also the fact that the objects of measurement are indirectly related to the causal factors
that give rise to the phenomena of interest.
Estimating the portion of the BOLD signal measurement that corresponds with task
related activity is an example of data manipulations used to improve the evidential
significance of neuroimaging data. This typically involves picking a model for the
hemodynamic response function (hrf), and, as discussed in the second chapter, using
deconvolution to partition the BOLD measurements into the hrf and noise. There are a
variety of approaches to estimating the hemodynamic response from the BOLD signal,
each of which involves making different assumptions about the causal factors involved in
its production. This is why the choice of model has a significant impact on the resulting
parameter estimates (see Lindquist et al 2009).
The deconvolution process plays a different epistemic role than analysis techniques like
subtraction and multivariate pattern analysis. Calculating an hrf is a pre-processing step
conducted to improve the strength of evidence provided by the results of subsequent
analyses. In the case considered in the second chapter, the process is used to minimize the
possibility that a machine learning classifier’s accuracy is due to convenient correlations
between biological processes that are concurrent with, but irrelevant to, the realization of
the cognitive process or state of interest (Wright forthcoming). Techniques like
subtraction and pattern classification analysis are not as important for addressing noise as
they are for addressing the indirectness of the data. The difficulty of this task is a function
of the knowledge investigators have about the causal links connecting the phenomena of
interest and the measurements. In the case of the BOLD signal and neural activity, the
fine-grained details of those causal connections are mostly unknown.
Data analysis techniques — such as subtraction or pattern classification analysis — are
used because they isolate patterns in the data that are informative about the claims,
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hypotheses or phenomena under investigation. New data analysis techniques change the
evidential value of data by making it possible to detect phenomena via the data patterns
they isolate. They do not do so by directly detecting the influence of the phenomena. If
they were supposed to detect the influence of phenomena directly, then the skeptical
arguments that point out worrying assumptions (e.g., van Orden and Paap 1997; Ritchie,
Kaplan and Klein forthcoming), would be sufficient to undermine the capacity of data
patterns to aid in assessment of the evidential value of neuroimaging data. It is here that a
distinction between data and the data patterns is informative. Such a distinction, like the
distinction between data and phenomena, can be drawn by appeal to the different
evidential roles data and data patterns play in neuroimaging research.
Data are often recognized by philosophers of science as valuable as evidence for claims
about phenomena to the degree that it is produced in such a way that the phenomenon of
interest exerts a detectable influence on it. Bogen and Woodward notice that data have a
number of undesirable features, in that they are complex and idiosyncratic to the context
in which they are produced. These features are tolerated because they allow “… data to
be useful as evidence…” (1988, p. 319). Ian Hacking recognized data as the ‘marks’,
produced by interactions between experimenters, measuring instruments and the objects
of measurement (1992). The most recent account of data made available in the
philosophical literature goes a step beyond this, arguing that data are anything that are
used as evidence (Leonelli 2015). This places the need to use data as evidence as more
than just a constraint on data production, but constitutive of what data are.
Experimental practices, such as carefully controlling experimental environments and the
efforts scientists go through to fix and stabilize observations, are often identified as the
central facilitators of the ‘detectability’ of the influence of the target phenomena. This is
part of Woodward’s argument that ‘building a better microscope’ is the most common
path to better science (2000), and these practices are the source of complexity and
idiosyncrasy that Bogen and Woodward identify as a necessary for the pursuit of
experimental knowledge (1988). The preceding arguments and examples I have presented
make clear that, as is the case in neuroimaging research, when experimental controls are
unable to ensure that there is a clear and clean causal link between the objects of
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measurement and the target phenomenon, data analysis and manipulation practices are
used to ‘cross the gap’. They do this by identifying, or isolating, patterns in data that
could possibly reflect the influence of the target phenomenon. Data patterns, however, do
not provide sufficient evidence to warrant claims about that phenomenon.
As I argue in the third chapter, data patterns are ill suited as evidence for claims about
phenomena because they are the product of manipulations that suppress information
relevant for evaluating claims about phenomena. This is consistent with the skeptical
arguments that identify the decisions involved in data analysis as a source of inferential
error (such as Aktunç 2014; Mole and Klein 2010). Skeptical arguments criticizing
inferences in neuroimaging research by focussing on the limitations of data analysis
techniques identify genuine inferential limitations of data patterns, but then mistakenly
ascribe them to the data the patterns are derived from. This move conflates the evidential
value of data with the value of data patterns. Data patterns are evidence for claims
pertaining to the evidential relation that holds between data and phenomena, and not
evidence for the claim about phenomena directly.
If data patterns are used to evaluate the evidential relation that holds between data and
claims about phenomena, then what criteria do, and ought to, guide their isolation and
explanation? In the fourth chapter, I argued that the choice of data analysis techniques,
and decisions made during their application, are guided by investigator’s understanding
of the function of the technique, the background theory they are approaching the data
from the perspective of, and the research questions they are analyzing it to answer. In
chapter three, I argued that data patterns are valuable insofar as they can be explained by
appeal to claims about phenomena. Putting these together, a data pattern is explicable
within a context when the theoretical background and understanding of the analysis
technique used to isolate it provides the explanatory resources to connect claims about
the target phenomena to the data pattern. Changes in any of these factors — analysis
techniques, theoretical background or understanding of the analysis process — can
change the perceived value of data by altering the explanatory relations investigators
perceive between claims about phenomena and data patterns.
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In summary, for data to be evidence for a claim about a phenomenon the causal factors
that give rise to the phenomenon must (1) be involved in the production of the data such
that they (2) leave detectable patterns in the data. The first condition reflects the fact that
data cannot provide evidence for a phenomenon that played no role in its production. The
second constraint is epistemic. Data cannot provide evidence for a phenomenon that
played a role in its production, but leave no detectable patterns in the data. Data
production processes are important for ensuring that the first condition is satisfied, while
the second condition is contingent on the methods and processes used to isolate and
interpret patterns in the data. Data patterns are valuable because they allow researchers to
assess the relevance and significance of data with respect to a claim about phenomena.
Data patterns are not a panacea to the challenges of interpreting data and determining its
evidential value. They, and the analysis techniques used to isolate them, are better
regarded as tools that play a central role in engaging and overcoming those challenges.
I argued in the preceding papers that the inferential gap between data and claims about
phenomena is managed by the use of multiple analysis techniques to isolate and explain
multiple patterns. In the next section I return to this idea and re-examine the significance
of multiple data patterns given the challenges with using neuroimaging data as evidence
outlined above. Where I had suggested in the second chapter that they provide inferences
with a degree of robustness, taking into account the inferential limitations of data patterns
and the process by which they are created as discussed above, robustness doesn’t quite fit
as an account of the epistemic advantage provided by multiple data patterns.

5.3

Multiple Patterns and Robustness

Interpreting neuroimaging data involves using a variety of analysis techniques. Each
technique produces a different data pattern by imposing different manipulations and
transformations on the data. Each manipulation, if the resulting data pattern is to be
interpreted as informative about the target phenomena, involves making assumptions
about the data. This is what skeptics often pick up on — arguing that subtractive methods
assume that discrete regions have discrete function (van Orden and Paap 1997), and that
classification analysis assumes successful classification is indicative of informational
content (Ritchie, Kaplan and Klein forthcoming). The example I considered in the second
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chapter showed how analysis procedures involving distinct assumptions can be used to
limit the reliance on assumptions in the final inference. In particular, the use of a
permutation test to select voxels for the pattern classification analysis minimized the
extent to which the inference relied on the assumption that the classifier was leveraging
relevant patterns in the BOLD data. I concluded the paper by drawing a parallel with
discussions of robustness in the context of debates about the epistemic advantages of the
use of multiple modes of measurement to validate measurement devices. When the same
result is obtained by multiple, independent, processes that result is regarded as robust
(Wimsatt 1981, p. 61). The suggestion was that multiple analysis processes enhance
inferences in neuroimaging research by providing a more robust body of evidence than
the results of a single analysis technique. Robustness is desirable because each line of
supporting evidence is independent, ensuring that the result stands even if some of the
evidence for it is overturned.
While this use of multiple analysis techniques in the interpretation of neuroimaging data
appears to fit the model of robustness, I did cautiously classify the robustness of a
collection of data patterns as weak and local. These qualifications are noteworthy
because, upon closer inspection, they each cut against one of the core features of
robustness. A conclusion is robust when multiple independent lines of evidence converge
on it. A collection of data patterns is weak because the outcomes are not directly
comparable and local because they are derived from a shared data set. With the
arguments and examples from previous chapters now in hand, as well as the distinction
between data and data patterns, it is worth looking again at these qualifications. I consider
the locality and weakness each in turn.

5.3.1

Local and Dependent

The dispute examined in the fourth chapter, over the reliability and significance of
NeuroSynth data for claims about the selectivity of discrete regions of the brain, shows
that the significance of data is determined by locally shaped epistemic criteria. The
criteria investigators consider when making judgements of data’s relevance are not
passively applied to the results of analysis techniques, but actively direct decisions made
during the analysis process. In this way, theoretical goals and the conceptual

138

understanding of data analysis procedures that determine the epistemic criteria data
patterns are evaluated by also influence decisions made in the process of creating those
patterns. While the concerns about locality raised in the second chapter mostly had to do
with the data patterns originating from the same data set, the case examined in chapter
four suggests that the shared theoretical context may be a bigger threat to their
independence. Alison Wylie’s work on inferences in archaeology puts a finer point on the
problem here.
Wylie distinguishes two dimensions along which research practices can be independent:
theoretical independence, which concerns the background theories, auxiliary hypotheses
and modes of reasoning involved in the practice; and causal independence, which
concerns the causal factors that give rise to a given data set or body of evidence (1999, p.
304). She argues that both are necessary for convergent results to be truly robust, and
cautions, as many contributors to the work on robustness analysis do, that appearances of
independence can lead to mistaken confidence in claims inferred on their basis (also see
Wimsatt 1981; Calcott 2013).
The lines of evidence represented by a distinct analysis process are conceptually
dependent. They are produced within the same research context and decisions made
along the way are guided by the same theoretical goals and background. While there is a
limited degree of causal independence — different patterns emphasize the influence of
some causal factors, suppress the influence of others, and often require different
assumptions of the data to obtain for their results to be interpretable — the patterns
ultimately originate from the same data set. This creates the conditions that can lead to
what Wimsatt calls illusions of robustness (1981, p. 71). Illusions of robustness can occur
when the appearance of independence conceals the dimensions along which the results
and methods are the same. The dispute over the value of NeuroSynth data provides a
compelling example of how the failure of the process by which data patterns are arrived
at to be theoretically independent can lead investigators to be mistakenly confident in a
result.
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Lieberman and Eisenberger’s mistaken assessment of the data’s value is driven by the
theoretical perspective they approach data interpretation from. Their theoretical
perspective, informed by their prior work on dACC function and understanding of the
meaning of reverse inference maps, directs the decisions they make in the analysis of the
data. In particular, the decision to only analyze reverse inference maps for a small
selection of terms, and discounting the significance of posterior probabilities. Both
decisions are justified by appeal to their theoretical commitments (Lieberman 2015), and
together they lead them to regard the data as warranting evidence for a selectivity claim.
L&E present multiple lines of evidence in the form of reverse inference maps to support
this conclusion. A conclusion ultimately dependent on the theoretical perspective they
approached the analysis from, as Yarkoni’s criticism — which is made from a distinct
theoretical perspective — demonstrates.24

24

Recall that Lieberman, in response to Yarkoni’s argument that the posterior probability

estimates are the right data pattern to consider when evaluating the significance of
NeuroSynth data for the target claim, insisted that they were ‘not interested’ in posterior
probabilities. This reflects a judgement that a data pattern, which Yarkoni presents as
contradictory evidence for the claim that dACC is pain selective, is actually irrelevant.
This example echoes a central premise of Jacob Stegenga’s argument against the
significance of robustness (2009). According to Stegenga, it is rare for a diverse body of
evidence to be convergent, and in cases where there is discordance the pursuit of
robustness does not help because the independence of the multiple modes of evidence is
often the source of the problem (p. 658). Indeed, the dispute over the value of
NeuroSynth data appears intractable in part because of the theoretical differences which
lead to opposing judgements of evidential value. Yarkoni’s lack of expertise with respect
to research on dACC function, and Lieberman and Eisenberger’s lack of expertise with
respect to the curatorial procedures of NeuroSynth, are referred to in arguments against
the validity, or relevance, of the opposing interpretation. Stengenga notes that decisions
about the relevance of data may be able to resolve the problem of discordant evidence.
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Data patterns isolated by multiple analysis techniques applied to a neuroimaging data set
are both causally and theoretically dependent. The shared theoretical background of a
collection of data patterns is a greater inferential risk than the shared origins. Not only
can the theoretical background data patterns be considered within direct assessments of
evidential value, but it also guides the process of creating those data patterns and can
direct judgements of the relevance of contradictory results provided by independent
analyses. Furthermore, the data interpretation process is aimed at determining the
evidential value of a particular data set and so, if multiple analysis processes are to be
used, it only makes sense to apply them to that data set. Theoretical dependence is an
epistemic liability, and causal dependence is unavoidable. Next, I consider the
relationship between the ‘weakness’ qualifier and the requirement that a robust body of
evidence converges on the same result.

5.3.2

Weak and Divergent

I classified the body of evidence provided by multiple analysis techniques as weak
because the patterns isolated by each technique are distinct and often cannot be directly
compared. In a footnote, I remarked that, while this is a problem for evaluating the
convergence of the results, which is required by a robust body of evidence, it isn’t a
problem unique to neuroimaging research. I referred to Jacqueline Sullivan’s work on the
multiplicity of experimental protocols, which casts doubt on the assumption that different
experiments aiming at understanding the same phenomenon in fact instantiate the same
phenomenon, given that the experimental protocols guiding the experiment often differ
between research contexts (2009). An analogous problem holds for the use of multiple

However, this just shifts the problem of identifying criteria for adjudicating between
discordant results, to identifying criteria for determining what results are relevant (p.
660). The same theoretical perspectives that lead to the opposed judgements of
significance, also direct the arguments against the relevance of the contradictory
interpretation and its supporting data patterns.
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data analysis techniques. Since they each implement a distinct series of manipulations,
isolating distinct patterns by suppressing different facets of the data, their results are not
about ‘the same’ thing.
Consider how the results of univariate techniques and pattern classification analysis are
used together in practice (as discussed in Coutanche 2013; Davis et al 2014). Subtraction
techniques proceed by averaging BOLD signal data within a region of interest then
contrasting that regional average between two task conditions. The result indicates the
mean difference in activity between the task conditions, or the mean activation of the
region. Pattern classification analysis involves using one set of variables, usually BOLD
activity, to predict another, either task conditions or behavioural responses. Classifier
accuracy is taken to indicate if information relevant to discriminating between the tasks is
available in the signal. Marc Coutanche’s discussion of the combined value of these tools
indicates that some studies use univariate techniques, such as subtraction analysis, in
series with pattern classification analysis in order to evaluate the sufficiency of the
information carried by multivariate patterns, while others use them in parallel to evaluate
the necessity of multivariate patterns for successful classification (2013, p. 669). The
sequence approach involves using a univariate technique to remove the mean activation
from the data and assess the effect on classifier performance. If the classifier accuracy
remains high, then this is evidence that the multivariate pattern (that is, relative
differences in activity between data points) is sufficient for classification. The parallel
approach can be conducted in several ways, either by performing classification on the
isolated mean activity, or by comparing subtraction and classification results. In either
case, the aim is to determine if there is information available in one, both, or neither of
the multivariate pattern and mean activity (p. 669-70). These comparisons would not be
meaningful if the patterns isolated by subtraction and pattern classification analysis were
convergent.
In characterizing the common features of concepts of robustness, Wimsatt notes that they
often involve looking for and analyzing things that are “invariant over or identical in the
conclusions or results of…” independent processes (1981, p. 44). The invariant results or
conclusions are regarded as robustly supported, and are conferred additional support by
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the independence of the various processes that produce them. In the comparison of mean
activation and classifier accuracy, investigators are not trying to identify an invariant
value, variable or pattern. Instead, claims about mean activation and claims about
classifier accuracy are taken together to be informative about the how information may
be encoded in the BOLD signal. If the mean activity is low, and the classifier is accurate
with and without the mean levels, then investigators conclude that task relevant
information is encoded in a multivariate pattern (that is, multiple parts acting in a
coordinated way). Identifying invariant properties is not the aim of applying multiple
analysis techniques to the data. Each technique is applied for the unique perspective it
provides on the evidential significance of the data with respect to a specific set of claims
and hypotheses.
This, and the failure of independence noted above, are together strong reasons to resist
the robustness account of the value of multiple patterns. While multiple analysis results
do not confer a data-phenomena inference with robustness, they are valuable for
interpreting the data and that value follows from their distinctiveness, not their
independence or convergence. William Bechtel, looking at how neuroscientists combine
multiple research techniques to make inferences, provides an alternative to robustness
along these lines. He argues that multiple research techniques are valued in neuroscience
for their complementarity, not independence (2002). The same can be said of multiple
data analysis techniques.

5.3.3

Complementary Perspectives

Techniques like single cell recording and neuroimaging are often used to calibrate one
another, and so fail to be independent in the way required for a convergence of results to
be regarded as an instance of robustness (Bechtel 2002, p. S49). Furthermore, techniques
like single cell recording, involve invasive interventions, such as implanting electrodes
into the brain, that can alter the functioning of the system. The same could be said about
the manipulations involved in the production and analysis of neuroimaging data: they
distort the data so that the data fail to reflect the full spectrum of causal factors that give
rise to the phenomena of interest. In this way, these techniques “… provide a very
selective and distorted perspective on the phenomena” that they are used to investigate (p.
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S49). Bechtel argues that this is not necessarily a problem for inferences in neuroscience,
as these differences can be, and are, leveraged to strengthen inferences and develop better
theories. Each technique is able to answer specific questions about the relationship
between brain activity and cognitive functioning. Taken together, they provide a more
complete picture of the phenomena involved in the production of the data. For instance,
where single cell recordings are limited to providing information about the function of
specific pieces of the brain, neuroimaging can provide information about more
widespread network-level activity (p. S54-5). The results of different techniques are
complementary as each provides information about the target phenomena that the others
cannot.
The same can be said of multiple analysis techniques as used to aid in the interpretation
of neuroimaging data. Data analysis techniques transform data by suppressing some
features and highlighting others in order to isolate a data pattern. The usefulness of a data
pattern is its interpretability when compared to the often-complex data sets it is derived
from. This is especially true in neuroimaging research, where data sets are large, and
measurements are indirectly related to the phenomena neuroscientists are interested in
learning about. Analysis techniques like subtraction and pattern classification analysis are
used to pick out specific patterns in the data that are informative about some, but not all,
aspects of the phenomena involved in its production. Data patterns do not reflect the full
range of causal factors involved in the data’s production that are relevant to the
phenomena of interest. In other words, data patterns are selective distortions of the data.
Multiple data analysis techniques do not provide independent lines of evidence as much
as they clarify the evidential import of the data with respect to claims about phenomena
by virtue of the distinct, and distorted, perspectives they make available to investigators.
Neuroimages and the machine learning classifier’s accuracy at discriminating between
conditions are each the product of a process that distorts the data. Each analysis result is
an isolated data pattern that reveals specific features of the data set at the expense of
being informative about other features. Distinct patterns warrant different claims about
the data, which in turn can be explained by appeal to claims about phenomena. Their
individual value is in their explicability, and their collective value in their distinctiveness.

144

While each analysis technique may require assumptions of the data that are potentially
false, and the manipulative process itself invites a variety of alternative explanations for
the pattern, the collection of multiple distinct patterns softens the impact of these
complications. As argued above, data patterns are not used to infer claims about
phenomena but are used to make claims about data and assess its value as evidence for
claims about phenomena. The distinctiveness of a collection of data patterns provides a
richer explanatory target than a single data pattern. Viable alternative explanations for a
data pattern may be readily available when only one pattern is considered, but to remain
viable the alternative must not be ruled out by another pattern in the data. The
distinctiveness of the patterns improves the capacity of a large collection of them to rule
out alternatives in this way, and their collective explanation provides resistance against
alternatives not explicitly considered by the investigators.
This process has epistemic advantages, as discussed above and in the second and third
chapter, but also brings with it risks, as demonstrated in the fourth chapter. Viewing the
process of data interpretation as explanatory, and aimed at explaining data patterns,
provides conceptual resources — and a perspective — that can aid in disentangling the
various factors that contribute to inferences from data as complex, varied and difficult to
make sense of as neuroimaging data. I have shown as much with this collection of work,
but there is much more work to be done. Especially as the technologies and tools for
handling, manipulating, analyzing and sharing neuroimaging data continue to rapidly
evolve.

5.4

Looking Forward

I have focused, with the exception of chapter four, on the positive contribution data
analysis makes to the interpretation of neuroimaging data. On the other side of the coin
are the inferential errors and reasoning mistakes that these techniques and the explanatory
process they contribute to, make possible. The increasing variety and complexity of
analysis procedures can lead to inferential errors or the misinterpretation of data in a
number of ways. Errors can be made in the data manipulations themselves, as a recent
paper showing that a significant number of neuroimaging studies may be the product of
systematic errors in standard analysis software and pipelines demonstrates (e.g., Eklund
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et. al. 2016). Errors can also arise when investigators’ understanding of the analysis
technique misrepresents its actual function. More generally, some have raised a concern
that the emphasis on greater sophistication in analysis may slow progress since a strict
focus on data creates distance between researchers and the material objects and
phenomena they are investigating. Familiarity with and close proximity to the material
objects under study has historically been important for inspiring the ideas that have
marked significant leaps of progress in the history of neuroscience (Marder 2015), and
has been identified as necessary for the effective interpretation of data in general
(Leonelli 2013). However, the work here shows that familiarity with the data analysis
techniques is equally important for shaping intuitions informing judgements about the
relevance of data patterns, the claims they warrant about the data, and explaining them by
appeal to claims about phenomena. Concerns about analytic flexibility, such as those
raised by Joshua Carp (2012), draw attention to inferential errors that can occur due to
decisions made in the course of implementing a data analysis technique. These kinds of
decisions have more impact when they pertain to pre-processing steps, which affect all
subsequent analyses of the data, then if they occur in the interpretive stage where they
only affect one data pattern. Analytic flexibility could also lead to prematurely ending
data interpretation because the data patterns isolated first do not provoke alternative
explanations, making the data appear to better support the target claim than it may have if
other data patterns had been isolated.
All of this points to an epistemic tension in the development and uptake of novel
techniques for analyzing data. On one hand, new techniques can clarify the evidential
import of data with respect to competing claims and hypothesis and promote the
discovery and study of phenomena previously impossible to detect in a data set. On the
other, new analysis techniques have the potential to lead a field towards the ever more
sophisticated production of misleading results. This situation is even more precarious in
neuroimaging research, where the data sets investigators work with consist in a large
number of variables — every six seconds a subject is in the scanner can result in over a
thousand data points — and have relatively low power due to low participant counts, and
limitations of experimental paradigms. Factor in the increasing variety of approaches to
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data analysis, and there are sufficient grounds to argue that neuroimaging research is “…
a ‘perfect storm’ of irreproducible results” (Poldrack et al 2017).
A common proposal for addressing this situation is to foster reproducible research
practices. Reproducible practices are those which allow independent investigators to
reconstruct the data analysis process using publicly accessible materials. Suggestions for
doing so include sharing data, algorithms, analysis code, and the pre-registration of
research plans (Poldrack et al 2017; Munafò et al 2017). The ideal reproducibility aims at
is a practice in which independent investigators can reconstruct the data interpretation
procedures that lead to the results of articles published by their peers. While the first step
towards fully reproducible practices is to make data and the code used to analyze it
accessible, achieving the ideal depends on the ability of investigators to identify, and
contrast, the rationale for the decisions made at each step of the process. Disputes such as
the case examined in chapter four show how doing so can be informative. Open
discussion allows for errors in reasoning due to the misunderstanding of data analysis
techniques, and mistaken judgements of data’s relevance to a claim, to be unearthed and
articulated. While it may not resolve the disagreement between the involved parties, the
ability to reproduce the conceptual elements of the interpretive process is necessary for a
practice to be fully reproducible. These factors permeate the interpretation process, and
so may have a greater influence on the judgement of data’s significance than the
manipulations of the data themselves.
New tools and techniques for the analysis, handling, storing and classification of data are
being developed and promoted in response to limitations of neuroimaging research
methods, and the growing volume and complexity of both the data, and knowledge,
produced by neuroscientific research. These tools include automatically curated databases
that allow users to perform large-scale, automated meta-analyses, such as NeuroSynth
(Yarkoni et al 2011), data repositories designed to handle the full complexity and
diversity of neuroimaging data produced in experiments, such as OpenfMRI (Poldrack et
al 2013; Poldrack and Gorgolewski 2015), and frameworks that support and facilitate the
development of a community-driven knowledge base, or ontology, such as the Cognitive
Atlas (Poldrack et al 2011). Critical analyses that examine how the interface between
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data, theories, and communities, are changing and have been changed by these
technologies will contribute to philosophical debates and could improve neuroscientific
practice. The arguments of the preceding papers, the approach presented above, and a
method of research that includes close interactions with scientists, provides a foundation
for pursuing this investigation in a manner that could prove valuable for improving the
inferential practice of those using these new techniques.
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